THE UNIVERSITY *of* EDINBURGH

State of Affairs Dynamics in Prose Fiction

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1994

Declaration

I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself.

Tatsuaki Tomioka

Edinburgh, 20th April 1994

Acknowledgements

In this thesis many examples are cited from Joyce's *Dubliners*, and there is a good reason for this. When I first came to Edinburgh in 1985 as an ACES (Advanced Certificate in English Studies) student, my interest in stylistics and narrative poetics was sparked by Mrs Elizabeth Black, who made me appreciate the depth and the richness of *Dubliners* as a narrative text. As I went on studying it, after going back to Japan, I became more and more convinced of how each of the fifteen stories in that work is characterised by its peculiar flavour, which can be of inexhaustible narratological interest. And I was also convinced that *Dubliners* as a whole covers almost every item worth noting in stylistics and narrative poetics. This made me decide, when I came back to Edinburgh in 1990, to research further into *Dubliners*, as well as other literary works, and write a thesis involving many observations concerning them. Therefore, my greatest debt of all is to Mrs Elizabeth Black, who took the trouble to read the draft over and over again with immense patience and tolerance and made invaluable and enlightening suggestions, and recommended improvements; without her guidance the present thesis would not have been as it is. My warm thanks should also go to Professor Alan Davies and Mr Keith Mitchell. How often their penetrating and revealing commentaries helped me realise where I could and should make more effort to make this thesis look better. And finally, many thanks to my wife Kumiko Tomioka, and my children, Sumire and Tetsuo, for support which goes beyond the merely academic.

Abstract

This thesis is a linguistic/ontological inquiry into narrative dynamics. Particular attention is drawn to elucidating the mechanism for recognising story events as one reads narrative discourse.

The overall discussion is a criticism of formal approaches to narrative dynamics which tend to make observations on the assumption that there is a fixed relation between language form and meaning (e.g. the distinction between events and non-events in narrative circumstances). As two possible factors responsible for preventing formal analysts from taking an elastic view of story-event structure in narrative, I point out overly metalinguistic and metatemporal attitudes held by many narrative poeiticians, grammarians and formal semanticists. The recognition of narrative dynamics is primarily concerned with our concept of time, so that this thesis focuses a good deal of attention on explicating how time can be conceptualised in narrative. The basic component of the argument, therefore, is made up of ontological observations concerning time, event, and change, which are mainly made in Chapters 3 and 5.

This thesis concludes that overly metalinguistic and metatemporal approaches to narrative dynamics tend to be fallacious, and that it is the commonsensical view that counts in the recognition of the event structure in narrative discourse. A hypothetical stance I adopt in constructing a narrative theory is the viewpoint of the ordinary reader of narrative fiction who is not formally trained, and therefore, does not necessarily respond to narrative texts in a highly metalinguistic or metatemporal way. The importance of assuming the ordinary reader's viewpoint for the proper recognition of the story-event structure of narrative is referred to in many different respects throughout the thesis.

Notational conventions

Italics are used for emphasis (e.g. In order to recognise this, what might be termed *the downgrading principle* will be required).

' ' single quotation marks are used for citing sentences, words (e.g. Common sense will argue against the view that 'John was handsome' contributes to making the reader feel story-event dynamics at work).

" " double quotation marks are used to represent non-literal meanings (e.g. On such occasions the story world becomes "transparent" to the reader).

This thesis notationally distinguishes between 'now' and NOW: 'now' is used when *now* as a linguistic form is referred to (e.g. The temporal adverb 'now' can co-occur with this sentence); whereas NOW is used to represent the meanings of presentness (e.g. This state of affairs can be said to constitute a significant NOW).

The following abbreviations are used for speech form and perspectival categories:

<Speech form categories>

NRS/TA	Narrative Report of Speech/Thought Acts
ID	Indirect Discourse

FID	Free Indirect Discourse
DD	Direct Discourse
FDD	Free Direct Discourse

<Perspectival categories>

EPED	Existential-Perspective Event Description
EPD	Existential-Perspective Deictics
RPED	Reporting-Perspective Event Description
RPD	Reporting-Perspective Deictics

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Appendix

Introduction

'What is story event?' 'What is narrative time?' or *'What is narrativity?'* - these are the principal problems to be discussed in the present thesis. One will soon recognise that the three questions posited above are all concerned with what might be termed 'narrative dynamics'. A possible answer to the question: 'What is this thesis about?' would be: 'It is a study of narrative dynamics'.

It seems that in the so-called narrative theories there are many things taken for granted. At first glance, the individual items assumed to be true may seem to vary according to who you are, a narrative poetician or a formal semanticist, a grammarian or a logician, but it often happens that on closer examination those seemingly different items turn out to be based upon a common set of attitudes or principles. They might be referred to as unduly metalinguistic and metatemporal attitudes to narrative discourse.

Needless to say, a narrative theory must be a product of metalinguistic and metatemporal approaches to narrative discourse, simply because it deals with narrative, which is a particular form of temporal discourse, as the subject matter. The present study is no exception, since it looks into narrative dynamics. In this respect, one might be able to say that being metalinguistic and metatemporal is to be taken for granted in the study of narrative.

The present thesis does not dismiss metalinguistic/metatemporal approaches to narrative as entirely misleading or useless, but attempts to see how valid or invalid such formal views of narrative can be in recognising or explicating narrative dynamics properly. The most immediate reason that has made me decide to write this thesis is that I have always had an

impression that, with the dynamic structure of narrative, the observations made by existing narrative theories tend to be counterintuitive due mainly to their overly formal views of narrative entities.

Of the two above-mentioned attitudes prevalent in narrative theories about the dynamic structure of narrative discourse, the metalinguistic one means what might be called 'rigid formalism', which pays perhaps too much attention, mainly from a grammatical or semantic point of view, to the "structural meaning" of a particular clause or sentence as a discrete syntactic unit representing narrative dynamics. What is observable there is a kind of mechanical fusion of form (grammar) and content (meaning); the assumed principle is that a particular grammatical form inherently designates a particular structural meaning . To be more specific, formal theorists tend to see a strong parallel between particular formal (syntactic and aspectual) characteristics and eventhood/statehood (e.g. the contention that the progressive form (-ING form) of a verbal predicate designates a state), which, as will be discussed later, can fail to identify story events in a commonsensical way. Besides, their formal rigidity tends to fall into rigid relativism, which is liable to consider the problem of event-sequence dynamics of narrative on the microscopic basis of two adjacent clauses. The central aim of this thesis is to argue that such rigid and mechanical formalism cannot necessarily capture the dynamics of narrative discourse as a linguistic and ontological organism.

The metatemporal attitude, which is intimately associated with the metalinguistic one mentioned above, concerns the way in which *time* is generally conceived of. By referring to the fact that time tends to be reified or objectified in our everyday life, it will be made clear that the kind of time that is principally dealt with in temporal discourse analysis is what might be called 'meta-time' (which I will later call *time in the time-point A-series*).

Our discussion will reveal the ontological fact that meta-time is quantitative, objectively measurable, and abstract in its nature. Meta-time is a kind of time that might well be thought of as 'time itself'. It is a time with respect to which mentioning *duration* (in the physical sense of the term) is most immediately relevant, and which is normally discussed in such contexts as 'time and tense' in linguistic fields or 'time theory' in metaphysical circumstances. What is highlighted by doing so is the presence of 'object-time', as another kind of time, that is qualitative, subjective, and concrete/substantial in its nature (which will be later called *time in the significant A-series*). Perhaps the most salient feature of object-time is its *existentiality,* which is deeply involved with the sense of presentness or now-ness that we can feel inseparably attached to a particular state of affairs in a significant way as we go along in everyday life.

It is later shown that narrative concepts such as story events, narrative time or narrativity are less concerned with meta-time than with object-time, and that this is one of the main reasons why existing narrative theories, which are apt to conceive of narrative dynamics mainly in terms of meta-time, tend to make rather counterintuitive observations concerning story-event dynamics in narrative discourse.

Methodologically, the present thesis aims at making a practical blending of linguistics and ontology. From a linguistic point of view, what is focused upon is the investigation of the relationships between sentential-aspect and eventhood/statehood, and from an ontological point of view, special attention is drawn to the intrinsic characteristics of time, event or change. When we say this thesis is partly an ontological approach to narrative dynamics, we mean that, from a general point of view, it deals with time, event or change as particular forms of existence in nature. The general orientation of this thesis is toward mitigating overly formal (grammatical) or ontological views

of narrative dynamics. It will be pointed out that ontological literalness can be as misleading and dangerous as formal literalness in identifying the dynamic structure of narrative, which is primarily the product of particular kinds of discoursal conditions, which might be called 'discoursal environments' as an amalgam of semantic, grammatical and pragmatic elements.

The overall objective of this thesis is to reveal the formal characteristics of narrative fiction as event description. The reason why fictional narrative, rather than historical narrative, is dealt with as the subject matter is that the former intrinsically presents a peculiar problem to the reader with respect to *focalisation* or point of view, which to a considerable degree concerns the interpretation of event-sequence dynamics, the investigation of which is the principal task of the present study.

This thesis is a theoretical work on narrative dynamics, which is inevitably a metalinguistic or metatemporal product. This means that it contains many technical and special terms which are familiar to formally-trained people such as grammarians, semanticists, or stylisticians, but which must be quite unfamiliar to the common reader who, for example, reads literary works for fun. What is to be stressed here, however, is that this thesis does not try to account for what formally-trained people will intuitively feel is right, by employing a lot of technical terms. It will soon be found, as discussion develops in the present work, that a good deal of attention is focused on making an inquiry into a commonsensical view of narrative dynamics. When I refer to the reader of narrative fiction in this thesis, I have no special type of reader in mind; my primary concern is to construct a narrative theory which can explain, from a commonsensical point of view, the ordinary reader's intuitive recognition of narrative dynamics. Therefore, much emphasis is placed upon clarifying the nature of

commonsensically - not esoterically - conceptualised entities such as story, narrative, story event, and narrative time. This thesis consists of six chapters. The content of each chapter is as follows.

Chapter 1 is intended as a review of some relevant theoretical concepts posited by narrative poeticians; the items to be spotlighted are the ontological concept of eventhood or story events suggested in the traditional scheme of the fabula/sjuzhet dichotomy. The problems of 'narrative modes' and 'narrative elements' are also discussed.

Chapter 2 is a review of the formal semanticists' conceptualisation of eventhood/statehood. The main items to be looked at critically are counterintuitive aspects of their metalinguistic and metatemporal attitudes to narrative dynamics. This chapter is a preliminary to Chapters 5 and 6, which attempt to emphasise the importance of mildly metalinguistic attitudes and object-time approaches for the detection of event dynamics in narrative discourse.

Chapter 3 attempts an ontological discussion of the nature of time, event and change. The main purpose of this chapter is to clarify the notion of 'narrative time' as a simulation of time in the real world. The discussion offers a theoretical basis which will help to avoid the commonly observable confusion between linguistics and ontology with respect to the so-called "narrative time progression/suspension". And the introduction of the contrast between meta-time and object-time will be another theoretical basis which will help to explain how narrative dynamics can be properly perceived.

The main concern in Chapter 4 is to give the right place to fabula in contrast to sjuzhet as its counterpart, on the assumption that the fabula-sjuzhet

scheme is closely associated with the recognition/detection of story events. The possibility of regarding fabula in fiction as a mental construct by the reader will be suggested. Another important aim of Chapter 4 is to discuss the problem of narratorial perceptibility regarding event description in narration and speech/thought presentation. I attempt to reformulate the traditional scheme of narratorial presence in terms of the way in which the narrator is perceptible as the event cogniser.

Chapter 5 is mainly a linguistic investigation of the relation between perspective, aspect, and the event/non-event distinction. Particular attention is paid to the problem of narrative perspective or narrativity; temporal immediacy and distance as perspectival values will be concentrated upon. In this chapter the theoretical drawbacks of meta-time approaches employed by formal semanticists will be explicated.

Chapter 6 contemplates the problem of event-sequence in narrative fiction. Both microscopic and macroscopic inquiries are attempted. The central aim of this chapter is to see how graphological linearity is related to the sequence of story events in narrative discourse. Discoursal criteria will be postulated for distinguishing *story-line events*, which contribute to the plot progression, and *background discourse*, which does not. And by pointing out the legitimacy of unifying a chunk of discourse as a particular story event, I make it clear that adjacency-minded approaches to narrative dynamics have their limitations, and that the proper recognition of narrative dynamics requires a more or less macroscopic view of discourse.

Chapter 1 On the concept of eventhood in narrative poetics

This chapter looks into the ways in which *story event* is generally viewed by narrative poeticians. Particular attention will be drawn to the traditional dichotomy between fabula and sjuzhet, introduced by Russian formalists. Some theoretical problems will be pointed out.

1.1 Fabula and sjuzhet

1.1.1 The traditional dichotomy

Narrative poeticians have traditionally worked with the two domains of inquiry, i.e. fabula and sjuzhet, introduced by the Russian formalists (Propp, 1968; Tomashevsky, 1965; Shklovsky, 1965 etc.). Their English counterparts are story and discourse (Chatman, 1978). Wales (1990: 169) defines fabula as 'the DEEP level, the abstracted chronological or logical ordering possible of the events', and sjuzhet as 'the SURFACE level with the actual sequence of events as narrated'. (The deep-surface contrast between fabula and sjuzhet is analogous, as Toolan points out (1988: 12), to the syntactic distinction between 'deep structure' and 'surface structure' introduced by Chomsky (1957, 1965), but Toolan admits the weak point of this analogy by saying: 'Here the Chomskyan analogy is weakest, since clearly most narrative transformations are not so much transformations as elaborations and enrichments, a fleshing-out of the basis story stuff' (Toolan, *op. cit.*: 13)). Danow (1986: 248) says that fabula is 'the chronological order of material prior to its aesthetic reorganisation', and that sjuzhet is 'the writer's redistribution of events and, therefore, the rearrangement of the chronological order according to a narrative plan seeking to achieve a series of calculated effects'. Culler (1981: 171), referring to the nature of

narrative, remarks almost the same thing as Wales and Danow:

> Narrative reports sequence of events. If narrative is defined as the representation of a series of events, then the analyst must be able to identify these events, and they come to function as a nondiscoursive, nontextual given, something which exists prior to and independently of narrative presentation and which the narrative then reports.

The accounts of fabula and sjuzhet given by Wales, Danow and Culler seem to connote the sequential relationship between the two entities. 'And' in 'fabula and sjuzhet' has a sequential meaning, which is almost the same as 'then' or 'and then'. Metaphorically speaking, fabula is the raw material to be processed, whereas sjuzhet is the finished product. This theoretical dichotomy seems to implicate the impossibility of the reverse order from sjuzhet to fabula, just as the "reverse flow" of time does not make any sense in the world in which we live.

The fabula-sjuzhet scheme can be also construed as based upon the dualistic distinction between so-called "objectivity" and "subjectivity". According to the dualistic view, fabula is an objectively isolatable or specifiable entity, whereas sjuzhet is a subjectively tinged or coloured product. Tomashevsky, one of the early users of the fabula-sjuzhet distinction, indicates the objective-subjective contrast by saying, 'the story is "the action itself," the plot, "how the reader learns of the action" '(1965: 67). In his scheme reality is also associated with the fabula side and fictionality with the sjuzhet side, which is suggested in: 'Real incidents, not fictionalised by an author, may make a story. A plot is wholly an artistic creation' (*ibid.*: 68). Almost the same view is observable in Toolan (*op. cit.*: 10) with respect to story (or fabula):

> Story seems to focus on the pre-artistic, genre- and convention-bound

> basic event-and-character patterns of narrative, with scarcely any room for evaluative contrasts or discriminations - *a level at which authorship seems an irrelevant concern* (italics are mine).

Rimmon-Kenan's definition of story also seems to recognise the objective/subjective dichotomy in fabula and sjuzhet (1983: 3): 'Story designates the narrated events, abstracted from their disposition in the text and reconstructed in their chronological order, together with the participants in these events'. In the following few sections the nature of such a theoretical stance implicated by the fabula-sjuzhet scheme will be looked at rather critically.

1.1.2 The constituents of fabula

This section starts by asking - 'Exactly what are the constituents of fabula?' and 'In what manner do they exist?' The status of fabula as a theoretical construct is, as we will see, not as stable as it looks. One common view is that fabula consists of events. Wales (1990), as we saw in the last section, refers to the existence of events on the two different levels, i.e. deep (fabula) and surface (sjuzhet). Culler (1981) and Danow (1986) can be said to share almost the same view. Toolan (1988) and Rimmon-Kenan (1983) can be distinguished from the three people mentioned above in that they are considered to have a different assumption with regard to the possible contents of fabula. Toolan defines fabula as:

> a basic description of the fundamental events of a story, in their natural chronological order, with an accompanying and equally skeletal inventory of the roles of the characters in that story (1988: 9).

In a different place in the same work he argues: 'Story is the basic unshaped story material and (with qualifications) comprises *events, characters* and

settings' (italics are mine). Rimmon-Kenan also refers to the existence of 'participants' as distinct from 'events' at the level of fabula (1983: 6), but her idea of the constituents of fabula seems to be slightly confusing when she mentions participants somewhere else as if they are a part of story events: 'Story designates the narrated events... together with the participants in these events' (*ibid.*: 3).

As shown above, the make-up of fabula is not necessarily defined in a clear-cut way, but what is unclear is not only the make-up but the nature of the alleged constituents. By the term 'basic description' Toolan suggests a certain embryonic level of verbalisation that is considered to be present at the stage of fabula. Chatman (1978) can be taken as claiming more evidently a certain level of verbalisation in fabula. He is another fabula-sjuzhet dualist, and the most salient feature of his story-discourse dichotomy is that temporal features such as order, duration and frequency are encapsulated into the story side. What is confusing in Chatman's schematisation is that he refers to 'summary', which is one aspect of duration, in his 'discourse' side as well. As referred to in the previous section, Culler might contrast rather markedly with Toolan or Chatman in that he implies that the non-verbalised, objectively identifiable story events exist prior to narrative presentation.

It might be argued that this sort of fuzziness that is almost invariably observable in the discussion of fabula is inevitable simply because what is directly available to the reader is only the "finished" product, that is, sjuzhet or discourse. Normally, the reader has no definite way of inferring exactly how events or other story elements were described at the level of fabula - if any description was ever made.

One underlying concept held by most fabula-sjuzhet dualists seems to be a

fixed direction from simple to complex, or from brief to lengthy, which ought to be recognised in the sequential ordering of the two entities. Fabula is 'unshaped, uncrafted, "unaestheticised" stuff' (Toolan, *op. cit.*: 12), whereas sjuzhet is reckoned to be a result of narrative transformations of fabula. Or more precisely, what sjuzhet represents are 'elaborations and enrichments, a fleshing-out of the basic story stuff' (*ibid.*: 13). One typical example illustrating the job of extracting fabula from the narrative discourse is Propp's morphology of Russian fairy tales. In his famous study (Propp, 1968: org. published in Russian: 1928), Propp gave an inventory of all the fundamental events (which he calls 'functions') in 115 Russian fairy tales (e.g. (1) 'One of the members of a family absents himself from home' (2) 'An interdiction is addressed to the hero' (3) 'The interdiction is violated'). It would be legitimate to say that what can be perceived as a common characteristic in his 'functions' or fairytale-developing actions is a kind of perspectival neutrality or perspective-free quality.

If we understand fabula as in such terms, then it is very likely that the expression 'An apparition emerges from the chimney' might have good reason to be interpreted as a fabula when the expression 'A disgusting apparition was now emerging from the half-broken chimney' is given as the sjuzhet; the first expression may well be reckoned as a simplified, thus more "basic" version of the second one. But one might have difficulty vouching for the basic, unshaped and objectively specifiable quality of fabula when one is obliged to interpret the expression 'John gave a warning to Rachel' as the fabula for the following sjuzhet 'John said to Rachel, "Look, if you go on like this, and if it was made public, you'll lose everything - your money, fame, and life"'. In this particular case, how should and can a "basic, perspectivally neutral" version of this speech event be retrieved or identified in the form of fabula? It seems reasonable to offer any of 'Someone gives a warning to someone else' or 'Someone threatens someone else' or 'Someone

reprimands someone else' as an equally suitable fabula for the sjuzhet given above. The question that arises here is: *How can the basic, objective nature of fabula as the predecessor of sjuzhet be guaranteed or identified?* Or should we think that as far as speech/thought events are concerned, the characters' direct versions which are not filtered through the narratorial voice can be interpreted as part of the fabulas? Then it follows that fabula can show itself, totally intact, on the level of sjuzhet, because in narrative discourse there occur many direct or free direct speeches /thoughts. If so, the theoretical basis of the traditional scheme, which is suggestive of the "temporal sequence" from the raw material to the finished product, will be considerably weakened or virtually collapse. Free presentations of speech/thought events in narrative seem to offer us a good reason to reconsider the theoretical validity of *fabula being prior to sjuzhet* in traditional schemes of narrative poetics. (In Chapter 4 I assume the possibility of thinking in the opposite direction, i.e. from sjuzhet to fabula, taking into account actual and practical situations of narrative writing and reading; what will be emphasised is some practical value of attempting to form fabula as a way of contributing to making story-event typologies.)

This section discussed the fuzzy nature of fabula in comparison with sjuzhet, which looks more stable due to the fact that it is presented to the reader as something directly available. The point of our discussion was, as mentioned above, that the theoretical difficulty recognisable in the fabula-sjuzhet scheme lies in the implicated temporal sequence *from* fabula *to* sjuzhet. The next section looks into how fabula under this scheme can be in the darkness in fictional narrative.

1.1.3 Fabula in fictional narrative

The review of the fabula-sjuzhet dichotomy in the last two sections has shed

light on some underlying notions which can be abstracted from many scholars' mildly discrepant views of the two opposite entities. They can be schematised as follows:

Fabula / story

Events
- non-narrated (considered to exist before sjuzhet)
- basic (perspective-free and specifiable as irreducible facts)
- objective (authorship is irrelevant)
- chronologically ordered

Sjuzhet / discourse

Events
- narrated
- enriched (embroidered and perspectivally coloured)
- subjective (authorship is relevant)
- not necessarily chronologically ordered

Figure 1.1

One thing we can learn from this schematisation is a semantic peculiarity that is perceptible in the relationship between the two entities; they are not opposite to each other in exactly the same way as 'true' and 'false' are. 'True' and 'false', like 'married' and 'unmarried', make *binary antonyms* (or contrasts) (Hurford & Heasley, 1983; Lyons, 1977; Palmer, 1976, etc.). The sense of one item in binary antonyms is totally dependent upon that of the other; 'True' cannot make sense (or exist) unless there is 'false'. In the case of fabula-sjuzhet pair, however, there is no such relation. It seems likely that sjuzhet cannot exist without fabula, but not vice versa. This is because fabula, i.e. the aggregate of core, irreducible events, is generally construed

as preceding sjuzhet in temporal terms.

It should be noted that this dichotomous concept was advanced as a part of the theoretical framework intended to account for the structure of narrative fiction. It might not be wholly unreasonable to infer that the relation between ourselves and the world must have worked as a model based upon which to speculate about the interconnection between narrative and the narrated.

When we talk about what happened in the real world, we usually know that there occurred some events, and that talking about them means verbalising or narrating them from a subjective point of view. In other words, we talk in our own way about "objectively identifiable events". This is the general picture that we think we have in our mind about the linkage between narrative and the narrated events in the actual world. With this in mind, we can have a closer look at the nature of fabula in fictional narrative.

From a pragmatic point of view, fictional narrative presents the reader with a peculiar problem. To the reader of fiction the starting point should be to accept a kind of "as if" situation in which fictional discourse pragmatically places itself. Needless to say, in fiction nothing actually happens; nothing is real about the discourse the reader encounters. The narrative convention demands that the reader take the story events as if they had actually occurred (this holds particularly when the narrative is rendered by what is called an omniscient narrator). Because of this peculiarity with respect to the truth-value of things told in fictional narrative, it sometimes happens that the reader, in the process of reading, is led to become metanarrative-conscious and will find the job of identifying the fabula impossible. This peculiarity of fictional discourse is well exemplified in Muriel Spark's 'Miss Pinkerton's Apocalypse'.

This short story is characterised by a kind of opaque authenticity concerning the story events or the fabula. As Black points out (1989: 281-292), in this story the centre of authority in the narrative suddenly disappears when the "omniscient" narrator is supplanted by the first-person narrator in the final paragraph and the reader is led to feel that what is there is narrative only and that no event described in that story is credible.

The general plot of the story is as follows: One evening Miss Pinkerton and Mr Lake experience a flying saucer's visit. At this point the fabula seems stable and identifiable because the event is represented in what Stanzel (1969) calls 'figural narration' (the narration responsible for the representation of the event is a hetero-diegetic, and extra-diegetic one). But the eventhood concerning the visit of the flying saucer becomes far less credible when the two protagonists offer incompatible views of what they think happened. Miss Pinkerton insists that the saucer was driven by a pilot, and Mr Lake denies the fact. The point in this particular case is, as Black mentions (*ibid.*: 283), that the reference to the presence of the pilot was not made by the narrator but by one of the characters, who, as long as they describe what happened, serve as the I-narrators who are fallible human beings.

From the viewpoint of narrative conventions the opacity attached to this situation can be explained in terms of who speaks. When physical events like 'David whipped Mary' are rendered by omniscient narrators, the reader is induced to feel as if he were actually on the scene, looking at what happened or is happening with his own eyes; the authenticity of what is narrated is not to be doubted. On the other hand, when a character presents an event in his speech or thought, the narrated or described event is inevitably opaque in its credibility. Metaphorically put, the reader, confronted with such an opaque event, might have an impression that he is looking through a coloured piece of cellophane at what the character says happened; the reader will naturally

think that the event presented in such a way might not belong to the real world, just as he might feel the world seen through that coloured piece of cellophane will have a doubtful status as a real image of the world as it is.

This sort of opacity of eventhood invariably occurs when an event is given only through the character's speech/thought presentation, and it is not vouched for by the framing narrator. One good example is Gretta Conroy's encounter with Michael Furey in 'The Dead' by James Joyce. There is no good discoursal evidence which will convince the reader that her meeting or affair with that young lad is authenticated by the authoritative narrator in that story (Gretta's story-telling about Michael Furey can be interpreted as an example of 'character-motivated secondary /STORY LINE/'. See 6.4.6) The reader, feeling suspended to some extent, might think that since Gretta says so, so it must be believed. Note that in that story Miss Morkan's annual dance, for instance, contrasts markedly with the alleged encounter of Gretta with Michel Furey in terms of the reliability of fabula.

Back to 'Miss Pinkerton's Apocalypse', the opacity of the credibility of the eventhood about the pilot driving the saucer is dramatically enhanced when the conflicting views of the event are presented by the two protagonists. If, as the omniscient narrator, the framing narrator had authenticated either of the conflicting views, then the reader, in the light of narrative conventions, would have no difficulty identifying fabula in the story. But the reader is completely puzzled when in the final paragraph an I-narrator appears. If this I-narrator is postulated as the same person with the first narrator the whole discourse in this story can be felt to be a product of a fallible person subject to hallucination. Then the authenticity of the fabula will be gone and as Black puts it, (*ibid.*: 286), this discovery should be the Apocalypse for the reader.

1.1.4 Conclusion

We conclude the discussion about the fabula-sjuzhet scheme by pointing out the theoretical problem involved in the traditional scheme.

As observed so far, compared with sjuzhet, which seems stable enough, fabula tends to be fuzzy and vague as a theoretical construct. The problems with fabula can be summarised as follows. 1) In fictional narrative, an ontological problem may arise when fabula is assumed to be "events themselves" as non-verbalised, objectively identifiable entities that exist prior to narrative presentation (cf. Culler, 1981), because in fiction no events actually happen. 2) When fabula is theorised as a basic, embryonic event description made by the author/narrator, which comes *before* sjuzhet (cf. Toolan, 1988), the problem of its availability will almost always arise, since, normally, what is directly available to the reader is only sjuzhet as the "finished" product.

The ontological aspect of the fuzzy nature of fabula is well exemplified in Spark's 'Miss Pinkerton's Apocalypse', as we discussed in the last section. If that story was classifiable as a so-called 'historical narrative', which deals with events that *actually* happened in the real world, and the events were known to the reader in an objective and off-narrative way, then the reader could safely assume that the narrative as a whole is nothing but a particular recount of the objectively identifiable events which are familiar to him in real terms, despite the conflicting and confusing presentation of the events as a narrative-telling skill. But Spark's technique as a fictional writer has an effect of making the reader realise the implausibility of setting up fabula as "objective events" in fiction.

With 2), it is not necessarily realistic to believe that every writer goes

through the process of organising fabula first, then turning to writing sjuzhet as a "polished" and "aesthetised" product. There may well be some writers who make it a principle to start with sjuzhet-writing, skipping the preparatory phase of thinking up "basic events" in their minds. This suggests that there is no theoretical necessity to set up fabula in the sense of 2) as against sjuzhet in narrative-telling.

It seems that what counts in fictional narrative is that narrative *is* . Of vital importance is the fact that it is narrative discourse that the reader directly and immediately comes across. Based upon the review of the fabula-sjuzhet scheme in this chapter, Chapter 4 will attempt to reformulate the traditional scheme; in the new system fabula in fiction will lose its status as a theoretical necessity as against sjuzhet; instead, it will acquire a new status as a perspective-free variety of story-event abstraction, which can be made by the reader as well as by the narrator.

1.2 Bonheim's 'narrative modes'

1.2.1 The four-mode system

1.2.1 and 1.2.2 single out Bonheim's typology of narrative modes (1982) as a typical example of the mode-chopping taxonomy in narrative studies, and see how linguistically and ontologically confusing a mode-distinguishing philosophy can be particularly in the light of comprehending story events or narrative time properly.

Bonheim claims that there can be recognised four different modes in narrative discourse: description, report, speech and comment. Description, according to him, is a presentation of something perceived by the five senses. Report is characterised by the use of action verbs, normally in the past tense.

Speech can be most easily identified because it is usually equipped with the following markers: 1) the verba dicendi; 2) quotation marks; 3) the present or continuous tenses; 4) the use of the first or second person; 5) incidental mode-switching indicators such as new paragraphs, the use of capital letters, italics, dialects, expletives; 6) shift of perspective, tone or style register. And finally, comment is identifiable when a particular discourse contains evaluative modifiers, generalisations not ascribable to fictional characters or judgements with a high level of abstraction.

Bonheim's typology is characterised by the following two points: 1) the four modes can be embedded into one another; 2) a clear dichotomous distinction can be made with respect to the presence/absence of the temporality and the spatiality in them. Concerning 1), report, for example, can include description, comment and speech. Bohnheim schematises this as follows (1982: 16):

Rep {Des, Com, Sp}

He cites an excerpt from E.A. Poe's 'The Fall of the House of Usher' (*ibid.*: 16):

> Upon my entrance, Usher arose from the sofa on which he had been lying at full length, and greeted me with a vivacious warmth which had much in it, I at first thought, of an overdone cordiality....

He classifies 'at full length' and 'vivacious' as description, and 'overdone' as comment. It is not difficult to see behind this mosaic view of narrative texture the assumption that at the level of discourse report, which represents action itself in a neutral way, can be embellished with different, individually coloured, modes of expression. It is to be noted that such a multi-mode

conceptualisation concerning narrative discourse has a strong resemblance to the dualistic view reflected in the fabula-sjuzhet theory.

With respect to 2) Bonheim's scheme is shown as follows (*ibid.*: 12):

	time	space
report	+	+
speech	+	-
description	-	+
comment	-	-

Figure 1.2

Bonheim's typology, which is intended as a tool for the analysis of the discoursal mode in narrative, has some problems. First of all, the distinction among the four different modes is not clear enough. Particularly, the borderline between report, description and comment seems extremely arbitrary and nebulous, which can be noticed in his remark on the element of volition as a possible indicator of report. He argues that the depiction of waves on the seashore should be a description, whereas the same action, if recognisable as the wrath of Neptune, will be classified as a report because volition is involved there (*ibid.*: 22). According to this criterion, the non-volitional clause 'The door opened by itself' is a description, whereas, the volitional clause 'John opened the door' is to be classified as a report. Commonsensically, the two clauses equally depict some action, so that both of them can be labelled as story events if employed as 'superordinate narrative clauses' (cf. 5.2.9). Therefore, it is virtually nonsensical to distinguish between the two clauses, one as a description , and the other as a report. And the description-comment distinction is also very vague. One would have much difficulty understanding the reason why 'vivacious' is a

description and 'overdone' is a comment in the example given at p.19.

The second problem concerns his concept of temporality and spatiality in narrative. Figure 1.2 suggests the irrelevance of spatiality in speech, but considering the ontological fact that speech is a variety of event, which *takes place* somewhere and sometime, it is not acceptable to assume that space is irrelevant to speech. And one would have to wonder what kind of time he has in mind when in Figure 1.2 he indicates the irrelevance of temporality in his 'description'; for example, the depiction of waves on the seashore, which he calls description, must have something to do with temporality of a certain kind.

The third problem with Bonheim's mode-chopping is its grammatical arbitrariness. According to his system, perhaps report and speech are to be considered on the sentence/clause basis, whereas description and comment may be realised in the form of sentence/clause or phrase, or word. Thus the expression 'John hesitatingly played the violin ' might be thought of as an example which comprises a report 'John played the violin' and perhaps a comment 'hesitatingly'. A very awkward and counterintuitive aspect about such a grammatically messy, Bonheimian analysis of narrative modes is that one will have to say that narrative time "moves forward" in 'John played the violin', but it stops at 'hesitatingly'. One would wonder why narrative time does not stop at 'John' or 'the violin' as well, if it is suspended at 'hesitatingly', since the "meanings" of these words are equally not concerned with temporality. Or a more fundamental question that will arise is: 'What kind of time is it, moving forward and stopping that way? Is it time at all?' All these questions might lead one to ask whether such a confusing mode-chopping is really appropriate for the proper recognition of narrative dynamics or story-event structure.

1.2.2 Narrative modes and narrative pace

Bonheim, who is obviously musically inclined, attempts a stop-and-go type of analysis of an excerpt from D.H. Lawrence's short story: 'The Horse Dealer's Daughter'. It is represented as follows (*ibid.*: 45-6):



Figure 1.3

This representation seems to exhibit some enigmatic elements about the relationship between mode and pace. First, it is difficult to understand why time is considered to move fast (signified in the vertical solid line) in the clausal sequence between the direct speech at the top and the reporting clause

'asked Joe'. It is clear that there is no temporal sequence perceivable between the two clauses. The term 'direct speech' normally presupposes the presence of a reporting clause or a tag, so that claiming that the first three lines consist of two different modes, i.e. direct speech and report is not acceptable in terms of narrative terminologies. Secondly, why is time 'slow' in 'with foolish flippancy', which is labelled as comment that ought to be timeless? Thirdly, what is responsible for the differences between 'slow' and 'slower' in lines 4 and 6? And it is not clear what is meant by 'description leading into report' concerning the discourse starting with 'The three brothers and the sisters sat round the desolate breakfast table....' Finally, with the last part of this excerpt beginning with 'For months, Mabel had been servantless...' one would have difficulty identifying exactly which discourse is 'some embedded description'. And why is the pace 'very fast' if description, which is timeless and does not contribute to the progression of narrative time in his system, is embedded there?

1.2.3 Conclusion

Bonheim's observations with respect to narrative modes and narrative time, as shown above are not convincing enough, and this is because such a mode-mosaic kind of analysis of narrative discourse, which is not uncommon in narrative poetics, seems to stem from a misconception of time or narrative time and from the improper understanding of the pragmatic relationship between narrator, text, the represented world, and reader. These problems will be returned to in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.

1.3 Narrative elements

1.3.1 Characters, settings and events

In 1.1.2 we looked briefly at the possible constituents of fabula, and found that they are not necessarily defined clearly. This section is a further argument of the same problem, but this time not concentrating on the fabula-sjuzhet distinction, but taking narrative as the supracategory. The main concern is to see how events are treated as opposed to other elements or constituents of narrative.

Chatman (1978) posits a division of story events into two items: existents (the characters and the atmosphere) and events (happenings and actions). As we observed in 1.1.2, Toolan (1988) gives events, characters and settings as the constituents of story. Almost the same items are postulated by Rimmon-Kenan (1983), who thinks of events and characters (or participants) as the ingredients of story. Perhaps the most numerous elements of narrative are posited by Bal (1985): the content of her 'fabula' comprises events, actors time and locations.

It would be possible to discuss from two different perspectives the fundamental concepts underlying the chopping-up of narrative into such elements as shown above. One is a genre-conscious perspective. It should be noted that event is inevitably taken as the indispensable element in narrative. The weight given to event, which can be recognised in the way in which it is always a part of the narrative elements in any narrative analysts' idea of narrative constituents, may imply that event is generally assumed to be the essential ingredient of narrative as a genre. The other perspective is an ontological one. What seems to be presupposed is a contrast between objects and events; the former are primarily to be perceived, while the latter should primarily be cognised. This dichotomy is deeply associated with the so-called 'first-order entity' and 'second-order entity' (Lyons, 1977). (We will turn to this problem in Chapter 3.)

A general propensity that is observable in theories or principles of narrative discourse is the attitude toward excessive subdivisions or segmentations of narrative items, which very frequently results in producing unnecessary, ontologically problematic, dichotomies or trichotomies. With respect to the genre-conscious handling of event, the greatest problem is its nebulous quality. In most cases events are merely treated paratactically with other elements such as characters and settings. Each of these elements is given an equal status as far as the way they are treated in the schematisation of narrative elements is concerned. Under such circumstances the essentiality of event without which a particular discourse cannot be classified as a narrative cannot theoretically be acknowledged, however emphatically events are referred to as the predominant elements of narrative. To put it another way, the paratactical treatment of narrative elements such as events, characters and settings presents no theoretical basis upon which the distinctive features of narrative discourse as a genre ought to be fully accounted for.

As far as the second perspective, i.e. an ontological aspect, is concerned, the problem is more serious. Constituents or ingredients of something - no matter what it is - can properly be called such if and only if they are incompatible with, or exclusive or independent of, each other. For example, when a building is made up of wood and stone, these elements do not presuppose or entail each other; they are independent items, so that they are justifiably called the constituents of the building. But what about narrative elements? Are they incompatible with each other? It could be acknowledged that characters and settings are two different elements; they do not presuppose each other. But is it possible to isolate an event itself from characters or settings, i.e. the situation in which it occurs? The answer must be negative. No event can occur in a vacuum; there can be no event itself. An event is unthinkable if it does not involve characters or settings. If one

says that narrative consists of characters, settings and events, it is almost tantamount to saying that the sentence 'John returned' is made up of a noun and a verb, and subject & predicate.

1.3.2 Rimmon-Kenan's concept of eventhood

The last section was a brief survey of an ontological problem about eventhood, which is perceivable in the notion of narrative elements. In the present section we look into the concept of eventhood posited by Rimmon-Kenan (1983); the reason for singling it out for discussion here is that there can be observed an unhappy mixture of two different dimensions, i.e. ontology and linguistics (sentence grammar in particular) with respect to the treatment of story event.

Rimmon-Kenan, like Chatman (1978), refers to an event as a change of state; she argues that an event is 'a change from one state of affairs to another' (*ibid.*: 15). But she rejects the idea of state and event (stasis and process) making up a story, as postulated by Chatman, in favour of the idea that an event can be assumed to be made up of intermediary states. She writes (*loc. cit.*):

> I do not insist on an opposition between state and event (or stasis and process), because it seems to me that an account of an event may be broken down into an infinite number of intermediary states.

Then she gives the following as an example of a succession of states implying a succession of events: '*He was rich, then he was poor, then he was rich again*' (*loc. cit.*) (italics are mine). It is noteworthy that she assumes that an event can be divided into states. This, it might be argued, is a good example illustrating a confusion of the level of cognition and that of linguistic

materialisation. The focal matter of interest in the present thesis is to attempt a theory of time and event which is capable of identifying the second and third clauses in the italicised example cited above as a form of discoursal realisation of story events. The fundamental argument this thesis puts forward is that the event-state distinction is to be made on the *semantic* level rather than on the *grammatical* level. One important implication of this is that the event-state distinction is most directly concerned with the presence or absence of *change*, which is basically a semantic phenomenon, and that event cognition and state cognition are to be conceived of as two distinct cognitive activities. Presumably, the immediate reason why Rimmon-Kenan argues that some intermediary states can be the constituents of an event is that the three clauses she gave as an example are what are often called statives in grammatical terms. This is where linguistics and ontology can be mingled with each other in an awkward and confusing way. Rimmon-Kenan's view of event and state well exemplifies a theoretical drawback commonly observable in overly metalinguistic approaches to narrative dynamics, as we will further discuss in Chapter 2. Here we will confine ourselves to claiming that a proper way of looking at the example given by Rimmon-Kenan is to try to see that the narrator's event recognition happened to be linguistically realised in the sequence of main clauses (excluding the first one) which are *grammatically* labelled as statives; it would be misleading to argue that an event can be turned into, or expressed by means of, a state or states.

Perhaps the most noticeable characteristic of Rimmon-Kenan's notion of eventhood is that she suggests event recognition on a macroscopic level. She claims (and I feel she does so justifiably) that a great number of events in a particular story can be taken up together and construed as a single event (e.g. The Fall of the Roman Empire), and she refers to the difficulty of drawing a clear distinction between event and succession of events (*loc. cit.*). To my

mind, such a notion of eventhood is the most macroscopic and perhaps the most elastic one ever presented by narrative theorists. But the problem is that she never attempts to give a theoretical basis upon which such a macroscopic view of story event becomes possible. Chapter 6 will discuss the possibilities of the macroscopic appreciation of story event under the rubric of 'event unification'.

1.3.3 Gerald Prince's 'stative events' vs. 'active events'

One extreme view of story event can be observed in the taxonomy posited by Gerald Prince (1982). He has encapsulated clauses normally classified as state or description into the event side. He argues that events are divided into two kinds: 'stative' and 'active'. A stative event, he claims, is a state, as can be paraphrased by a sentence of the form NP's V-ing (NP) AUX be a state (e.g. a stative event 'John is learning Japanese' can be paraphrased by 'John's learning (Japanese) is a state': 'John's' can be formulated as 'NP's', 'learning (Japanese)', as 'V-ing (NP)', and 'is', as 'AUX be'), and an active event represents an action and cannot be expressed by a sentence with the form denoting 'state' as above (1982: 62). According to him, 'John was handsome' or 'The sun was shining' are classifiable as stative events, and 'Peter ate an apple' or 'The cat jumped on the table' as action events. He does not give any reason for thinking that way; he only says: 'I am not making distinctions between states and processes, happenings and actions, etc., because such distinctions are not relevant to my discussion' (*ibid.*: 168).

Prince's peculiar concept of story event implicates that the sentence/clause boundary will automatically be taken as the event boundary, which virtually means: 'So many sentences, so many events in a particular story'. He argues:

> There is no upper limit to the number of events that may be recounted in

> a given narrative: one tale may relate fifty events, another one five hundred, still another one ten thousand and so on (*ibid.*: 63).

This sort of overgeneralisation can be said to be counterintuitive mainly from an ontological point of view. Common sense will argue against the view that 'John was handsome' and 'Peter ate an apple' equally contribute to making the reader of narrative feel story-event dynamics at work. Prince's extremely sentence/clause-bound view of story event has some serious problems. Perhaps the biggest problem is that the examples tend to be discussed in a fairly decontextualised manner, and this may be thought of as a rather unfair treatment of narrative discourse. Needless to say, in narrative a kaleidoscopic change of what is called point of view, perspective or focalisation is quite frequent. It is very likely that even 'John was handsome', which might be regarded as a typical state clause in terms of sentence grammar, will have good reason to be interpreted as an event (someone's cognising activity) when context indicates that it is focalised by a character, and actually textualised as in: 'John was handsome!' (The relation between eventhood and focalisation will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 6.)

1.3.4 Conclusion

The general intention of 1.3 was to suggest the two aspects to be attended to in the study of narrative: one is *the narrative world* as a represented world, and the other is *the narrative discourse* as the linguistic medium through which the narrative world is represented. When someone claims that narrative elements comprise characters, settings and events, his attention is being directed toward the narrative world, whereas, if someone says that narrative is made up of stative events and active events, then he may be attending to the narrative discourse in a metalinguistic way. One will easily perceive a kind of discrepancy between the first and the second types of

people. But the problem is that the term 'events' appears in both cases. This seems to implicate the fact that event tends to be confusingly conceptualised both on the semantic and grammatical bases. In order to avoid such an ontological/linguistic confusion, it will be necessary to try to distinguish between *event* and *event description*; the former is to be conceived of primarily in terms of ontology , and the latter is inevitably involved with linguistics, since what matters will be how events are given linguistic expression.

Chapter 3 will be devoted to the ontological discussion of eventhood to clarify the semantic aspect of event, and it is mainly in Chapters 5 and 6 that we will argue the problem of event description with a view to explicating narrative dynamics.

Before doing that, in Chapter 2 we review the formal semanticists' conceptualisation of eventhood/statehood as another example of confusion between linguistics and ontology. We critically look at counterintuitive aspects of their metalinguistic and metatemporal attitudes to narrative dynamics.

Chapter 2 Formal approaches to narrative dynamics

In the preceding chapter we took a general look at how eventhood in narrative is conceived of mainly by literary analysts and referred to some confusion resulting from the failure to recognise properly the relationship between event recognition and its linguistic materialisation in narrative. In this chapter we turn to what might be called 'grammatical notions of eventhood', as against the narrative poeticians' theoretical constructs such as fabula and sjuzhet. The main objective is to examine basic concepts underlying the formal semanticists' treatment of events/states in narrative discourse. Particular attention is drawn to formalists' *metatemporal* and *metalinguistic* approaches to narrative dynamics. As good examples of their metatemporal and metalinguistic attitudes we spotlight 'reference time' and 'aspectual types' respectively.

2.1 Reference times

2.1.1 Three temporal entities

When reading a narrative the reader will inevitably recognise the temporal sequentiality of states of affairs that are being narrated. In other words, it must be impossible for the reader to engage in reading narrative without being aware of the temporal ordering of story events. One could say that a narrative, whether historical or fictional, is so presented that the reader will get the impression of the story time "moving forward". One important contribution to giving a linguistic account for such an intuitive reaction of the reader was originally made by Reichenbach (1947), who distinguished three times associated with each utterance of a tensed sentence. In this section we attempt an overall review of his temporal scheme.

The three different times can be accounted for as follows (Taylor, 1977: 203):

(i) The point of speech, i.e. the time at which the utterance is made.

(ii) The point of the event, i.e. the time at which the speaker asserts the event (or state) described in the sentence to occur (or obtain)

(iii) The point of reference, i.e. the temporal standpoint from which the speaker invites his audience to consider the occurrence of the event (or the obtaining of the state).

Of the three times mentioned above, (i) and (ii) are self-explanatory: they are 'speech time' and 'event time' respectively. What is to be noted here is (iii), i.e. 'reference time', which corresponds to the notion of 'the time that is being talked about'.

Reference times can be specified by means of time adverbials as in:

[2]-1 That accident occurred *at 4 o'clock on September 20.*
[2]-2 *By the end of June* the whole situation had completely changed.

Or they can be co-textually or contextually given with no time adverbials as in:

[2]-3 (John stepped into the room) and turned on the light.

In [2]-1 the reference time coincides with the event time, and in [2]-2 the referencet time follows the event time. Particular attention must be paid to the reference time with respect to the event 'John's turning on the light' in [2]-3. It is worth noting that the reference time needed for the reading of

the event is considered to be located *right after* the parenthesised event (i.e. John's stepping into the room). This means that the reference time for John's turning on the light can be reckoned as immediately consequent upon the event time, i.e. the time the event 'John turned on the light' occurred.

It is to be recognised that there is a strong parallel between the three temporal entities (i.e. speech time, event time and reference time) and the so-called 'clock time' or 'calendar time'. As a matter of fact, the times we have been discussing with respect to the three examples given above can reasonably be expressed in the form of clock time or calendar time. Let us consider [2]-3, for instance. Supposing the speech time is the present time as deictic centre, then the past tense of the two event clauses suggests that they happened before that time (e.g. John's stepping into the room occurred , say, 30 minutes ago, and the event is followed by the subsequent event, i.e. John's turning on the light which occurred, say, 29 minutes ago). And, as we have seen, the event time of a simple-past clause coincides with the reference time of it. This means that the reference times of those two event clauses are the same as those specifically given times.

One important thing to be noted about the concept of speech time in Reichenbach's three temporal entities is that setting up speech time as against event time and reference time is feasible in deictic situations. What we mean by deictic situations is intimately associated with the concept of 'absolute tense' by Comrie (1985: 36). Absolute tense is a tense system whereby one locates a situation relative to the present moment. This means that mentioning speech time in contrast to event time and reference time can be said to be relevant only in event descriptions in actual situations (e.g. the report of what happened yesterday) or in historical narrative. Crucial is the fact that in fictional narrative, mentioning speech time is generally irrelevant, since the tense system in fictional narrative is a relative (or non-

deictic) one (*loc. cit.*) in which the reference point for location of a situation is some point in time given by the context.

For the immediate purpose of the present thesis which attempts to study the temporal dynamics of prose fiction, we can concentrate on event time and reference time in terms of relative tense, virtually neglecting speech time as a product of the deictic tense system.

In the next section we look into the way reference time is generally considered to operate in narrative clauses. By looking at Partee's system we contemplate formal semanticists' view of narrative dynamics.

2.1.2 Reference time in narrative discourse

It is generally assumed that the important function of Reichenbach's reference time can be clearly understood when we see it employed to account for the so-called "forward movement of narrative time". Partee (1984), one of those formal semanticists who claim the crucial role of the reference time in updating the narrative time, discusses the notion of 'just after', or the anaphoric nature of tense, referring to the function of reference time: 'Intuitively the reference time introduced by an event-sentence is located "just after" that event' (Partee, 1984: 254). Another important thing Partee refers to about the relation between events and reference time is that, following Hinrichs, she suggests that events are included in reference times (*loc. cit.*). She illustrates the way in which the narrative time moves forward by using an example cited by Hinrichs (1981: 66):

[2]-4 Jameson entered the room, shut the door carefully, and switched
e1 **e2** **e3**

off the light. It was pitch dark around him, because the Venetian
s1 **s2**

blinds were closed.

(notation: **e** = event; s = state)

According to Partee's system, narrative time progression/suspension in [2]-4 can be accounted for as follows. For the reading of **e1** a past given reference time **r0** as the starting point is supposed, and **e1** occurs within **r0**. This can be explained in a more lucid, everyday manner, employing the notion of clock/calendar time. Concerning the occurrence of **e1** a particular time point or some duration of time such as from 5:50 to 5:51 on a particular day may be assumed as the reference time **r0**. It could be said that **e1** took place *during* that time; this is tantamount to saying that **e1** is included in that time. And then **e1**, by consuming some length of time from the beginning to the end, introduces a new, ensuing reference time, say, 5:52 or 5:52-53 as **r1**, which in turn will be employed as the reference time to interpret **e2**. Similarly, **e2** introduces a new reference time **r2** for the interpretation of **e3**. Up to **e3** narrative time is considered to move forward because of the renewal of reference times. But when the narrative comes to **s1**, narrative time is construed as being suspended, since there is no renewal of the reference time. This situation can be explained as follows. If the time when **e3** finished taking place was at 5:55, then the event triggers a new reference time **r3** for the reading of the following situation. But **s1** can be interpreted as a static situation that holds at **r3**. This means that **r3** is included in **s1**, i.e. the time **s1** is assumed to hold. If one uses the clock-time wording, one could say that **s1** is a static situation at a particular time point after 5:55, say, 5:56 (**r3**), and that **s1** itself does not introduce a new reference time for the reading of the ensuing narrative situation.

The "forward movement of narrative time" concerning [2]-4 will be shown in the following pictorial presentation:



Figure 2.1

(Notation: $\subseteq$ stands for the relation of temporal inclusion (e.g. 'e1 $\subseteq$ r0' can be read as: e1 is included in r0); < represents the 'just after' relation (e.g. e1 < r1 can be read as: just after e1 r1 is introduced).)

This kind of formal analysis of narrative discourse, using the reference time as the key concept, seems to make conspicuous the anaphoric nature of tense in a convincing way. Bauerle (1979) and Hinrichs (1986) claim that it is not tense itself that is interpreted anaphorically but the reference time of tense.

It is to be noted that the fundamental attitude underlying such an analytical approach to narrative dynamics tends to be highly metatemporal and at the same time metalinguistic. The metatemporal feature of reference time can be understood by contemplating its abstractness, which can be conceived of independent of the states of affairs which are referred to as events or states in the discoursal sequence in narrative. And the metalinguistic characteristic is clear in that the temporal structure (or event structure) of narrative is considered on the basis of consecutive main clauses as discrete syntactic units; the reference-time approach can be said to be remarkably sensitive to clausal boundaries in detecting the temporal dynamics of narrative. In the next section we have a closer look at the metatemporal feature of reference time.

2.1.3 The abstract nature of reference time

The aim of this section is to argue that there can be observed an interesting parallel between reference time and "abstract" time. What I mean by abstract time is the meta-time which seems to be taken for granted when one attempts to make an answer to abstract or metaphysical questions such as: 'How durative is the present or now?'.

It is not very easy to understand the temporality of reference time. When Reichenbach (1947: 290) graphically introduced the notion of reference time in relation to the other two temporal entities, i.e. speech time and event time, reference time was conceptualised as a punctual entity (Notation: E = event time; R = reference time; S = speech time):

Simple past: I saw John



R,E S

Present: I see John



S,R,E

Figure 2.2

But world knowledge tells us that the event 'I see John' is usually not punctual; it can be durative enough (it may have lasted for a couple of hours). This sort of obscurity as to whether reference time is a durable or atomistic, durationless entity can be observed in Partee, when she argues that the reference time introduced by an event is located *just after* that event (see 2.1.2), which seems to implicate the intrinsic punctuality of reference time, But she also seems to suggest the durativity of reference time by indicating the temporal-inclusion relation between events and reference times. If

reference times include events, then it might be feasible to take it that reference time can be slightly more durative than the time that an event takes. But when the reference time comes to a state clause, it behaves rather differently; it appears to get punctual.

By postulating the distinction between *asserted reference time* and *assumed reference time* Dowty's interval semantics (1986) seems to try to explain that reference times can be durative, and punctual as well. Dowty contrived the two-fold notion of reference times as an argument against the Reichenbachian concept of reference time which tends to interpret reference times too punctually. He claims that the temporal ordering the reader perceives in a narrative is not merely a consequence of the times at which sentences are *asserted* to be true, but also of the times at which we *assume* they obtain.

Dowty's two-fold notion of reference times is based on his three defining criteria for the three aspectual types (1986: 42):

(a) A sentence a is a stative iff it follows from the truth of a at an interval of I that a is true at all subintervals of I (e.g. John was ill from 2 to 4).

(b) A sentence a is an activity iff it follows from the truth of a at an interval of I that a is true of all subintervals of I down to a certain limit in size (e.g. John played in the meadow from 2 to 4).

(c) A sentence a is an accomplishment/achievement iff it follows from the truth of a at an interval I that a is false at all subintervals of I. (e.g. I listened to a Beethoven's piano sonata from 2 to 2:30).

The punctuality of asserted reference time seems to be hinted by the phrase 'from the truth of a at an interval if I' in each of (a), (b) and (c), whereas

the durativity of assumed reference time seems to be observable from '*a* is true at all subintervals of I' in (a) and from '*a* is true of all subintervals of I down to a certain limit in size' in (b).

Presumably it is Caenepeel's notion of 'symmetrical and asymmetrical referential centres (RC)' (1989: 68-73) that claims in the most clear-cut way that reference times can be atomic intervals, which suggests the possibility that reference times can be minimally durative, i.e. punctual. Her system tries to account for the durativity and the punctuality of reference times, employing Dowty's asserted and assumed reference times. Her schematisation shows that the so-called 'event clauses' has a symmetrical RC. One example:



Example: The train arrived.
Type: culmination

Figure 2.3

In Figure 2.3, [r] is asserted reference time, and [r'], assumed reference time. PP is 'preparatory period', designating a period leading up to the change of state, and Cons is 'consequence', designating a period ensuing after this change of state. Figure 2.3 corresponds to Dowty's aspectual type (c): the punctuality of asserted reference time [r] coincides with that of assumed reference time [r'], so that the referential centre is symmetrical.

And in the so-called 'state clauses' RC is asymmetrical. One example:

<////////////////////// r' //////////////////////>

[P]

[r]

Example: He was tired.

Type: non-contingent states, also referred to simply as states.

Figure 2.4

Figure 2.4 corresponds to Dowty's aspectual types (a). The notation [P] designates 'point' (a particular time point), which introduces a punctual asserted reference time [r]. And the duarativity of r' implicates, for example, that a few minutes before the time point the proposition 'He was tired' was true, and a few minutes after the time point the same proposition was still true. Thus, the referential centre is asymmetrical.

The possibility that reference times can be punctual, i.e. virtually durationless, seems to be hinted at in Partee's temporal system (see Figure 2.1), which says that state clauses surround or include reference times, but it is Caenepeel's system that insists that the asserted reference time becomes punctual when it is applied to statives. She explains as follows this peculiar behaviour of her asserted reference time when it is combined with a progressive, a variety of her 'state clauses' (*ibid.*: 122):

> ...a progressive takes as its input a process, and it describes this process as ongoing or in progress *at a particular point of time, by compressing its asserted reference time into an atomic interval.* (italics are mine).

From a formal point of view, a significant implication of applying the notion of reference times to the analysis of temporal dynamics of narrative discourse can be summarised as follows. Reference times "behave"

differently according to the temporality exhibited by a particular (main) clause. That is to say, by seeing the behaviour of reference times one can distinguish between event clauses and state clauses in a rather clear-cut way.

It can be pointed out that the temporal discrepancy illustrated in the asymmetrical RC by Caenepeel is virtually identical with what has traditionally been referred to as the framing effect. Leech (1971: 17) explains the temporal frame due to the progressive aspect as follows:

> The Progressive Aspect generally has the effect of surrounding a particular event or moment by a "temporal frame", which can be diagrammed simply:  . That is, within the flow of time, there is some point of reference from which the temporary eventuality indicated by the verb can be seen as stretching into the future and into the past. With the Progressive Present, the point of orientation is normally identical with "now", the present moment of real time. But in the Progressive Past, some other definite point of reference must be assumed.

It is evident that the umbrella and the point in the above diagram correspond to Dowty/Caenepeel's assumed reference time and asserted reference time respectively. Particular attention should be drawn to the abstract nature of the asserted reference time. Leech says that in the present tense, for example, the point in the diagram should be looked upon as 'now', the present moment of real time. The question that can be posited here is: 'What temporality is suggested by that 'now'? ' One could easily recognise that this sort of time or presentness is abstract enough to be susceptible to metaphysical contemplation; for example, one may be inclined to ask exactly how long or durative that 'now' can be in physical terms. The abstract nature of that 'now' is clear in that it is not the *time* of the progressivised state of affairs in relation to which that 'now' is being referred to; that 'now'

is something that can stand on its own, as it were, (the speaker's 'now' or something), separable from the progressivised state of affairs. And such abstractness seems to be reflected upon the assumed reference time, as well, which is now assumed to be made up of the three temporal characteristics, i.e. past, present and future, as Leech suggests above by saying 'the temporary eventuality indicated by the verb can be seen as stretching into the future and into the past'.

It is of ontological interest to know that the peculiar nature of reference time, which seems to be perceived in the past-present-future scheme when applied to state clauses, looks irrelevant when it is applied to event clauses. Neither Partee's system (Figure 2.1) nor Caenepeel's symmetrical structure of RC implies the validity or necessity to conceive of reference time in the past-present-future framework of time with respect to event clauses.

One important aim of the present thesis is to argue that the reference-time approach, due mainly to its meta-time orientedness, is not appropriate for the proper understanding of narrative dynamics, i.e. the dynamics of story-event structure in narrative discourse. In the next section brief reference will be made to theoretical problems with the reference-time approach to the temporal structure of narrative.

2.1.4 The counterintuitive aspect of the reference-time approach

In the preceding sections we have observed that in formal terms it is generally supposed that by looking at how the reference time "behaves" in a particular (main) clause, one can judge whether it is an event clause or a state clause. This section attempts to suggest that such a formal and mechanical event-state differentiation can be counterintuitive and non-commonsensical in the light of story-event detection/recognition.

Consider the following example:

[2]-5 (a) John opened the door (b) and came into the room. (c) He was depressed. (d) He lay down on the sofa.

One serious theoretical problem with formal semanticists' approaches to narrative discourse is that cited examples tend to be highly decontextualised. [2]-5 can be counted as one of those decontextualised examples. According to a rather mechanical analysis employing the reference-time scheme, the reference time will be updated in (a), (b) and (d), but it will be suspended at (c); the formal interpretation will say that in (c) the atomised asserted reference time is surrounded by the state verbalised as 'He was depressed'. Thus, the narrative discourse [2]-5 can be said to consist of three events and one state. This analysis, however, will not sound as convincing as it looks if another situation was textualised as 'John was very happy' somewhere before [2]-5, and the reader comes to (c) with 'John was very happy' in mind. In that case the reader will naturally be able to detect some change implicated in (c), which is grammatically (aspectually) labelled as a state, so that he might feel he can construct a typical event clause 'John got depressed' (though not knowing exactly when it was) out of the state clause.

The problem with the reference-time approaches to narrative is that the formal stance employed as the fundamental principle may dismiss the reader's intuitive reaction of that kind as invalid or groundless, since their principle requires that the reader attend to the formal characteristics of discourse and the behaviour of reference times. In other words, formal approaches to narrative dynamics expect the reader to be highly metalinguistic and metatemporal.

I acknowledge that it is a serious theoretical fault if a particular narrative theory cannot identify the eventhood implicated in (c) in a well-contextualised situation as mentioned above. One of the focal matters of interest in the present thesis is to contrive a theory which can be supported by commonsensical views of story events - a theory which can explain the eventhood of clauses like (c) in a contextualised situation. For this purpose the following chapters will concentrate upon the investigation of time, change, the event/state distinction, presentness, tense and aspect, and narrative perspective.

Another problem with the reference-time approach to narrative dynamics concerns the fact that, with respect to the detection of eventhood of speech/thought presentation, the reference-time approach is not necessarily useful and effective. As we will discuss in more detail in Chapters 4 and 6, as a showing of the narrative world, speech/thought presentation ('non-tagged speech' in particular) presents the reader with a peculiar problem concerning the event sequence or segmentation as a meaningful and discrete graphological unit. It is quite normal that a narrative fiction comprises the so-called narration and speech/thought presentation, but traditionally, when formal analysts research into the temporal structure of narrative discourse, they attend mostly to narration, paying very little attention to the dynamicity of speech/thought presentation. This thesis is going to study the eventhood detectable in speech forms as well as narration.

2.2 Aspectual types

2.2.1 Vendler's typology

Our discussion in 2.1 has revealed the two aspects that can be observed in the

formal semanticists' notion of narrative dynamics: 1) reference time is generally considered to play a very important role in the reading of temporal ordering in narrative; 2) a close interrelation can be perceived between the function or the behaviour of the reference time and the aspectual characteristics of main clauses, which can be roughly divided into two different types, i.e. event clauses and state clauses. (Partee's theoretical system illustrated in 2.1.2 has some technical problems; a major one is the rather irrelevant nature of *speech time* labelled **rs** with respect to narrative fiction. This problem will be referred to in Chapter 5). It is about time to shift our attention to the aspectual types which, in terms of the formal analysts' theoretical stance, concern the schematisation of the internal structure of event. The present section looks into Vendler's typology (1967), which can be taken as the most influential one among similar typologies proposed over the years by a number of people like Ryle (1949), Kenny (1963), Allen (1966), Bach (1981), Rescher and Urquhart (1971).

The most salient feature of Vendler's typology is that it attempts to see the aspectual characteristics inherent in the lexical structure of verbal predicates. He sets up 'processes' as the supracategory, and the processes are subdivided into accomplishments, achievements, activities and states.

Verbal predicates like 'build a house' or 'read a book' are classified as accomplishments; they denote heterogeneous processes with successive phases with a natural end point; the end point of an accomplishment is distinct from its other points, so it is heterogeneous.

Achievements are defined as verbal predicates denoting punctual processes; they have neither successive phases nor intrinsic duration, thus they realise a culmination point. Verbs like 'die', 'start', 'hiccough', 'find' are typical examples.

The verbal predicates labelled as activities are characterised by their homogeneous processes which have successive phases with no culmination point or end point. The homogeneity of activities can be explained by the nature of any part of the process being the same as that of the whole. Verbs such as 'walk', 'run', 'speak' can be classified as activities.

Finally, states designate processes without successive phases. States resemble activities in that they are also homogeneous, and like activities, they stretch over an undemarcated time line, thus an end point or culmination is irrelevant to states. But states should be distinguished from activities, Vendler argues (*ibid.*: 106), in that they do not denote any dynamics. Some examples of states are 'know', 'be tall', 'want', 'love'.

Vendler's original classification will be schematised as follows:

processes with successive phases		processes without successive phases	
homogeneous	heterogeneous	punctual	period
activities	accomplishments	achievements	states
run, walk speak	run a mile write a letter	find, win a race	love, know want

This familiar Vendler's scheme of verb-types has been criticised by many scholars for its lexis-orientedness. Caenepeel (*op. cit.*: 65), for example, points out that it is misleading to classify different classes of verbal predicates on the basis of the aspectual characteristics which are considered *inherent* to their lexical structure, and argues for the necessity of the *grammaticalisation* of aspectual distinctions. Mourelatos (1978: 419), one of those who claim the need for the grammaticalisation of aspectual distinctions, explains how the verb 'know', which is classified as a state in

Vendler's system, can be encoded as an achievement when grammaticalised as 'And then suddenly I knew'; he speaks of the insight sense denoted by 'knew' in this sentence.

2.2.3 attempts a general criticism of the grammar-oriented aspectual distinctions, as well as the lexis-oriented ones, but before doing that, in the next section we take a look at a more dynamic postulation of aspectual types - a grammaticalised version of aspectual distinctions - which attempts to interpret the dynamic structure of temporal discourse on the basis of the interaction of the inherent aspectual qualities of the main verb with a number of 'operators'.

2.2.2 Sentence-based classifications of aspectual types

Dowty's interval semantics (1986) can be construed as offering a theoretical basis upon which aspectual types of contextualised main clauses, which are supposed to be more dynamic than Vendler's lexis-oriented classification, have recently been put forward. Interval semantics was originally proposed by Taylor (1977) and extended by Dowty (1979). This theory mainly concerns the notion of the truth-value of a sentence with respect to an interval of time. As shown in 2.1.3, Dowty introduced three defining criteria for the three aspectual types in connection with the notion of the truth of a sentence cconcerning a time interval. The schematisation postulated by Dowty may well be construed as asserting that aspectual types should be a classification not of verb meanings but of sentence meanings. This naturally leads to the view that various sorts of 'operators' (Caenepeel, *op. cit.*: 65) should be taken into account to determine the aspectual class an expression belongs to. Operators can include auxiliaries, certain temporal and aspectual adverbials, and other complements (*loc. cit.*). In addition to these, context also functions as an operator. According to this

dynamic scheme of aspect conceptualised on the basis of the structural meaning/function of main clauses, a proposition 'John play tennis' can be realised as an accomplishment when it is rendered as 'John played tennis', whereas the same proposition ought to be interpreted as a state when it is expressed as 'John was playing tennis'.

The fluidity of aspectual features of main sentences/clauses is well portrayed by Moens' 'transition network' (Moens, 1987: 45):



Figure 2.5

This figure is an attempt to show that almost any verb can occur as almost any category. Take 'PROCESS -- CULMINATED PROCESS' transition, for instance. According to Moens, the transition from a process like 'run' to a culminated process like 'run a mile in less than 4 minutes' adds a culmination point to the original process, and when such a culmination point is added, there can be perceived possible consequences. He also argues that moving up from process to culminated process means moving from the category '-

consequences' to '+ consequences' (*loc. cit.*). Conversely, he argues that with the sentence 'John played the sonata for about eight hours' the culminated process expression 'play the sonata' is here turned into a process of 'repeatedly playing the sonata, so that there is a move from the category '+ consequences' to '- consequences' (ibid.: 46). A more dynamic move from one category to another, and to still another seems to be meant with respect to 'point' verbs such as 'hiccough'. This network would claim that the sentence 'John hiccoughed' belongs to POINT in terms of category, and that the category will change into PROCESS when 'hiccough' is iteratively realised as in 'John used to hiccough', and that the category will further change into PROGRESSIVE STATE when the verb appears in dynamic sentences such as 'John was hiccoughing'

Perhaps the most notable characteristic of Moen's transition network is the contrast between 'basic propositions' and 'expanded propositions' (cf. Lys & Mommer, 1986; Caenepeel, 1986). In Figure 2.5, the starting point of an arrow is assumed to signify the basic proposition, and the ending point of the arrow, the expanded proposition. Thus, the verb 'run', for instance, will be described *basically* as a process verb, as Moens says (*op. cit.*: 46), which stretches over an interval of time and occurs freely with a for-adverbial. But when it is combined with an object like 'a mile' or with an in-interval, it will belong to a different category called culminated process, which is considered an *expanded* realisation of 'run'. (Moens and Caenepeel refer to such transitions from basic to expanded forms as 'coercion'; in this particular case, a process ('run') is coerced into a culminated process ('run a mile').)

The fundamental attitude underlying this typology is a highly metalinguistic one toward the schematisation of eventhood and statehood. This typology is a 'classification of how people describe the world, rather than how the

world itself is' (*ibid.*: 43); it is not intended as a typology of 'real world events', as Moens puts it. What this saying implicates is a kind of strong and rigid connection which he believes exists between particular lexico-grammatical properties and event/state meanings. One ontological problem with such a view is that it may well be thought of as suggesting the "existence" of linguistic/grammatical events or states, besides real world events or states. It should be part of world knowledge that events or states are the phenomena that happen or exist *in* the world. Moens' argument is misleading in that it implicates the possible existence of a closed and specific world in which linguistic events or states "exist". The next section spotlights the ontological and linguistic problems with formalists' views of aspectual types.

2.2.3 Problems with formalists' systems of aspectual types

In 2.2.1 we looked at Vendler's lexis-oriented typology of aspectual types, and in 2.2.2, as an argument against lexico-semantic schemes of aspectual types we observed grammar-oriented aspectual distinctions. What this section intends to do is to point out some fallacious elements that can be generally recognised in the way in which formalists conceive of the relation between aspectual types, which are primarily *semantic* items, and language form (both lexical and grammatical).

What is most noticeable about the formalists' view of aspectual types is the misleading metalinguistic consciousness which is concerned with the problems of *language form* and *language use*. It could be said that, for example, when Vendler classified 'know' as a state, he was metalinguistic-conscious in a fallacious way. A normal metalinguistic reaction to the verb form must have been: ' "Know" is an English verb'. And another normal one must have been: ' "Know", which is an English verb, can be used so as to

designate a state, depending on the linguistic circumstances'. Vendler's mistake was that in making the taxonomy of aspectual types he assumed that there is an *inherent* parallel between the lexical form and the meaning.

Wittgenstein (1953: 128) suggests that meaning is *language use*. We could take it that language has no "meaning" if it is not used. The aspectual distinctions such as achievement, accomplishment, or state can be considered semantic phenomena, i.e. meanings. Note that these meanings are only to be differentiated from each other; ontologically, it should have no meaning to speak of the *basic* or *inherent* meaning of a particular linguistic form, which may suggest the validity of mentioning the expanded or developed meaning of the same linguistic form. The ontological problem with Vendler's thinking was that he failed to notice that he *actually* used the English verb 'know' in a particular way (a kind of mental use) when he labelled it as a state in his system, and that he assumed that the verb 'know' basically or inherently denotes a state. He should have realised that the notion of *basic-ness* can be relevant not to language meaning (use) but to language form.

This ontological/linguistic confusion can be also observed in those who criticised Vendler's lexis-oriented typology and attempted grammar-oriented systems. At first blush, grammar-oriented approaches to aspectual types may seem to emphasise the importance of language use, since they claim that the same verbal predicate can exhibit different aspectual characteristics, depending on how it is used. But the following remark by Caenepeel (*op. cit.*: 65) well illustrates grammar-oriented people's confusion between form and meaning: 'Vendler's taxonomy essentially classifies different classes of verbal predicates on the basis of the aspectual characteristics *inherent to their lexical structure*' (italics are mine). This saying seems to presuppose or take it for granted that a particular lexis (verb form) can have a basic or

inherent aspectual feature.

One good example of grammatical fallacy of this kind is Moens' 'transition network' (see Figure 2.5). Take two verbal forms 'run' and 'run a mile' for instance (cf. Moens, 1989: 46). What can be observed in his system is the confusing parallelism between the formal transition from plain (or basic) to complex and the meaning varieties such as process and culminated process. He argues that the verb 'run' basically designates a process, but when it is combined with an object phrase 'a mile' it expandedly designates a culminated process. But I wonder whether one has to think that way. It may be meaningful to say that 'run' is a *plain form* and that 'run a mile' is an *expanded form* in terms of language form, but it is ontologically illegitimate to contend that the basic meaning of the verb 'run' is a process, and that the same verb can designate a culminated process in an expanded way, according to the grammatical circumstances, i.e. depending on how it is used. My argument is that when one says that 'run' is a process, and 'run a mile' is a culminated process, the two "meanings" are equal in status (the two expressions 'run' and 'run a mile' are equally used in an equally distinct way) and that one should have no ontological reason to think that there is a transitional relation from basic to expanded in the meanings of the two expressions.

It would be useful and helpful to contemplate this situation metaphorically. The English verb 'RUN' can be compared to a postage stamp before use. At this level, one might be purely metalinguistic, thinking, for example, that the verb consists of three letters. (It is to be noted that the fact that the verb 'RUN' comprises three letters is not a part of the *meaning* of the verb). But when one claims that 'run' is a process, he has actually used it; he described a particular state of affairs (belonging to his imaginary world) using the linguistic sign. This situation can be compared to the postage stamp being

postmarked. At this level, the stamp can be said to be connected to the world in a practical way. That is, the verb 'RUN', by being used to denote a process, is connected to the world (whether fictional or real). That the verb has no *basic* meaning inherent to it can be understood by reasoning that when one thinks of the meaning of 'run' one cannot abstract the meaning of 'run' itself with no-one, no-entity, no-where involved in it; the meaning of 'run' is inevitably linked with some concrete or specific items in the world, however nebulous or vague they are as mental constructs (even when one in an abstract way tries to think of the meaning of 'run' as a process, some ghostly entity will "run" in one's mind). And when one argues that 'run a mile' is a culminated process, one has used the English verb in just another way; the postage stamp called 'RUN' is postmarked in a different way. Again, the meaning of 'run a mile' is ontologically unthinkable without some specific world-entities involved in it. In short, the meaning contrast between ' run' as a process and 'run a mile' as a culminated process is comparable to a postmark contrast imprinted on two postage stamps called 'RUN'. Under such circumstances one will find it illogical to say that one postmark (the after-use sign) is a basic one compared with another. In another metaphorical situation, on the metalinguistic level the verb 'RUN' is comparable to a musical score, for example. When one insists that 'run' is basically a process, and that it can expandedly be a culminated process when it is combined with objects such as 'a mile', it is tantamount to saying that New York Philhamonic Orchestra's playing of Beethoven's *Eroica symphony* conducted by Leonard Bernstein is a *basic* performance, and Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra's playing of the same music conducted by Herbert von Karajan is an *expanded* one. Obviously, such saying is almost nonsensical and does not accord with our intuitions.

Thus, the illusory and fallacious nature of Moens' transition network of aspectual types is made clear from a linguistic/ontological point of view. If

it is feasible to point out the misleading tendency in Vendler's lexis-oriented typology to see a parallelism between the lexical form and the meaning (the aspectual property), then it is also possible to refer to the similarly misleading propensity in grammar-oriented systems to see a co-relation between the grammatical form and the meaning. A typical example is the notion of 'progressive state' in Moens' system (see Figure 2.5). The principle reflected in the term is that the progressive as an aspectual property *inherently* denotes a state. Here we can perceive a misleading metalinguistic attitude in the recognition of the relation between language form and language meaning (use). A hidden assumption underlying such a mistaken attitude is that semantic items such as events or states are primarily *formal* phenomena.

One of the focal matters of interest in this thesis is to make an linguistic/ontological inquiry into the nature of story event in narrative fiction. In the course of our discussion it will be clarified that the fundamental criterion for a particular discourse to be identified as a story event is whether it can be considered to indicate some *change* as a part of its "meaning". In Chapters 5 and 6 the change-indication as a semantic test to detect the eventhood of a particular discourse will be applied to a number of differently contextualised progressive expressions as story-event candidates, as well as to other grammatical forms.

2.3 Aspectual types and time in narrative

2.3.1 "Narrative time movement" in Dowty's TDIP

According to Partee (1984), who, following Hinrichs (1986) and Bach (1981, 1986), sets up three different aspectual types of sentences, i.e. events, processes and states (Partee's 'events' correspond to Vendler's 'achievements'

and 'accomplishments', and her 'processes' and 'states', respectively to Vendler's 'activities' and 'states'), event clauses update the "narrative time", while process/state clauses do not, but her theory is not necessarily well accepted as accounting for the relationship between the aspectual features of clauses and the temporal ordering in narrative discourse. In this section, by taking up Dowty's idea of narrative dynamics we shed light upon a problematic facet of the relation between aspectual types of clauses and the so-called "narrative time progression".

Dowty's TDIP (Temporal Discourse Interpretation Principle) (1986) argues that reference times are normally to be updated even after his 'statives' and 'activities' (which correspond respectively to Partee's 'states' and 'processes'). Dowty's TDIP is closely associated with his interval semantics, which, by emphasising the notion of the truth of a sentence with respect to an interval of time, distinguishes two kinds of reference times, i.e. the asserted and assumed reference times, as already observed in 2.1.3. According to him, the asserted reference time is updated after each clause in the following example:

[2]-6 (1) Mary entered the president's office. (2) A copy of the budget was on the president's desk. (3) The president's financial advisor stood beside the copy. (4) The president sat regarding both admiringly. (5) The advisor spoke. (Dowty, 1986: 49)

Dowty explains the temporal ordering of clauses in [2]-6 as follows. Sentences (2) - (4) are statives, which one will expect to be true not only at the asserted reference times but also beyond them; they are assumed to hold before and after both (1) and (5), which can be classified as event sentences. One can account for the updating of asserted reference times after each of these five sentences by arguing that the asserted reference times of the stative

sentences are to be reckoned as the time it would take for a hypothetical observer to get these visual pieces of information. Put differently, the observation Dowty makes concerning temporal ordering in narrative is that a portion of time is considered to be consumed even in statives, because of the conscious effort made by some perceiving entity, and that is why after each sentence the (asserted) reference time is to be updated.

Discussing the eventhood/statehood of the so-called statives such as (2), (3) and (4) in [2]-6 is one of the important aims of the present thesis, and we will attempt to take a closer look at the linguistic and ontological characteristics of statives in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Here it will suffice to point out some problematic aspects of Dowty's argument. His contention that narrative time moves forward even after statives can be controversial in that it fails to pay proper attention to the problem of *focalisation*, i.e. the narrative problem of 'Who sees?'. A danger lies in his sweeping generalisation with respect to the temporal feature of statives. As will be argued later, as far as the quoted example is concerned, it seems likely that the three statives in question are event expressions; a reasonable way of viewing them would be to assume that each of (2), (3) and (4) in [2]-6 includes a matrix clause 'She saw' or 'She realised' at the immanent level. But Dowty neglects other narrative circumstances in which there can be statives for which speaking of the involvement of the character as a *character-focaliser* is irrelevant. One example:

> [2]-7 The village of Marlott lay amid the north-eastern undulations of the beautiful Vale of Blackmore aforesaid, an engirdled and secluded region.... (Hardy, *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* : 48)

[2]-7 may well be construed as a description of setting, which has no bearing upon the character-focaliser's cognitive act as an *internal event* (see

Chapters 4, 5 and 6), so that there can be perceived no narrative time progression there.

And another problem with Dowty's concept of temporal dynamics in narrative discourse concerns the way in which he cites examples. A general tendency perceivable in the formalists' analysis of temporal discourse is a microscopic and decontexualised way of giving examples. In the course of discussion in this thesis it will be shown that the fundamental criterion for a particular discourse to be recognised as a story event is whether the discourse can be considered to represent a *change* of some kind or not, and that the eventhood of a particular discourse is not necessarily to be identified on the microscopic basis of consecutive clauses. This means that the task of story-event recognition tends to require a more or less macroscopic reading of narrative text. In this respect, the above example given by Dowty is unfair because of the paucity of context.

2.3.2 Contingency and autonomacy

A counter-argument against Dowty and Partee can be found in Caenepeel (1989). Her theory of temporal ordering in narrative is characterised by the exhaustive observations of the ways in which consecutive main clauses relate to each other. Her conclusion can be summarised as follows: the reader's impression of the narrative time progression depends on the presence or absence of 'contingent relations' between two consecutive main clauses. By contingent relations Caenepeel means not merely temporal sequentiality but also what she calls 'atemporal factors' such as causality and enablements (Caenepeel, 1989: 119). According to her, the aspectual distinctions such as event, process or state are not directly concerned with the temporal ordering in narrative. An example she gives illustrates this (*ibid.*: 83):

[2]-8 Beyond the window a car starts up, an aeroplane passes overhead. (Lively, *Moon Tiger*: 207)

Caenepeel gives it as an example of her E (event) + NCE (Non-Contingent Event) sequences. She claims that no update of the reference time can be observed here; in this particular case two event structures are arranged sequentially, but the relation between the two main clauses is not contingent but 'topical'. By contrast, she argues that in the following example the consecutive arrangement of two state clauses invokes the impression of temporal update because of the contingent relationship between the two clauses (*ibid.*: 88):

[2]-9 She was nearer to him now [...]. She was level with him, passing him. (Gordimer, *Is There Nowhere Else Where We Can Meet?* : 19)

Caenepeel's system, which emphasises contingency or sequentiality as a key factor contributing to the forward movement of narrative time, is not without problems.

One problem is a counterintuitive observation concerning the contextual change (or coercion) of aspectual features of propositions. According to Caenepeel (*ibid.*: 72), the aspectual type of the proposition:

[2]-10 He hiccoughed

is 'point'; in this proposition both asserted and assumed reference times are atomic, but the asserted reference time is not a culmination, so that [2]-10 does not evoke a contingency structure. This aspectual observation seems to suggest that point clauses like [2]-10 is irrelevant to the update of

narrative time. Caenepeel would claim, however, that narrative time moves forward in the clausal sequence as in:

[2]-11 He hiccoughed, and laughed.

Her system would explain that in [2]-11 the first clause is coerced into a culmination as it is followed by a clause which is contingently related to it. But one might wonder whether it is reasonable to try to account for the temporal ordering between the two clauses in [2]-11by assuming the contextual change of the aspectual type of the first clause. It seems that the proposition 'He hiccoughed' in [2]-11, due to its aspectual boundedness, *autonomously* represents a change (event) by itself, which can contribute to the reader's impression of narrative time progression. It is very difficult to find an ontological reason why one must say that the aspectual change of the first clause in [2]-11 from point to culmination is the immediate cause of the update of narrative time.

Another problem with formal systems like Caenepeel's is that they tend to emphasise the formal characteristics of discourse at the apparent level, so that the immanent eventhood represented by focalised state clauses such as those examples given by Dowty (see [2]-4) is likely to be neglected. According to the theoretical schemes postulated by Partee, Caenepeel, the second clause in the following example would not update the narrative:

[2]-12 John looked out of the window. There was a dog lying on the grass.

What counts with respect to [2]-12 in terms of event recognition is that one cannot deny the possibility that the second clause may be interpreted as implicating an internal event with John as the cogniser/perceiver. If it is

feasible to speak of such internality of eventhood, then one will be justified in assuming that the narrative updates at the second clause in [2]-12, despite the formal feature of the clause which is generally supposed to represent a state.

In order to dismiss the counterintuitive view that the second clause in [2]-12 does not concern the progression of narrative time, one will have to take the problem of focalisation, i.e. the problem of 'Who sees?', into account. We will turn to the problem in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

2.3.3 A confusing aspect of the concept of narrative time

This section points out an ontological problem concerning the concept of 'narrative time', which is usually to be taken as something that moves, stops or reverses in narrative studies.

Moens (1987: 92) suggests that narrative time stops at a stative clause by saying:

> As a result, time does not move forward in a narrative with static clauses, since the stative point that they add to the overall event structure of the discourse cannot become a new temporal focus

He also suggests the reversing of narrative time by saying: 'Time seems to be moving backward here' as an explanation of the event structure of the sentences: 'John fell. Mary pushed him' (*loc. cit.*)

Here we understand that narrative time is conceptualised as some entity capable of moving, stopping, and reversing. Assuming that narrative is intrinsically a representation of a world (a simulation of the real world in

spatio-temporal terms) by means of narration, one will be able to recognise the danger of taking too literally the idea that narrative time behaves like a vehicle - sometimes moving forward, sometimes stationary, and sometimes going backward, since it is ontologically to be acknowledged that time in the world never behaves like a vehicle. My argument is that time in narrative time is to be assumed to be time in the represented world. It could be said that those who treat narrative time as if it were a car or a bus fail to distinguish in a proper way between *narrative-telling* and *the represented world.*

The dual aspect of narrative as an amalgam of narration (discourse) and the represented world will be discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, and before that in Chapter 3 we are going to attempt an ontological discussion of the nature of time, event and change in order to avoid a confusion stemming from the mixing up of linguistics and ontology.

2.4 Conclusion

The general aim of Chapter 2 was to look at the way in which formal analysts conceive of temporal structure of narrative discourse in a metatemporal and at the same time metalinguistic way.

Their metatemporal attitude toward narrative dynamics is well exemplified by the reference-time approach. The peculiarity of the behaviour of reference time can be metaphorically described as follows. When the reference time is involved with an event clause it behaves like a fisherman; it throws a net to capture the event clause (theoretically the event time is supposed to be *in* the reference time), whereas, when it is concerned with a state clause it behaves like a mathematical point - an extentionless entity; it shrinks to a kind of durationless time. An interesting aspect of reference

time is that, when it acts upon an event clause, speaking of the past-present-future division of the event time seems irrelevant, whereas, when it is involved with a state clause, one can refer to it in the past-present-future framework (as far as the assumed reference time is concerned). It appears that the abstract nature of reference time is clearly felt particularly when it is referred to in relation to state clauses. In Chapter 5 the metatemporal nature of reference time will be contrasted with the concrete and *significant* nature of object-time.

The metalinguistic consciousness of formalists can be recognised in their general assumption that there is an inherent parallelism between the lexical/ grammatical form of language and aspectual types as meaning varieties. As we observed, such a formal assumption is somewhat connected with the metatemporal nature of reference time frequently employed as a test to know whether a particular discourse is an event or a state. In grammar-oriented taxonomies of aspectual types particular formal (grammatical) features tend to be associated with the presence or absence of temporal dynamics, i.e. the event-state distinction. It will be shown in the course of discussion in the present thesis that such formal rigidity does not lend itself to the proper recognition of story events in narrative discourse.

Formal approaches to narrative dynmics tend to fail to pay enough attention to the problem of *focalisation*, which can be considered to be an important element particularly when it is necessary to judge whether or not a particular clause, which is grammatically labelled as a stative, represents an internal event (some focaliser's perceiving act). Moreover, a theoretical problem with the grammar-conscious analysis of narrative discourse is that it fails to perceive the eventhood of a particular discourse, which is grammatically a stative, and for which contemplating internal eventhood is irrelevant. In terms of story-event detection, the importance of the recognition of such

eventhood will be emphasised in Chapters 5 and 6.

In the next chapter the nature of time, event and change will be discussed mainly from an ontological point of view. The main purpose of Chapter 3 is to offer a theoretical basis which will help to avoid the commonly observable confusion between linguistics and ontology concerning the so-called "narrative time progression/suspension".

Before proceeding to Chapter 3 we attempt to give an overview of the concept of eventhood which is employed in this thesis as one of the vitally important items with which to explain a commonsensical view of narrative dynamics.

2.4.1 The concept of eventhood - an orientation

The present thesis conceives of event as change of state. This can be accounted for as follows. For example, an event description 1): 'A silence fell' can be taken as representing a change from a state in which 1) does not hold to a state in which 1) holds. As will be observed in Chapter 3, this concept of event, which is concerned with the truth value of a proposition in the lapse of time, attends to the occurrence of change, but is not necessarily interested in identifying the item that undergoes change. Considering the ontological nature of event (or change of state) as a spatio-temporal particular, it is evident that a change is inevitably a change in some particular entity, either real or fictional. I claim that what changes when an event occurs will be clearly understood if one assumes a *property-oriented* view of event. Take 1) for example. If it takes place in a narrative world, then one can speak of a change of the world by looking upon 1) as a new fact, i.e. a "new property" added to the world, since the narrative world with 1) added as a new property is to be ontologically differentiated from that without it.

It is to be noted that the notion of event as change of state outlined above should be distinguished from its "grammatical" versions such as postulated by Fillmore (1970 b: 125), who labels verbs like 'break' and 'bend' as 'change-of-state verbs', and verbs like 'hit' and 'slap' as 'surface-contact' verbs. According to Fillmore, in sentences like 2): 'I broke the window with a hammer' the object ('the window' in this particular case) undergoes some kind of change of state after the event symbolised by the verb occurred, whereas in sentences like 3): 'I hit the window with a hammer' it can be uncertain, from the use of the verb, whether the object has undergone any essential change or change of state. If one takes the meaning of 'change of state' in a "grammatical" sense as postulated by Fillmore, and assumes that event is equivalent to change of state, then sentences involving what Fillmore calls 'change-of state verbs' describe events, while those involving what he calls 'surface-contact verbs' may or may not describe events. Our criterion of eventhood, however, claims that, even if the window suffered no damage in 3), one could refer to a change of state with respect to 3) by attending to the fact of someone called 'I' hitting the window as a property which was newly added to the state in which 3) did not hold. And as for what changed, all the items that are within the spatio-temporal frame in which 3) occurred can be construed as possible candidates for undergoing change. We assume that the concept of eventhood we adopt in this thesis well accounts for a commonsensical - not necessarily grammatical - notion of event or change of state.

Another thing to be emphasised is that the so-called aspectual-type distinctions are not directly relevant to the non-grammatical view of event. Lyons (*op. cit.*: 483) subdivides his 'dynamic situation' into event and process by saying: 'If a dynamic situation is extended in time, it is a process; if it is momentary, it is an event'. There seems to be no significant reason to make such a distinction, considering the vagueness of the criterion, i.e.

the length of time taken by the act. And, as discussion goes on in the following chapters, it will be understood that, with dynamic situations concerned with eventhood, the Vendlerian categories of aspectual types such as 'accomplishments', 'achievements' and 'activities', or aspectual types observable in Moens' typology (1987) such as 'points', 'culminations' or 'culminated processes' are not necessarily relevant to our discussion of the recognition of narrative dynamics. A commonsensical stance we employ in this thesis suggests that, with things as spatio-temporal particulars in the world (either real or fictional), they either *come into being* or *are there from the beginning*, and that there is no other alternative.

Of these two situations the former concerns occurrence or temporal dynamics (eventhood), and the latter concerns existence or temporal non-dynamics (statehood). This is why we think it is ontologically enough to posit event and state as two distinct entities when we discuss the mechanism of dynamics in narrative fiction, which is considered to represent a world as a spatio-temporal particular.

Lastly, one of the most important aims of a narrative theory in this thesis is to clarify the mechanism for perceiving eventhood in the so-called 'statives' such as (c) in the following example:

[2]-13 (a) She rested the nape of her neck against the cool iron bed-rail (b) and fell into a revery. (c) *There was no longer any perturbation visible on her face.* (Joyce, 'The Boarding House': 75) (italics are mine)

Arguing that (c) in [2]-13 can be construed as a story-event description, contributing to the plot progression (or "narrative time movement"), will lead to pointing out the linguistic /ontological fallacy of the reference-time

approaches often employed by formal analysts of narrative discourse. In order to claim eventhood represented in narrative clauses like (c) in [2]-13, we will place a good deal of focus on the investigation of the two facets of presentness in later chapters.

Chapter 3 Time and eventhood

This chapter is an attempt at an ontological discussion of the nature of time, event, and change. Its immediate purpose is to give an ontological basis for describing narrative dynamics in the following chapters, so that reference to the relation between the human recognition of dynamics and the linguistic expressions will be withheld as much as possible, since we think it is important to focus on ontological contemplation first, in order to avoid the confusing account of dynamics recognition that tends to arise from an unhappy mixture of ontology and linguistics (formal awareness). What our discussion attempts to elucidate are: 1) the intrinsic relation between time and change (event); 2) the ontological nature of narrative (story) time as a simulation of time in the real world; 3) the dual aspect of human consciousness of time, which might be conceptualised in the *chronos-kairos* contrast.

3.1 MacTaggart's theory of time

3.1.1 The temporal series

MacTaggart (1927) discusses the nature of time employing the unique concept of 'temporal series'. In this section we take a general look at his theory of time which is said to have made a great contribution to the foundation of tense-logic. Particular attention is drawn to what MacTaggart means by *change* in its relation to time.

One of the most important presuppositions of MacTaggart's discussion is that there is an intrinsic relationship between time and change. He says: 'It would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time involves change' (1927:

11). With this presupposition in mind he posits the following three series: the A-series, the B-series and the C-series. The A-series is a series in which positions in time are either Past, Present or Future. In the B-series each position is Earlier than some and Later than some of the other positions; the relation of *earlier than*, and the relation of *later than* are transitive and asymmetrical. And the C-series is a non-temporal series where things are ordered in a certain way, but with no directionality: one good example will be letters in alphabetical order.

It should be obvious that the C-series is not temporal: the numerals from 1 to 10 do not reflect any temporal ordering. No change can be perceived between, say, 5 and 6, unless the numerals are used in connection with some states of affairs, like the age of a particular child. Note that what will be changed in that situation is the age of the child, not the numerals themselves.

Compared with the C-series, the B-series seems temporal enough, but MacTaggart argues that it is not suitable to encapsulate *change*. He writes: 'If *N* is ever earlier than *O* and later than *M*, it will always be, and has always been, earlier than *O* and later than *M*, since the relations of earlier and later are permanent' (*ibid.*: 12) (*N*, *M* and *O* designate events). According to this permanent scheme, a particular event will never cease to be that event, so that no change will occur. It is to be noted that there is a strong resemblance between the notion of the B-series and Newton's 'absolute time' and Bergson's 'spatialised time'. Bergson says (1910: 101):

> .....We set our states of consciousnesss side by side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside one another; in a word, we project time into space, we express duration in terms of externity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another.

Bergson's notion of spatialised time is not necessarily clear about the relationship between time and change, and that is where it should be differentiated from MacTaggart's B-series, which adamantly rejects the notion of change. As a matter of fact, the B-series is not easy to understand for a couple of reasons. Perhaps the strongest reason is that MacTaggart assumes that it is *event* that changes. When he talks about change he invariably refers to the change of events such as 'the death of Queen Anne' (*ibid.*: 13). For MacTaggart, what changes with respect to 'the death of Queen Anne' is its characteristics, i.e. pastness, presentness and futurity. Such a rather queer concept of change contrasts markedly with a normal, more commonsensical idea that change is to be referred to as the change of things or objects, not of events. It is not difficult to see that MacTaggart's notion of change is associated with a classic, metaphysical problem of unity and separability of *substance* and *form*. The point is whether the pastness, for example, which is construed as the property or characteristic of the event 'the death of Queen Anne', is separable from the event itself, just as Mr Keddy's car is isolatable from Mr Keddy himself. It is quite clear that MacTaggart's standpoint is a dualistic one which allows for the separation of the form from the substance as a rule. Some critical remarks will be made about such a strong dualism in 3.4.

Another factor contributing to the difficulty of the B-series is that it lacks independency as distinct from the other two series, i.e. the A-series and the C-series. As MacTaggart acknowledges (*ibid.*: 30), the B-series can be conceived of only when paratactically, non-temporally arranged terms in the C-series are combined with the A-series which gives to them the directionality from past, present and future, and the notion of change. Presumably, what is most baffling about the B-series is that we have to struggle hard to separate the concepts *earlier than* and *later than* with no change involved from the most familiar, everyday notion of change deeply

connected with the past-present-future direction that is quintessential in the A-series. For the purpose of the present thesis it seems very meaningful to know the difference between the A-series and the B-series, in order to recognise properly the nature of the meanings of time, change, and event, so that we will go on to discuss the nature of the temporal series further.

3.1.2 The B-series and change

To understand the B-series, the following pictorial representation will be helpful:



Figure 3.1

Now let us assume that Figure 3.1 represents a spatial situation. A dog and a horse are located at two different spatial points A and B (the solid straight line can be taken as a particular road of some length). The isotropic nature of space tells us that the two animals exist simultaneously in two different places, and we know that under such circumstances it does not make any sense to say that the dog has changed into the horse; the dog and the horse are *there* in their places without disappearing as long as they stay there.

Now all we have to do to get a clear picture of MacTaggart's B-series is to assume the two spatial points A and B as the two different temporal points, and think of the solid straight line as symbolising something temporal which

indicates that A is earlier than B and that B is later than A. And what matters here is to keep looking at the two animals in the spatial, isotropic sense. The idea that the dog has changed into the horse must be totally dismissed.

Now it is is important to have a clear idea about the notion of change. Russell, in his *Principles of Mathematics* (1903), says:

> Change is the difference, in respect of truth or falsehood, between a proposition concerning an entity and the time T, and a proposition concerning the same entity and the time T', provided that these propositions differ only by the fact that T occurs in the one where T' occurs in the other.

This definition of change by Russell may well be thought of as a formal account of our commonsensical view of change (there will be more to be said about the nature of change; we discuss the problem in more detail in 3.3). It is to be noted that such a notion of change is concerned with *transiency* which can be recognised only by a knowing subject or a subject-of-consciousness that looks upon some entity as existent, perceivable at a particular point of time, and looks upon the same entity as non-existent, and only recollectable at a different time. At this point, it is rather easy to recognise that the notion of change best fits the A-series in which only *present* is reckoned to be real and perceptible. (This is partly responsible for MacTaggart's dismissal of the A-series, time and change as unreal; this problem will be discussed in the next section).

If we apply the truth value theory about change postulated by Russell to the dog-and-horse situation being referred to in the present section, we realise that the temporal nature of the B-series requires us to see that the proposition 'X is a dog' is true at the temporal point A, and that the proposition 'Y is a

horse' is true at the temporal point B, and that it is wrong and irrelevant to claim that the proposition 'X is a dog' is false at the temporal point B. Considering that the concepts *earlier than* and *later than* are after all derived from the past-present-future scheme of the A-series, it could be argued that the B-series is ambiguous in that it is a queer blending of a physical and "objective" view of time on the one hand, and a psychological and "subjective" view of time on the other. Maybe we can find parallel situations in scientific writings which are intended as purely physical and mathematical descriptions of entities such as the orbit of the earth rotating around the sun, but which will inevitably employ expressions of perception when some visual description is required.

The discussion in this section suggests that the notion of change is alien to the B-series, which is a kind of physical concept of time, and that it is congenial to the A-series, which seems to presuppose the existence of some entity that is capable of perception. In the next section we look into how MacTaggart, who claims that change is essential to time, ended up arguing against the existence of time. We will find his controversial arguments spotlight some psychological quality ascribable to the notion of change.

3.1.3 The unreality of time

The most notable feature of MacTaggart's theory of time is that he claims the unreality or non-existence of time. He argues that time is unreal for the following two reasons: 1) The A-series, the only one in which change as the essence of time is possible, lacks independence as a theoretical construct; 2) The characteristics of the A-series, i.e. pastness, presentness, and futurity, which are apparently incompatible, are in fact compatible with each other.

What is it that MacTaggart means by the lack of independence with regard

to 1)? He claims that change must be recognised in such circumstances as the following (*op. cit.*: 13):

> It (the death of Queen Anne) was once an event in the far future. It became every moment an event in the nearer future. At last it was present. Then it became past, and will always remain past, though every moment it becomes further and further past. (my parenthesis)

With this saying MacTaggart suggests an inevitable involvement of some focaliser or viewer of things from a fixed temporal axis which is quintessential in the A-series. This can be known from what he says in connection with the existence of consciousness on the past-present-future series: 'If there were no consciousness, there would be events which were earlier and later than others, but nothing would be in any sense past, present, or future' (*ibid.*: 14).

MacTaggart casts doubt on the status of the A-series as the "objective" and real existence due to its dependence upon a *term* outside the time-series. Concerning the term he only says: 'To find such a term would not be easy, and yet such a term must be found, if the A-series is to be real' (*ibid.*: 20). From context, however, what he means by the *term* might be identified with what he calls 'consciousness'. It seems clear that such consciousness is intimately associated with what Russell refers to as 'egocentric particulars' (1940: 108); he gives the words 'this', 'that', 'I', 'you', 'here', 'there', 'now', 'then', 'past', 'present', 'future' as those of which the denotation is relative to the speaker. Obviously, they resemble what linguists call 'deictics' (Lyons, 1977; Levinson, 1983; Fillmore, 1966, 1970 a; Hjelmslev, 1937; Jakobson, 1957, etc.). (MacTaggart's contention that the A-series can be thought of as real only in its relation to something else, something outside of the time-series, might be very controversial from a metaphysical point of view, since

it suggests a kind of transcendental self which stands outside time; it seems to me that such an existence is not agreeable with our commonsensical idea that everything in the world has no choice but to occur or exist in time and space).

The second point of his argument about the lack of independence, or the contradiction, of the A-series is concerned with the compatibility of pastness, presentness, and futurity. He writes: 'If M is past, it has been present and future. If it is future, it will be present and past. If it is present it has been future, and will be past. Thus all the three characteristics belong to each event' (*ibid.*: 20) According to him, this is a contradiction because the three determinations are not exclusive of each other. Whether it is a real contradiction or not is very controversial again, because what MacTaggart refers to as a contradiction here presupposes a movement of *point of view*. The three characteristics, as MacTaggart himself points out (*ibid.*: 21), are incompatible when they are simultaneous. Moreover, he indicates the lack of independence of each determination in the A-series by arguing that we cannot know the meaning of, say, pastness if we have no knowledge of presentness or futurity (*ibid.*: 20). Apart from a great many discussions and debates that have so far been triggered by what MacTaggart referred to as the contradictory qualities of the A-series, he made a conclusive remark on the unreality of time as follows:

> The reality of the A-series, then leads to a contradiction, and must be rejected. And, since we have seen that change and time requires the A-series, the reality of change and time must be rejected. And so must the reality of the B-series, since that requires time. Nothing is really present, past, or future. Nothing is really earlier or later than anything else or temporally simultaneous with it. Nothing really changes. And nothing is really in time. (*ibid.*: 22)

Reviewing MacTaggart's contention that time is unreal is not necessarily the immediate purpose of this section. Our intention has been to shed light on a vitally important aspect of time and change - which might be described as intrinsically psychological or subjective - by taking an overall view of MacTaggart's discussions. The following section will have a look at what MacTaggart says about the relationship between the A-series and the C-series, and by so doing the enigmatic nature of time, which seems to reject being referred to merely as something illusory, subjective or psychological, will be revealed.

3.1.4 The A-series, the C-series, and our experience of time

MacTaggart reached the conclusion that time is unreal because of the contradictory nature of the A-series, but it is noteworthy that he did not reject all the elements in our experience of time as unreal or illusory. He writes (*ibid.*: 30): 'It is possible that, whenever we have an illusory experience of a time-series, we are observing a real series, and that all that is illusory is the appearance that it is a time series'. The real time-series, which MacTaggart suggests, is the C-series, and according to him, our illusory experience of time comes only when the subjective and psychological A-series is combined with the C-series - a series in which the terms are connected by permanent relations (*loc. cit.*). What he means to say is that the C-series, which is intrinsically non-temporal, will appear as a time-series when some other element acts upon it and makes it plausible as the past-present-future entity. And that element is a knowing subject, as referred to in the previous section.

It is quite natural, it seems to me, that MacTaggart tries to see some "objectivity" or reality about time underlying our experience of time. As he acknowledges (*loc. cit.*), it is very difficult to suppose that all the elements

that we experience are illusory, and I think that this is particularly true of our experience of time. Apart from the way time really is, its directionality is an undeniable psychological fact for us human beings. This is not to be dismissed merely as "subjective". Let us think about a situation: one could say that time is subjective enough in that each of us can set up a particular point of time as his or her NOW; this means: 'So many people (or focalisers), so many NOWs'. But if a particular point of time, A.D. 1800, for example, is singled out as NOW for every individual, then A.D.1700 is absolutely the past for everyone, and similarly, A.D. 1900 is absolutely the future, again, for everyone. This is due to the *anisotropic* nature of time, and there is no room for personal choices or preferences. The situation will be totally different when a particular group of people go to a concert and listen to Mozart's *Jupiter Symphony* and then they are asked how they liked it; their impressions can be genuinely subjective and vary from one person to another. If it is feasible and reasonable to reserve real subjectivity only for situations like that, we cannot help thinking that subjectivity in time or in our experience of time lacks authenticity or genuineness.

3.1.5 Conclusion

In 3.1, by looking into MacTaggart's theory of time, we observed that the notion of change is alien to the earlier-later scheme of the B-series, which intrinsically has no room for the recognition of transiency, and that it is in the past-present-future scheme of the A-series that change can be spoken of, since the A-series presupposes the existence of some entity capable of perception. We found that MacTaggart's notion of temporal series can be a theoretical basis for claiming that the notion of change is closely associated with the existence of some conscious being. But this does not necessarily mean that time is our subjective and psychological phenomenon; as discussed in 3.1.4, time has some enigmatic aspect as a queer hybrid of subjectivity and

objectivity. With such peculiar characteristics of time in mind, we go on to discuss the nature of time in 3.2, paying particular attention to its directionality, continuity, and irreversibility.

3.2 The nature of time

3.2.1 The reification of time

Wittgenstein says that philosophical problems are likely to arise when 'language goes on holiday' (1953: 19), and this seems to be particularly true of time, which has been one of the most controversial issues in philosophy for over two thousand years. This section brings into focus the general tendency that time is metaphorised in language, and points out a confusing and misleading situation in which linguistic meanings attached to the word 'time' tend to stand out on their own, alienated from our intuitive knowledge of time.

As Lakoff and Johnson say (1980: 42), time in English has a marked tendency to be metaphorised as A MOVING OBJECT, as illustrated in examples such as: 'The time will come when...'; 'The time for action has arrived'. It is noteworthy that these examples imply a particular direction of time from the future to the present. The reification of time can be detected in the following examples as well: 'Time flies'; 'Time rushes by'; 'We cross the river of time.' From these we understand that time is conceptualised as something that moves, flows, or flies. A natural question that will arise here is: if time is such a mobile object, then how fast does it move, and in what direction? It is well known that Newton proposed the idea of 'absolute time' as characterised by its constant flow, unaffected by human conception. He says: 'All motions may be accelerated or retarded, but the flowing of absolute time is not liable to change' (1966: 8). Here,

a possible question that will be posited is: if time is, as Newton says, a constant flow, how can we know its constancy? From experience we know that, unlike the flow of the river, the flow of time - if ever there is such a thing - is not visible.

The following example might be taken as illustrating that the flow of time is ontologically not verifiable. Suppose there are two invisible rivers of time: a swift river A, and a slow river B; a canoe running down the river A at 40 mph will look as fast as a motorboat running down the river B at the same speed. This tells us that we cannot know the real speed of the rivers by merely comparing the apparent movements of the objects running down them.

Another problem concerned with the idea that time moves, flows or flies is that time can be also conceptualised as something that will stop or reverse, simply because our knowledge of the world leads us to assume that if time is capable of such movements, then it ought to behave just like our familiar objects like cars, trains or planes. So we tend to feel that it makes sense to say that time stops or moves backward. In 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 we will discuss this problem and the illogicality or the impossibility of such behaviour of time will be revealed.

Jaques (1982: 61-62) argues that the flow or flux of time is a peculiarly psychological directionality, resulting from a fusion of past, present and future, and he tries to show how the impression of the "time arrow" can be weakened by observing what happens when an arrow is shot. His points of argument can be summarised as follows. When the arrow moves from the bow toward the target, the sense of direction felt by the viewer is literally spatial, not temporal; it is the arrow that moved, not time; the arrow left the bow at a time A and reached the target a few seconds later at a time B, and

these earlier and later recordings of time is static; in the viewer's mind all that happened is in the present. Jaques claims:

> We have a sense of the coexistence and interaction of past, present and and future because memory, perception, and desire exist as a unified field of force. It is from this unified field of force that we get our sense of temporal direction just as surely as a pointing arrow gives a sense of spatial direction. (*ibid.*: 62)

Grünbaum (1963: 663) refers to the fusion of past and present responsible for the flux of time:

> The flux of time consists in the *instantaneous awareness* of *both* the temporal order *and* the *diversity* of the membership of the set of the remembered (recorded) or forgotten events, awarenesses in each of which the instant of its own occurrence constitutes a *distinguished element.*

It could be argued that time, when it is reified, is so confusing that it is difficult for us to grasp its nature. If we shake off the linguistically contaminated meanings given to the word 'time' in our everyday life and try hard to see what it is really like, then we might be able to get nearer to its essence. As Kant says (1967: 38), time may well be construed as the form of inner sense given *a priori,* which is a necessary representation that underlies all intuitions. Ontologically speaking, it is to be recognised that time, as well as space, is the form of the world only in which existence and movement of things and objects are possible.

3.2.2 The direction of time

The last section discussed the awkwardness of contemplating time using a

metaphor of spatial movement, by focusing on the ontological problem of the rate or the speed of time when it is assumed to be some entity capable of moving or flowing itself. The present section concentrates on the problem of the direction of time as a moving object. The main purpose of the discussion is to spotlight the ambiguity of time moving either from past to present, and to future, or from future to present, and to past.

As pointed out in the previous section, the idea that time moves or flows is institutionalised in the structure of language so deeply that it is by no means easy to dismiss it as invalid. This seems to suggest that time as a mobile entity, however psychological it is, is intimately associated with the way we understand the world. A question that arises when we think of time as capable of moving or flowing is: *In what direction?* Is it from past to future, or from future to past? Many people have speculated on the problem of the direction of time employing either one of them. We will take a quick look at this problem by referring to Bergson and Heidegger as two polarising philosophers about the direction of time.

We can find a typical example of the past-to-future type in Bergson (1911: 196-197). Bergson's theory of time is characterised by its memory-oriented approach, and he illustrates the past-present-future flow of time by the pictorial representation as follows:



Figure 3.2

With regard to this figure, Bergson makes the following comment:

> If I represent by a cone SAB the totality of the recollections accumulated in my memory, the base AB, situated in the past, remains motionless, while the summit S, which indicates at all times my present, moves forward unceasingly, and unceasingly also touches the moving plane P of my actual representation of the universe.

In Bergson's temporal scheme the movement of time is conceptualised as MY PRESENT going toward the future continuously. One of the very important philosophical implications involved here is that the past is regarded as something motionless upon which we cannot positively act, whereas the present is to be taken as something flexible and dynamic through which we act upon things and objects around us.

Heidegger contrasts with Bergson in that he contemplates time as coming from the future. Heidegger's metaphysical stance concerning time is expounded in *Being and Time*. According to him, *Dasein* (human life) 'can move toward itself in the mode of the "future" only by moving backwards its past at the same time' (1949: 93) (my parenthesis). For Heidegger the present is withheld, and it is the future that comes to the present.

Which is the right direction of time? From past to future or vice versa? As a matter of fact, this problem was worked out by MacTaggart. His theory of temporal series practically evaporated this metaphysical riddle. He shows (1927: 10-11) that the past-present-future movement of time occurs when we take the A-series as sliding along a fixed B-series. This can be illustrated as:

(1)



By contrast, the future-present-past movement of time occurs when we take the B-series as sliding along a fixed A-series. This can be shown as:



Figure 3.3

Obviously, (1) represents Bergson's idea of temporal movement. In (1), the movement of the present into the future is the movement of time; the knowing subject travels into the future in the car called time. On the other hand, in (2), which is thought of as complying with Heidegger's temporal scheme, the knowing subject is fixed in the present, not moving at all, and cars called time, coming from the future, pass by one after another.

Thus, the directional ambiguity of the temporal movement can be successfully accounted for by applying the idea of temporal series postulated by MacTaggart. It is now clear that when we think of time as a moving entity there are two possible directions; both may be right or wrong. But what is to be noted is that, apart from the problem of whether time itself flows or not, both (1) and (2) in Figure 3.3 tell us one and the same thing about the nature of time. That is, the direction is from NEW to OLD. In (1) where the present slides from left to right, presentness is constantly renewed, and the old present is labelled as the past. And the same thing happens in (2) in which 'Later' slides from right to left; there we can see laterness constantly renewed, and the old laterness becomes earlier to the renewed laterness coming from the right. This relation between NEW to OLD does not flow or move. This relation itself is the direction of time.

As a conclusion, it could be said that time *lapses* - if not moves or flows - and the lapse of time can be sensed in the fixed order of states of affairs from NEW to OLD ('NEW' can be taken as corresponding to presentness or laterness, and 'OLD', pastness or earlierness).

3.2.3 The irreversibility of time

Wittgenstein (1922) claims that one cannot think of illogical things. If so, the reversion of time is undoubtedly one of those things. In the previous section we recognised that time is a fixed relationship observable in the order of states of affairs in the world. The present section argues that time as such does not move backward. (The discussion in this section is mainly based on Ohmori (1976: 287-294).)

In the world in which we live, there are two possible reversals. One is a spatial reversal in which two pedestrians M and N, for instance, walking in that order at a particular time, are walking in the reversed order N M at a different time. The other one is what might be termed reversion of process(es), which can be observed in the reversing of a film. The former is concerned with the local differences of two (or more) objects, which has no problem because it is a spatial reversion. It is the latter that needs careful attention, for when people speak of "the reversion of time", they usually refer to the latter kind of reversion (we call it *process reversion* for convenience).

MacTaggart's B-series tells us that it is part of world knowledge that if Event A precedes Event B, it never happens that the order reverses at a later time. Therefore, what can be done in the process of reversal in the backward flow of a film is to offer the audience Events A' and B' which, though resembling Events A and B that occurred (either historically or fictionally) some time

earlier, are in fact totally different in content. And those reversed events belong to totally different times. There can be recognised no backward movement of time. Some people might object to this view and argue that one can be justified in assuming that time moves backward as far as the reversed world is concerned - even if it is a film world. But we have to draw attention to the fact that what is reversed is the order of events or states of affairs, not the directionality from NEW to OLD.

Now let us consider this problem in the world of fiction, where apparently nothing is impossible. It is well known that the time traveller "goes backward" in time. But we have to note that if he goes back to A.D. 1600 to meet Elizabeth I in London, he does so from, say, April 1st in 1993 on. And his encounter with the English Queen occurs definitely after the time when he started his journey.

As far as the process of reversal in the world of science fiction is concerned, two situations can be conceived of. One is a case in which the process of the reversing film, familiar to us in our world, is *actually* going on. That is, originally there occurred a certain number of events in the normal order in that world, and some time later the order reversed. In that case, the situation is quite similar to the reversing of a film in the world we know. The events occurring in the reversed order are totally different from those that originally took place before in that those reversed events are occurring *after* the original events, and that the processes are reversed. The other situation is that in that world events happen in the reversed order *from the beginning*. It is to be noted that it is some entity outside (presumably the narrator or the reader looking at the world from a normal point of view) who recognises the order of events is reversed there, since to the inhabitants that is a normal world. In such a world, events that ought to be verbalised on the earth as in: 'John got the bullet in the left leg and fell' might be

described as: 'John got up and the bullet left his left leg'. That is a world where there is no cause-and-effect relationship that is the norm in our world. In that world dead people become alive, and debris are put together into an old building, which gradually become new. From our point of view, everything is reversed there, but the direction is from NEW to OLD. And what matters is that 'NEW' or 'OLD' has nothing to do with the materialistic quality of objects.

The point of our argument is that the reversing of the order of events does not affect the directionality of time from NEW to OLD. In a situation: '(a) John got the bullet in the left leg, (b) and fell,' (a) was *new* before (b) happened, and when (b) happened and new-ness was renewed, then (a) became *old* . Similarly, in the reversed situation: '(c) John got up, (d) and the bullet left his left leg', (c) was *new* before (d) occurred, and then the newcomer (d) pushed (c) back to the past. This shows that when we focus on a particular event in relation to oncoming events, the focused event has no alternative but to turn from NEW to OLD. In no sense the reversion of time is possible.

In Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking-Glass*, when the White Queen says that what she remembers best is *the things that happened the week after next*, she is just talking about her anticipation that belongs to her present. And when she screams *before* pricking her finger, she does so because she feels pain in her present.

If we talk about time using the past-present-future scheme, we must say that in any possible world the past is invariably the present that was gone, i.e. the ex-present. Speaking of time reversing is speaking of the ex-present becoming the present. This is tantamount to saying that old is new, small is large, or cheap is expensive. Thus, we cannot talk about the reverse of time

without making a logical contradiction.

3.2.4 The continuity of time

What do we imagine when we try to mean something meaningful by thinking or saying that *time stops* ? Usually it is a scene in which every object in it has ceased to move, just like a "frozen scene" in a film. It is evident that such an image of temporal suspension is intimately connected with our everyday, familiar experiences in which vehicles such as cars and trains stop moving.

In the preceding three sections it has been argued that time is to be recognised not as some concrete entity capable of moving or reversing itself, but as representing a relation between events, so that it must be contended here that time does not *stop*, since it is not a mobile entity. The movement or stoppage of something - whatever it is - makes sense only *in time* , and we cannot make any sense out of the stoppage of time itself.

As Poincaré claims (1952: 93), we cannot picture empty space. Similarly, we cannot imagine the void of time; time is always there both "objectively" and "subjectively". This enigmatic nature of time, already pointed out in 3.1.4, is hinted also by Kant (1967: 56):

> Time, as the formal condition of the possibility of changes, is indeed objectively prior to them; subjectively, however, in actual consciousness, the representation of time, like every other, is given only in connection with perception.

3.2.5 Conclusion

The main purpose of 3.2 was to make an ontological inquiry into the nature

of time. Investigating the ways in which time is reified in linguistic expressions, we made an attempt to argue against the idea that time flows, or moves. We revealed unreasonable aspects resulting from the river-of-time metaphor, such as the direction or speed or rate of time. In connection with the misleading aspect perceivable in the image of time as a moving entity, we accounted for the absurd and illogical nature of the idea that time moves backward.

Based on the ontological understanding of the nature of time, the focal point of discussion in 3.3 and 3.4 will be the relationship between time and consciousness with respect to the recognition of change and eventhood.

3.3 Change

3.3.1 Identity and change

The aim of this section is to clarify that change is closely connected with the concept of identity of things and objects.

People often use an expression 'one and the same thing' in a linguistic environment in which an entity is described as looking different or behaving differently on different occasions. In such cases we know that the entity referred to as 'one and the same thing' is supposed to *survive* the changes that happen to it. That such an idea of identity of things or objects is quintessential to our conceptualisation of change can be known from a definition of change as in:

An object x, changes if and only if
(i) there is a property, P
(ii) there is an object, x
(iii) There are distinct times t and t', and
(iv) x has P at t and fails to have P at t' (or vice versa)

This is what Lombard (1982: 80) calls 'the Ancient Criterion of Change', held by ancient Greek Philosophers. Russell gives another definition of change as follows:

> Change is the difference, in respect of truth or falsehood, between a proposition concerning an entity and the time *T* and a proposition concerning the same entity and the time *T'*, provided that these propositions differ only by the fact that *T* occurs in the one where *T'* occurs in the other. (see 3.1.2)

In these definitions expressions 'an object x' or 'an entity' can be identified as one and the same thing that does not change itself but survive the change. It will soon be understood that such an idea of identity conjures up the metaphysical ghost that has been haunting philosophy since ancient times, i.e. the problem of *essence* and *attributes*. Suppose what happened to a rose, which was red at 3 o'clock, turned into a white one at 4 o'clock. Of course a change can be perceived there, but could we argue that what changed was the colour, namely, an attribute, but not the essence (the rose-ness?)? As Berkeley points out (1972: 73), it is impossible to conceive colour without visible extension, the *form;* if the colour vanishes, then the rose will inevitably disappear.

Normally we do not take these two roses existing at two different times as different entities. Then how can we identify the two different-coloured roses as one and the same thing after all? It seems evident that in order to recognise the change that occurred to the *same* rose in the one-hour lapse of time, we need a concept of identity concerning the rose in question. It is a notable fact that the structure of language is felt to help us keep the 'one and the same thing' or the essence intact from the change. We would say that *the rose* was red at 3 and *it* was white at 4. However fictitious the subject-predicate structure of the language may look, only then can we notify

ourselves that there was a change. Discussing the essence-attribute problem in detail is not directly relevant to the purpose of the present thesis. What we are inclined to suggest is that, apart from the problem of whether there is something that can be termed 'essence' or not, the identity-seeking human cognition *a priori* tends to label the red rose and the white rose as the two different appearances of the same rose enduring at least between the two distinct times, rather than as two totally different entities present at two different times.

It is worth mentioning that in the so-called transformation the identity of an object x changes at the same time with the transformation. For example, when a caterpillar becomes a butterfly the identity of the former will be lost the moment it turns into the latter. However, the identity of the caterpillar will endure until it becomes the butterfly, and after that human cognition will try to see in the butterfly a specious kind of identity of the caterpillar as the "transformed caterpillar"; otherwise no change can be perceived. (This sort of change labelled as transformation could not be well explained by the Ancient Criterion of Change, in which an entity X's acquisition or losing of P (property) is emphasised as the necessary condition of change, for it is difficult to assume that some change in the property of the caterpillar was responsible for its turning into the butterfly.)

It is a complicated task to define exactly what the property is, but we must acknowledge that the property is to be thought of as a flexible item, as will be discussed in 3.3.3. Here it will be enough to point out that properties can be abstract as well as concrete. This will be understood by contemplating a situation in which a particular person dies. When a person named Ted dies, it will be normal to think that a great change (perhaps the greatest change) occurred to Ted. But how is it possible to talk about change *in* Ted, who, at least on the perceptive level, has ceased to be the matter of enduring entity?

Unlike the caterpillar's case we cannot mention the "transformed Ted", because he is gone. One might argue that his bones or ashes can be identified as Ted, though drastically transformed. If that is a reasonable idea, then it can be interpreted as just another case of transformation. But we can conceive of this situation differently. It does not seem entirely illogical to assume that when Ted dies, a property is either lost or gained; if we think of his life as P, then X, i.e. Ted, loses P, whereas, if we regard his death as P, then X gains P at the time of death. Assuming that the identity of Ted will continue somehow or other even after his death (this might sound reasonable if we believe that Ted "lives" in our memory after dying), this property-oriented view of change can be considered to give a convincing account for our ordinary, natural recognition of change associated with the death of a particular person.

The maintenance of identity in a lapse of time between two distinct time points involving change will become problematic in a coming-into-being situation. For example, when cancer developed in the pancreas of a person named John, how can we construe this as a change? If we pay attention to the cancer, we will recognise that it had no identity before it came into being. Perhaps this is why it is very awkward to say that *the cancer has changed.* The situation is quite different from the case of Ted's death, in which it was impossible to refer to the enduring identity of Ted. Here we must note that as long as we focus on the cancer that came into being, we cannot speak of change properly, or we cannot identify exactly what changed. In order to recognise cases like this as a change, what might be termed *the downgrading principle* will be required. What I mean by this term is that when a new entity is brought into being, it must be *downgraded* to a property P of a larger entity X, to which the new P is supposed to belong. In the case of the example in question, the newly-developed cancer, the moment it is "born", will be deprived of the independent status as an

entity X, and will be downgraded to a property of John, now conceivable as X of which the cancer is a property. Only then can we recognise that there occurred a change, and besides, it is possible to identify exactly what happened. Undoubtedly, the immediate element that has undergone a change is the pancreas, which can be referred to as the possessor of the new property, i.e. the cancer. It is evident that the continuing identity of the pancreas can be perceived during the time involving the change.

It has been thus revealed that there is an intrinsic relation between change and identity. The intrinsic relation can be summarised as follows: If an object or entity X undergoes some change, X must not cease to be X at least before it experiences the change. So far we have concentrated on the property-oriented view of change, and we have not paid much attention to the truth-value view, exemplified by Russell. The main reason for this is that the Russellian view of change is not necessarily interested in identifying exactly what changed. Take the cancer's case for instance: when one says that the proposition 'The cancer was not existent' is true at T, but it is false at T' when the cancer developed, so that there was a change, then we will understand that there occurred a change, but this truth-value view of change is not directly concerned with mentioning exactly what changed. It could be argued that both the property-oriented and the truth-value views of change are formal accounts of our commonsensical notion of change; the only difference is that the former is primarily concerned with identifying the item that underwent change, whereas the latter attends to temporal sequentiality, i.e. that change did occur.

In the next section, the problem of what changes will be brought into focus. It will be shown through the discussion that the downgrading principle and the property-oriented view of change play a very significant role in identifying the elements that undergo change(s), and that, as we already

observed in the discussion of MacTaggart's temporal series, the recognition of change is after all subjective and psychological rather than objective and physical.

3.3.2 The elements that change

Concerning the notion of what changes, there can be observed two polarising views. One is a rather limited, physical view, and the other is a comprehensive and psychological view. A typical example of the former can be found in Mellor (1981: 107). He claims that change in a particular item does not mean the automatic change of everything related to it, and illustrates his point of argument by saying that if someone ceases to be famous unawares, that is a change not in that person but in the attitudes of other people. Almost the same, constrained view of change is offered by Moens (1989: 117), who says: 'When an event occurs or an action is performed, only one element in the situation changes; in a newly created situation a large set of facts will remain unaffected'. By contrast, it is MacTaggart who represents a comprehensive view of the elements that change. Without making any further comments, he just describes change in an enigmatic way:

> And if anything changes, then all other things change with it. For its change must change some of their relation to it, and so their relational qualities. The fall of a sand-castle on the English coast changes the nature of the Great Pyramid (1927: 11-12).

The main objective of this section is to show that either view of change can be correct. In the course of discussion it will be made clear that the downgrading principle, introduced in the last section, can play a very important role in identifying what changes.

In order to explain the mechanism of the change recognition we suppose a particular situation in which a car got involved in an accident and its bonnet was completely crushed. People with limited views of change would claim that it is the bonnet that has changed; the bonnet is the immediately, and physically, affected area, but the rest remains intact. That is a reasonable idea, but wouldn't it be equally reasonable to say that *the car has changed* ?

The difference between the two views is deeply concerned with the activation of the downgrading principle. If we apply the X(entity)-P(property) scheme to this situation, we will find that identifying the element(s) that change(s) is greatly influenced by the way in which X is conceived of. When one restricts the area of X to what can be said to be immediately affected environment, then there is no need for the downgrading principle to be activated. This sort of restriction of X might be called 'the fixation of X'. And this fixation of X may lead to the limited view of change. By contrast, the comprehensive view of change results from what might be referred to as 'the fluidification of X'. This means the theoretically infinite enlargement of X from the immediately affected area to a larger area. It is to be recognised that then the downgrading principle works. A smaller X is downgraded to P of a larger X, which in turn will be downgraded to P of a still larger X.

From the viewpoint of the fixed X, the bonnet is X, and P (perhaps the normal function of the bonnet) is lost, or P (perhaps the abnormal function of the bonnet) is gained; thus one could say that the bonnet (X) has changed. From the viewpoint of the fluid X, however, the situation will be different. One could argue that the car has changed if one, the moment one sees the bonnet (X), the immediately affected area, downgrades it to P of the car, a larger X to which the bonnet belongs. In that case, the car is considered to have either lost P (perhaps the bonnet itself), or gained P (perhaps the

crushed bonnet), so that it is possible to say that it is the car that has changed.

Now let us think about an example of the maximal enlargement of X. Suppose an extremely dog-loving British woman has lost her beloved dog. She might think that the dog changed, if she takes the dog as X, and the dog's life as P. And she might also think that it is herself that changed because of the dog's death, if the dog is downgraded to P of a larger X, that is, herself. Another possibility is that she might feel that the whole family, of which she is a member, i.e. a property, has changed, if she downgrades herself to P; the change in P (herself) causes the change in X (the family). And this X can be also downgraded to P, if a larger X (perhaps the street where the family live) is set up. In that case, the whole street may change. If this process continues, finally the whole world will change. This may sound extreme and absurd, but no-one can deny this possibility, and such a downgrading process seems to account for our everyday experiences very well. We often hear people say things like: 'When my husband died, everything changed.' Here we must note that the graphological sequence given above to explain the downgrading process does not imply that the process of downgrading occurs sequentially in that order. Actually there is no segmentation in the process. The downgrading process happens *all at once*. The size or volume of X will be determined by manifold factors such as circumstances, emotion, or interest. In other words, *where to stop* is entirely up to the subject of consciousness that is in a position to recognise change.

It is an empirical fact that the activation of the downgrading principle is very common and frequent in our everyday recognition of change. One example is reading a literary text. It is our ordinary experience that if a particular expression is replaced by some other expression, then the whole text can look different. In Joyce's 'Eveline', for example, a climactic speech or thought presentation can be observed toward the end of the story: 'No! No! No! It

was impossible'. If we supplant it with a direct speech: '"No, I can't do that", she said', then we would have to say that this rather noticeable stylistic modification can change at least our stylistic evaluation of the whole story. It is obvious that the downgrading principle is working in that case; the original expression is deprived of its status as X, and is downgraded to P of a larger entity X, that is, the whole text. If we adopt the limited view of change and take the original expression as fixed X, then we would claim that it is the re-written part that has changed, thinking that X has lost P (a freer representation of speech), and that the change has nothing to do with the rest of the text. It is to be acknowledged that such a limited view of change is far from instructive, particularly in terms of reading and interpreting literature; or we could go so far as to say that it is an entirely inappropriate approach to literature.

One might suppose that, from the way in which the limited and comprehensive views of change has been contrasted with each other, the limited view is physical and "objective", whereas the comprehensive view is psychological and "subjective". What we intend to do in the next section is to dismiss such a strong contrast as illusory.

3.3.3 The change of the world

In the last section we have seen that adopting the downgrading principle can lead one to the recognition of the change of the whole world. In this section it will be shown that the limited view of change can equally do the same thing.

In referring to the world, we have so far tended to regard it as a physical entity which contains objects such as dogs, human beings, literary texts. But as Vendler points out (1967: 143-145), *facts*, as well as objects, are *in* the

world. A fact-oriented view of the world is represented by Wittgenstein: 'The world is the totality of the facts, not of things' (1922: 31). It is not the immediate purpose of this section to look into the difference between objects and facts, but it would be useful to give it some thought here. The point is that, as far as the nature of human understanding is concerned, the cognition (or perception) of objects and that of facts are not as distant from each other as one might suppose. It is often said that objects can be seen, whereas facts cannot (cf. Vendler, *op. cit.*: 141). But one will understand that this contrast is too strong if one reflects what happens when we actually see objects. For example, if someone sees (on the conscious level) a crashed car on the road, of course he can claim that he is looking at an object, not a fact. But it must be agreed that in order to cognise or perceive the object as such he must know *the fact that there was a car crash* or *the fact that the car had crashed.* (The fact recognition mentioned here is actually the event recognition; in my understanding the latter is to be subsumed under the former). It would be empirically reasonable to say that when we notice something (this can imply some sort of inner speech) we see not only *objects* but also *facts.* Thus, perception and cognition is intertwined in an inseparable way. As we see in 3.5, human cognition of some entity, either an object or a fact, is largely dependent upon the cognitive focus of a particular person in a particular situation.

Getting back to the discussion of change and the world, it should be recognised that if we conceive of the world (X) as made up of facts (Ps), then the limited view of change can encompass the change of the world. Now the world, as an identical entity, is the fixed X, and the peculiarity of this X is that its properties, i.e. facts, are ever increasing in number. If Mr Smith's dog died, that (P) will automatically change the world (X). The world with the new P is to be distinguished from the world without it only in terms of the addition of the new property. (One controversial problem

concerned will be whether the two worlds are totally different from each other; it could be claimed that, in the light of the intrinsic relation between identity and change in the fixed-X type of change recognition, some identity of X (something like the world-ness) will endure and survive ever-occurring changes.) Note that facts that change the world are new events or new changes, not already existing facts such as: 'J.F. Kennedy was assassinated.'

Through the discussion in this section it has been made clear that the limited view of change, as well as the comprehensive one in which the downgrading principle is the key element, can also lead one to recognise the change of the world. We now understand that the physical-psychological contrast, which seems valid enough with respect to the limited and comprehensive views of change, is not as convincing as it looks.

3.3.4 Conclusion

In 3.3 we observed that one can recognise change when one attends to the behaviour of P in the X (entity)-P (property) scheme, and perceives any loss or acquisition of P that occurs in a lapse of time. We also observed that there are two different views of change, i.e. the limited view, and the comprehensive view, and that the mechanism of the latter can be explained by the downgrading principle. An attempt was made to mitigate the clear-cut contrast between the limited view which appears physical and objective, and the comprehensive view which seems psychological and subjective, by showing that through the manipulation of X the limited view can reach the same view of change as will be reached by the comprehensive view.

3.4 Eventhood

3.4.1 Expressed change vs. recognised change

In 3.3 we argued about the nature of change, and it is now to be understood that by referring to change, or change of state, we have been actually talking about *events*. So far we have discussed our dynamic recognition of entities in the world as spatio-temporal particulars. This means that we have discussed the nature of events. An event can be defined as a recognised change of state. The reason why an event is defined that way is that we think it is important and significant to distinguish linguistic expressions such as (A) 'The weather changes' (generic) from ones such as (B) 'The weather changed' (specific). In (A), a change is expressed, but no change as a spatio-temporal particular is recognised. On the other hand, in (B), a particular change of state is not only expressed but also *recognised*. The relationship between linguistic expressions and event recognition will be discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6, but at the present stage it will be meaningful to differentiate (B) as a recognised change, i.e. an event, from (A) as a merely expressed change.

3.4.2 Subjectivity, objectivity and eventhood

The main aim of this section is to attempt an ontological discussion of the objectivity of events and the subjectivity of event descriptions by conscious beings.

In the preceding sections, when we looked into the nature of time or the nature of our recognition of time, we understood that time is related to change in an intrinsic way in the past-present-future scheme, and that the recognition of change entails consciousness. In the last section we defined an event as a recognised change of state, and it should be acknowledged that when we speak of change in relation to time we always refer to the recognised change, i.e. event. Therefore, for the purpose of the present thesis, we will hereafter employ the two terms 'change' and' event' in the

same sense.

An ontological question that is likely to be posited here is: If event or change entails consciousness, then is event impossible where there is no consciousness? The answer to this question is yes and no. The point is how we take the meaning of *existence*. I have no intention of going into an ontological labyrinth path concerning the problem of existence; what I would like to clarify is the objectivity of events in a commonsensical way.

If there is someone who takes an extreme view and associates the meaning of existence only with his own consciousness, then a plane crash that takes place in some place he cannot be conscious of would not "exist" for him, at least at the time when the event happens. That is to say, this extremist believes that things that he cannot directly perceive do not exist; he assumes that the world will cease to exist when he dies. But if he is capable of showing a kind of philosophical flexibility, he will have to acknowledge that the event *actually* and *objectively* happened where his consciousness was not involved. Generally speaking, it is through *perception* that reality can be most convincingly verified. If it is true that the person was unconscious of that plane crash, so that the event did not "exist" for him, he would be able to confirm that the event is an objective entity by actually going to see or feel the crashed plane (if it is possible). There he could experience the change that occurred to the plane by seeing the debris scattered around. (World knowledge will lead him to see a history of the plane that must have been intact before that. The event-recognition with respect to the plane will become possible in the contrast between the perceptibility of the crashed plane and the conceivability of the intact plane. In this particular case, the change (event) *in* the plane can be mentioned by thinking of the plane as the fixed X, and its crashing, as P (an acquired fact)). In other words, by doing so he can verify the "existence" of the event. Such confirmation by

perception will be the best possible way of knowing the objectivity of events, which is an empirical truth in our everyday life. In short, the commonsensical view of the world will tell us that events can be objective entities.

Compared with the tactile or perceivable objectivity of physical events such as a plane crash, or a murder of someone, the objectivity of *thought events* can be problematic. In our everyday life, it often happens that someone else's thinking is not verifiable in an objective way, unless he declares himself that he is (was) involved in such and such thinking, or unless the fact that the thought event happened to him is traceable in some way or other. When a person named Ted insists that a person named Jack, whom Ted has never seen, must have, as an objective fact, engaged in some thought at least once in his life - though the content of the thought event cannot be identified, it could be said that an ontological metaphor concerning Self and Others is operating. The metaphor, based on our empirical beliefs and concerned with our *mental omnipresence*, can be described as 'I am he'. Ted's belief in Jack's thought event(s) as an objective fact may derive from a kind of subjunctive situation in which Ted thinks that, as two human beings capable of thinking, if he were Jack, he would do some thinking, just as he himself actually does, so that the objectivity of Jack's thought event can be empirically guaranteed.

In contrast to the ontologically problematic objectivity of events, the subjectivity of event description will be far less controversial. Event descriptions, as well as other descriptive activities by human agents, are subjective, as can be recognised in the following examples:

(a) The HAL computer becomes operational in 1992.
(b) The weird, man-killer computer, which was actually the brightest

one ever produced, was born in 1992.

Compared with (b), (a) sounds "objective" and neutral, but the impression of the objectivity is concerned with the choice of register, which itself could be construed as a perspectival choice by an individual or individuals.

Ontologically speaking, the subjectivity of the two expressions is clear, since they make no difference in that they both are event descriptions reflecting the speaker's attitudes. (In narratological terms, however, it is considered meaningful to make a distinction between (a) and (b) by arguing that the objective-sounding wording in (a) is a comparatively *perspective-free* event description, whereas the emotionally charged, and tensed phrasing in (b) is classifiable as a *perspectivally-situated* event description. The problem of perspectival distinction will be discussed in Chapter 6.)

3.4.3 Events as spatio-temporal particulars

We would like to start this section by quoting a passage from Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* :

> 'All right', said the Cat; and this time it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the end of the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone.

The Cheshire-Cat's grin without its face is one of the nonsense examples packed in that story. If Alice saw such a grin, she must have experienced an impossible event. In the preceding two sections it was elucidated that we cannot conceive of an event save by reference to its spatio-temporal particularity, and that the recognition of eventhood is the matter of cognitive involvement of some conscious being. The present section is going to make

some further comments on the nature of events as spatio-temporal particulars.

In 1.3.1 we made an observation that no event can occur in a vacuum (see 1.3.1). In that section we critically looked at the trichotomous nature of what are usually termed 'story elements' - events, characters and settings, which are often seen in the literature of narrative studies. The point of the review was to reject the idea of event itself, as independent of particular things and objects, in the recognition of dynamics. From the argument we have made so far with respect to change and event, there should be no doubt about the contention that no event can occur in a vacuum. An event, because of its spatial-temporal particularity, is totally unthinkable without some particular thing or objects involved in it. It is impossible to separate from the event of the Cheshire-Cat's grin the face of the cat, or the whole body of the cat. And in terms of the spatial particularity of the event, the bough of a tree, on which the cat was sitting, can be said to be closely related to the cat's grin; so, the two expressions 'The cat grinned' and 'The cat grinned on a bough of a tree' will make no difference in that they are both event descriptions. From a pragmatic point of view, (as we will refer to in Chapter 5), the temporal particularity in fiction may have a different feature from that in reality, but there is a parallel between the two in that in both an event has no alternative but to be the matter of *temporal relativity;* an event never fails to occur *before* and *after* some other events. In other words, the temporal location of an event is determinable in relation to those of other events. It could be argued that in that sense an event is a temporal particular both in fiction and reality.

As Hacker rightly points out (1982: 480), unlike objects, which are directly related to space, it is with time that events are immediately associated. So we must acknowledge that there are events of which the spatiality seems

rather irrelevant, such as the decrease of the value of the sterling, or the expiration of copyrights. If we look at those events macroscopically, however, we might be justified in speaking of the spatiality of even such events; it is an undeniable fact that they occur somewhere in the universe, either real or fictional.

3.4.4 Conclusion

Our discussion in 3.4 attempted to look into ontological characteristics of events and of event descriptions. The main points of discussion were: 1) that the idea of event itself is impossible; as a spatio-temporal particular, an event entails some particular things and objects; 2) that the objectivity of events (physical events in particular) is to be guaranteed mainly by the perceptibility (in reality) and by the empirical fact that events (more exactly, world-entities which will be identified as events if directly experienced by conscious beings: e.g. the explosion of a star millions of light years away from the earth) can occur when and where one cannot be conscious of them; 3) that event description, no matter how neutral or objective it may sound, is ontologically subjective due to the reflection of the speaker's point of view in it, but it will be of narratological interest to try to differentiate objective-sounding, perspective-free, event descriptions from subjective-sounding, perspectively-situated ones.

3.5 The recognition of dynamics

3.5.1 Focus and periphery

The general aim of 3.5 is to contemplate the differences in recognition between events and non-events (states and objects), from amalgamated viewpoints of ontology, epistemology and psychology. The discussion will

focus on: 1) the selective aspect of human consciousness; 2) the way in which the so-called action or dynamics is concerned with our cognitive acts; 3) the importance of acquired or lost Ps (properties) of the X (entity)-P (property) scheme in connection with events. In the present section an emphasis is placed upon discussing the selective nature of human consciousness.

It is a well-known psychological fact that human consciousness is inherently selective. One cannot experience more than one item in conscious focus at a time. This is well exemplified by the famous reversing face-vase figure, which is frequently employed in the literature of gestalt psychology to illustrate the selectivity of human cognition as well as the ambiguity observable in things and objects (Gross, 1987: 96):



Figure 3.4

When we see the faces as figure, the vase has disappeared into the background and vice versa; they cannot be focalised together. A similar example can be found in Wittgenstein (1953: 194):



Figure 3.5

When we see the figure as a rabbit's head, a duck's head clicks out of focus and vice versa. The reversing face-vase figure and the Jastrow's duck-rabbit given above well illustrate the cognitive fact that when we focus on a particular thing, all the others become peripheral. As Jaques writes (1982: 55), when someone attends to the motion of the pen with which he is writing something, its permanent qualities as a thing fall into the background, whereas, if he notes its shape, its thing-ness will be brought into focus, and all the others, including its motion, will be temporarily inhibited and held out of the centre of attention.

It is evident that such a cognitive selectivity is intimately associated with the discriminating nature of consciousness. Psychological observations such as made by Freud (1923) tell us that consciousness, as against unconsciousness, does correspond to the word-presentations. There should be no doubt about the nature of language that pin things down; language seems to have a remarkable effect of making continuous things look discontinuous. When someone notices a rose in the vase and says to himself, 'What a beautiful rose!', then, the object recognition by means of verbalisation has distinguished the particular rose from all the other objects in the world. It is worth noting that such a discriminating, discontinuity-making nature of language lends itself to a static view of the world. In a purely physical world, in which molecules are incessantly dancing, and elementary particles are continuously changing their locations, there will be nothing but dynamics in a genuinely continuous situation, but language, as it were, kills it. It would be argued that once someone makes a linguistic expression about something, and attends to its meaning and form, his metalinguistic consciousness might lead him to take an overly stative view of the world. In Chapters 5 and 6 we are going to refer to the misleading aspect of such a

non-dynamic view of the world that tends to be observed in formal approaches to narrative dynamics.

3.5.2 Events and non-events (objects and states)

This section makes an attempt to see how the three cognitive activities, i.e. objects, states, and events can be accounted for by the focus-periphery framework we referred to in the last section. Particular attention will be drawn to the ways in which events are to be distinguished from non-events, i.e. objects and states.

Let us illustrate by the following situation. Suppose there is a grandfather clock ticking in a room. The pendulum is swinging all the time, and someone comes in (he has never been in that room before).

Presumably, the first thing he will do, when he attends to the clock, is to identify it as a grandfather clock. That is the recognition of an *object.* At this stage, he is matter-conscious, and the thing-ness of the clock is focused on, and the rest is all backgrounded (this does not mean that all the other things have entirely gone from his mind; they are just existent as peripheries). The object recognition like this can be said to serve as an answer to the question: *What is that?*

And then if his attention shifts from the object as a spatial entity to the condition or quality of the object, that is, to the *state* of the clock, he becomes state-conscious, and its quality, condition or relation to other things will be his main concern: if he thinks: 'This clock looks monstrous' or 'This clock is similar to the one I saw in John's house', the thing-ness of the clock has fallen into the background, and its state has come to the top of the layer of his consciousness. More importantly, the situation will be the same if his

attention goes to the action or dynamics of the pendulum. The pendulum is swinging regularly, and it should be noted that the regular swinging of the pendulum can be reckoned as a quality or property of the pendulum or the clock. So here again, the action of the pendulum may well be recognised as a state. Virtually no recognition of change takes place. It is also to be noted that the state recognition can be taken as functioning as an answer to the question: *What is it like?*

When we go on to the third entity, i.e. *events*, we have to admit that under this particular circumstance it is rather difficult to speak of events. But if we think of a forced situation, eventhood seems just possible. If the person watching the clock pays particular attention to an individual swing of the pendulum that occurred during a particular span of time, then he will be change-conscious. To him, the swing of the pendulum from left to right was a particular one distinguishable from all the other similar but again individual swings. The regular, constant motion of the pendulum as a state has been held out of the centre of attention, and the recognition of a change will be spotlighted in his consciousness. It is evident that events can be taken as a possible answer to the question: *What happened?* But it will be agreed that such eventhood squeezed out of this "eventless" situation sounds quite unnatural. Here we must recognise that with respect to the relation between eventhood and action/dynamics there are some important aspects to be scrutinised. This will be argued in the next section.

As far as eventhood is concerned, there is still another point to consider. As a matter of fact, it is not utterly impossible to speak of eventhood concerning all the situations we have observed so far about the grandfather clock. If the person's focus of attention is upon his own cognitive behaviour, rather than upon the externality of the situation, reflectively he might assume that he has experienced a cognitive sort of event each time he recognised something;

when he recognised the grandfather clock as such, he might have thought: 'I recognised that it is a grandfather clock', and the same can be applied to his state and event recognition. Under such circumstances his recognising acts are foregrounded, and can be counted as events. Needless to say, it is not acceptable to try to perceive such events as *pure* and *objectless* events due to their cognitive nature. As we already confirmed in the preceding sections, perceiving an event is a cognitive activity, and it is totally impossible to sever from eventhood some specific objects or things involved. As far as the case in question is concerned, when the recognising acts themselves are conceived of as events, they are impossible without the recognised external items concerned with those events.

We have observed four different cases with regard to the grandfather clock situation. In order to clarify the distinctive feature of events, as against objects and states, it would be meaningful to apply the X-P scheme, introduced in 3.3, to each case and attempt to see the way in which P (property) or P's behaviour can be perceived.

First of all, in the object recognition it is X itself that is brought into focus. The structure of the recognition will be formalised as: 'X is a grandfather clock.' Making reference to the acquisition or loss of P is irrelevant in this case.

In the state recognition, on the other hand, reference to P makes sense. With the first example 'This clock looks monstrous', the clock's 'monstrous looks' can be singled out as P, and with the second example 'This clock is similar to the one I saw in John's house', it would be reasonable to pick out as P the similarity of the clock to the one possessed by John. And the situation will be formalised as: 'X has P'. Note that P mentioned in the state recognition can be considered to be already *in* X when it was focalised.

In contrast to objects and states, events are clearly concerned with the acquisition or loss of P. When we look at the case of the pendulum, its individual swing will have good reason to be viewed as an acquired P. The P in this case is a particular movement of the pendulum (X) that was not possessed by X before. As we observed in 3.3.1, the nature of P can be flexible, either concrete or abstract. The formal structure of the recognition here will be: 'X has acquired P'.

The same can be said about the other kind of events, i.e. what might be termed *internal events* (any event recognition is intrinsically internal because it is, as repeatedly pointed out, a cognitive act, but what I mean by internal events here are those in which the subject-of-consciousness becomes particularly self-reflective, and his attention goes to the dynamics of the cognising act itself rather than to the dynamics of the cognised things or objects). When the person saw the clock, and recognised it as such, he might be able to single out his perception or cognition as a new P added to the catalogue of the totality of his perceptive or cognitive acts (X). Thus we can speak of eventhood in this kind of cognitive behaviour.

Through the discussion concentrating on the contrast between objects, states, and events it is now partially made clear how dynamics or the recognition of dynamics is related to those cognitive activities. In the next section more stress will be placed upon investigating how dynamics - both physical and non-physical - is associated with the three cognitive activities.

3.5.3 *Chronos, kairos*, and dynamics

The main concern in this section is to make an inquiry into how objects, states, and events are distinguishable from each other in terms of the recognition of dynamics. The discussion will reveal an epistemological fact

that dynamics or the recognition of dynamics is related to each of the three cognitive activities in a distinct way.

It is the way in which dynamics is involved in states and events that will be the centre of our attention, but before proceeding to it, we are going to make a brief reference to the connection between the object recognition and dynamics. In terms of the selectivity of human consciousness, it is quite noticeable that in recognising an entity as an object the presence or absence of dynamics is irrelevant. Let us think about the pendulum case in the last section. We have to acknowledge that we can recognise it as an object even when it is swinging, if we attend to its thing-ness, putting all the others to the background. Note that what is captured on the conscious level in this case is the thing-ness only, and that the rest, including the motion that is to be identified as swinging on the conscious level, is entirely overshadowed by the focalisation. This cognitive situation will be formalised as: 'There is X'. This grammatical form implicates that no dynamics is recognised.

In discussing the problem of dynamics in relation to states and events it will be useful to familiarise ourselves with *chronos* and *kairos*, introduced by Aristotle. Jaques (1982: 14) explains the two temporal notions as follows:

> In brief, the distinction between these two terms is that of chronological, seriatim time of succession, measurable by clocks or chronometers - *chronos* ; and that of seasonal time, the time of episodes with a beginning, a middle, and an end, the human and living time of intentions and goals - *kairos*.

Marsh (1952: 19) refers to *chronos* as 'time as chronological' and *kairos* as 'time as opportunity'. It is our contention that dynamics or non-dynamics recognisable as states mainly concerns *chronos* and dynamics that can be

labelled as events is primarily related to *kairos*.

When we contemplate the way in which we recognise dynamics we will find that a certain kind of action or motion does not lend itself to the recognition of change. The constant swinging of a pendulum is a good example. Its swinging is homogeneous, regular and repetitive; it is normally difficult to see a beginning, a middle or an end in it. It is a typically chronos-type action, and as long as our attention is tied to the constant dynamics, we will be unable to recognise eventhood or change there. We should note that the action of the pendulum - swinging - can be construed as part of the distinctive features of a pendulum; it is part of the "meaning" of the instrument. So it sounds quite reasonable to take the swinging as a quality, or an equipped property of the pendulum. Almost the same is true of the constant turning of the wheels of a car, or of the incessantly moving elementary particles in the microscopic, physical world. They can normally be considered properties of the entities. Physicists might argue that the physical world is genuinely eventful because molecules and particles are constantly dancing. They are correct if they conceive of every local movement of molecules as spatio-temporal particulars. In that case, each movement of the molecule might be recognised as a change, but it must be admitted that such recognition is a very forced one. Our experience tells us that far-fetched sorts of change recognition like that, paradoxically enough, tends to fall into the recognition of non-change or state.

The situation might be slightly different, but there is a very strong parallel between the cases given above and the successive events that are repetitive in our everyday life and are felt as daily routine. If someone goes to work at 9, eats lunch at noon and leaves the office at 5, and he repeats this regular cycle every day, it must be difficult for him to experience them events or changes. By repetition eventhood will fade away, and those activities will be

felt as part of his qualities. Attempting to see eventhood by focusing on a particular succession of those activities on a particular day is as unnatural as trying to label a particular movement of the constantly swinging pendulum as an event.

Now we turn to the relation between events and dynamics. Dynamics peculiar to the recognition of events is characterised by its kairos-type feature. It can be *meaningful*; it can suggest it got started at a particular time and ended at another particular time, even if the duration is so short as to be called point. The constant spin of the car's wheel is amenable to the state recognition, but if we attend to a spatial shift of the car, as can be described: 'The car ran down the hill', then we can recognise it as an event. It is to be noted that the movement of the car is a spatio-temporal particular which can theoretically be definable as a newly attained P (property) of the car. The length of the span may vary, but temporality seems to be a key element of eventhood. (What is meant by temporality here is a relative concept; even a state of affairs that lasted one hundred years can be an event because of its temporariness in a macroscopic span of millions of years).

We cannot conclude that repetition, or habituality of any kind is alien to events (for example, the expression 'John often complained' can be interpreted as an event description, since it is possible to assume that John's complaining acts are particulars that occurred during a certain period of time), but it could be argued that, generally speaking, an event favours a one-off act or movement - whether physical or non-physical.

3.5.4 Conclusion

In 3.5 we were mainly concerned with the selectivity of human cognition. We investigated the discriminating tendency of our consciousness to single

out one aspect of things and put all the rest into background. With such peculiarity of consciousness in mind, we attempted to distinguish events from objects and states, drawing particular attention to the loss or acquisition of P (property) in the X-P scheme. And by introducing the two temporal concepts *chronos* and *kairos*, we pointed out that the recognition of dynamics of a certain kind may be congenial to statehood but not to eventhood, due to the difficulty of perceiving any loss or gain of P.

In Chapter 5 we are going to argue that *chronos* is virtually identifiable as what might be called 'meta-time', i.e. abstract and objectively measurable time, which may well be referred to as 'time itself', whereas *kairos* can be intimately associated with what might be called 'object-time', i.e. significant and subjective time, which is intrinsically event (change)-oriented. One of the most important aims of this thesis is to show that narrative time, which is a kind of eventful time, is more directly concerned with *kairos*, i.e. object-time than with *chronos*, i.e. meta-time, and that a proper recognition of narrative dynamics requires the reader to pay enough attention to the time of *kairos* type.

Before doing that, in Chapter 4 we will take a general look, mainly in the light of narrative poetics, at the relationships between events, language, and narrative discourse. Chapter 4 will serve as a kind of bridge between the ontological discussion of eventhood in the present chapter and the grammatical (both sentential and discoursal) discussion of story events that will be made in Chapters 5 and 6.

Chapter 4 The narrative act

As a preliminary to the linguistic/ontological discussion of story events in narrative that we are going to make in Chapters 5 and 6, this chapter attempts a general discussion of the relationships between events, language and narrative discourse. Our discussion will be centred around the following two points. Firstly, on the assumption that the fabula-sjuzhet scheme is intimately associated with the recognition/detection of story events we will reconsider the traditional fabula-sjuzhet dualism; one of the important aims of our discussion is to give the right place to fabula. Secondly, we go on to the problem of narratorial perceptibility in story-event description. With the eventhood of narration, we attempt to clarify the relationship between focalisation and story-event detection. In the course of discussion the inherent ambibuity regarding the problem of 'Who sees?' in narrative will be revealed. With the eventhood of speech/thought presentation, we will postulate a new scheme of narratorial presence in terms of the way in which the narrator is perceptible as the event cogniser.

4.1 The problem with fabula in fiction

4.1.1 Narration of historical events

The present section attempts to illustrate the mechanism of narration regarding immediately experienced events in the real world. The aim is twofold. One is to clarify the ways in which encoding, decoding, and text are generally related to each other in historical narrative, which concerns rendering story events that took place in the real world. And the other is to make the mechanism of fictional narration, which will be discussed in the next section, stand out in clear relief in contrast to that of historical

narration.

We can set up a particular narrative situation, in which a ten-year-old boy goes to the zoo and he later tells his father about what he experienced there. The important point is that there is a temporal gap between the event time and the telling time. The gap must be such that if the telling time is the present , then the event time is the past. As we will argue in Chapter 5, such a temporal gap is normally a necessary condition for a particular verbal act to be classified as a narrative. The narrative mechanism of the above-mentioned situation can be pictorially presented as follows:



Figure 4.1

First of all, it is to be acknowledged that in this particular case the narrator's zoo experience makes up the story world, and that the story world

belongs to the real world. Now, what the numbered arrows are supposed to signify can be accounted for as follows.

The solid arrow (1) designates the narrator's immediate experience of the zoo - a world entity. It is an entity or a group of entities to be sensed, perceived, and cognised.

The solid arrow (2) signifies the encoding process by the narrator; the encoding is to meet the formal requirements of narrative discourse, either oral or written. That is, the general form of the discourse is expected to be that of event description (as for the formal features of event description see Chapter 5). There are two things to be noted concerning the arrow (2). First, (2) normally follows (1) in temporal terms; this means that the narrator's rendering of his experience should have the form of *report* if it is to be referred to as a narrative. The temporal perspective of what is reported is a past one. The narrator is expected to know how things started and ended; the knowledge of the beginning and the end of what he is going to tell is a vitally important part of story telling, i.e. narrative. Second, the direction of the arrow(2) should not be taken as indicating 'from Zoo to Narrator'. Note that (2) is a continuation of (1), and that the direction of the arrow (2) means that the narrator verbalises what he experienced in the zoo. Another implication of the arrow being oriented toward the narrator is that the narrator himself can be a recipient or a reader as his narration or encoding goes on.

The solid arrow (3) indicates the direction of narration from the narrator to the reader. There are two possibilities with respect to the relation between (2) and (3). One is that there is no temporal discrepancy between (2) and (3), and in that case, the narrator's rendering in (2) and (3) are practically

the same. Put differently, (2) and (3) can represent a single sjuzhet told at some time after (1). Another possibility is that there is some gap of time between (2) and (3). It seems likely that on some occasions the narrator tells himself the story events as a trial before he completes a final version to be rendered to the reader. The trial will be a kind of skeletal telling to be "polished" or "aesthetised" afterwards, and the narrator may repeat the polishing process more than once, with the intention of improving upon the previous one. Under such circumstances, (2) and (3) are considered to be different sjuzhets performed at different times.

What is indicated by the arrow (4) is the reader's decoding process. The broken line of (4) is suggestive of the indirectness of the reader's experience of the zoo - the story world. The event-oriented world conjured up by the narrative act of the narrator is a represented one. It is a kind of medium-through world, so that it is not a world directly perceivable. It is in this respect that (4) is to be differentiated from (1), which indicates the directness of the world experience. Strictly speaking, however, it might be possible to mention a medium-through nature of (1) as well, particularly from a physiological point of view. When we see things, for example, we are in fact looking through our eyeballs, which are "spectacles", as it were. Physics will tell us that the world we see or experience is one perceived through our five senses, and that the purely physical and objective world does not belong to the world of our perception, which functions as a medium through which we experience reality. But this physiological nature of mediacy should not be overrated in terms of the authenticity of the indirectness of the reader's experience of the world involved in the verbal representation of the story events in a narrative situation. In summing up, if it is feasible to refer to (1) as indicative of the narrator's *direct* experience of a perceived world, (4) can be said to designate the reader's *indirect* experience of a conceived world.

Particular attention should be drawn to the broken arrow (5). What is to be noted is the active role of the reader as a potential detector or recogniser of story events. It will be rather easy to see a parallel between (5) and (2); both concern the cognitive feedback involving the process of verbalisation on the part of the narrator and the reader respectively. As already pointed out, the indirectness of the reader's contact with the story world is due to the fact that the world is presented to him by means of language. In his *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) Wittgenstein claims that the so-called "meaning" of language is its *use*. In the zoo situation we have been discussing, the use of language can be accounted for as follows. In (2) and/or (3), the narrator uses language in such a way that he can successfully conjure up an event-oriented world in the reader's mind. In order to do this, he has to know how to use language in that particular situation, i.e. the formal characteristics which are supposed to be appropriate for event description in narrative. Whether the ten-year-old narrator is clearly genre-conscious or not, he is expected to know that sentences like:

[4]-1 A lion came close and roared at me

are more appropriate than generic sentences conveying no spatio-temporal particularity such as 'A lion is a huge animal', if he wants to tell his father what happened to him at the zoo. Then, if the narrator's intended image signifying something that happened to the narrator is evoked in the reader's mind, it means that the reader knows the use of the language. Here we must recognise the irresistible force of language as a conjuror of some entity of the world. When the event description [4]-1 is made the reader has no choice but to have an image of a lion which came close and roared at the narrator, exactly as is told, as long as the reader's attention goes to the represented world, and not to the speech itself (the eventhood of the speech itself will be discussed in 4.3). Such a high degree of receptivity on the reader's part can

be construed as good evidence that he knows the language. At this point, the reader has two options open to him. One is to recognise the story events exactly as the narrator encoded them. And the other is to attempt his own event description by making a kind of deviation from the original encoder's linguistic choices of various kinds such as lexico-grammatical features, including sequencing and segmentation, and the choices of register, and point of view (focalisation), etc.. The sentence [4]-1 may be considered as describing two events grammatically, but it might be reasonable for the reader to interpret it as expressing one event which can be rendered as 'Something scary happened to my son', or 'He went to the zoo' in a more macroscopic way. The point in this case is that there should normally be some temporal gap between (4) and (5). The reader interprets (5) on the basis of the indirectly experienced world of narrated events indicated by (4). But the interpretation is not compulsory; the optional nature of (5) is indicated by the parenthesis in Figure 4.1. This active function of the reader as the event recogniser will be also referred to in the next section.

4.1.2 Narration of fictional events

This section aims at illustrating the encoding-decoding mechanism considered to be involved in story-telling in narrative fiction. By so doing, the contrast with the narration of historical events will be spotlighted.

Important material which can be taken as an example suggestive of how writers actually engage themselves in producing narrative fiction is *The Notebook of Henry James* (1947), which, by introducing the note-taking-habit of Henry James, shows how he developed ideas for stories. The following is a part of a general sketch of story events which were to be ripened into *What Maisie Knew*:

[4]-2 A child (boy or girl would do, but I see a girl, which would make it different from *The Pupil*) was divided by its parents in consequence of their being divorced. The court, for some reason, didn't, as it might have done, give the child exclusively to her parent, but decreed that it was to spend its time equally with each - that is alternately. Each parent married again, and the child went to them a month, or three months, about - finding with the one a new mother and with the other a new father. (De Vere Gardens, W., November 12th, 1892)

Needless to say, [4]-2 does not correspond to reality; the events described there are fictional, produced in the author's mind. One significant implication of [4]-2 is that there are no world entities to be perceived first, and then verbalised as events. It appears that the first thing the author does is to use language in a particular way so that a story world, i.e. an eventful world is created. This is where narration of fictional events essentially differs from that of historical events. A pictorial presentation of the narrative mechanism of fictional events can be as follows:



Figure 4.2

The most remarkable feature of Figure 4.2, in contrast to Figure 4.1, lies in the imaginary production of a spatio-temporal world by means of language, which comes at the very first stage of this narrative act. Therefore, nothing told belongs to reality, i.e. the world one can perceive. This means that, if an event description 'The lion roared' is made in this narrative scheme, the state of affairs recognisable as an event does not correspond to any objectively identifiable world entity. What is implied by 'objectively identifiable world entity' is the decibel level of the lion's roaring, for example. In reality, the entity which can be lexically materialised as 'roared' in a proposition 'The lion roared' is real enough (if the truthfulness of the proposition is guaranteed), and anyone could have measured its decibel level, if he had wanted to. The measurable decibel level, it could be argued, is something that "objectively" exists in the physical world in which we live, irrespective of whether it is recognised as an event or a state, depending upon how its temporality can be assessed. By contrast, no such thing is possible in a world of fiction; in this respect fiction or the world of fictional events can be said to be highly "subjective". This is why in Figure 4.2 'The story world' is demarcated by the broken line, and is encapsulated in 'Narrator'; this implicates that the story world is a subjective product of the author's imagination (for the purpose of this thesis no distinction is made between author and narrator), and, therefore, there is no direct connection between 'The real world' and 'The story world'.

Now let us account for the functions of the four different arrows in Figure 4.2. To begin with, the solid arrow (1)' should be contrasted with the two solid arrows (1) and (2) in Figure 4.1. The direction of (1)' designates the direction in which the narrator's verbal act goes to create a fictional version of world entities. It is worth noting that it is very likely that the narrator performs this process repetitively before he finally becomes satisfied with his writing. So, the initial version may well be more or less similar to [4]-2,

which sounds remarkably skeletal, summational, and general. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, whether the writing at this stage can be called narrative or not depends upon the way in which event descriptions are structured in it.

Supposing (1)' signifies the final version to be published or presented to the reader, then (1)' and (2)' are identical with each other in terms of content. What is to be remembered is that the narrator in Figure 4.2, just like in (2) of Figure 4.1, is the speaker, and at the same time the hearer of the narrative discourse he is "polishing" or has completed. The solid arrow (2)' corresponds to (3) in Figure 4.1. The narrative discourse is directed to the reader. It is normal that in fictional writing there is some time gap between (1)' and (2)'.

The arrow (3)', equivalent to (4) in Figure 4.1, is indicated by a broken line which is suggestive of the intrinsic indirectness of the reader's experience of the story world. At the stage of (3)' the reading of the graphological product which the reader has set before his eyes can be compared to the reading of a piece of music. Someone with a perfect knowledge of how to read music will have difficulty *not* reading a particular set of musical notes. For instance, if he is given three quavers followed by a crotchet, he will read them as such. The same goes for narrative discourse and its reading. If the reader has a good or perfect knowledge of the language, the narratorial voice which goes 'The wolf howled at me' will conjure up in the reader's mind a particular image the discourse represents. When given this event description, the reader will have enormous difficulty acting against the adamant force of the graphological sequence as an image conjuror, unless his concern is primarily a metalinguistic one. (In this respect, reading narrative as such, not as a set of passwords, for example, is a matter intimately associated with a pragmatic relation between narrator, text, and reader.)

Naturally, the visual or auditory characteristics which the reader experiences when the discourse 'The wolf howled at me' is given will differ from those the narrator imagined in the process of encoding. When the narrated events or situations are real ones, as in historical narrative, those characteristics can be objectively identifiable. In fictional narrative, however, things get started with language, not the experience of the world in real terms, so that a certain kind of vagueness concerning the details of the represented world is an inevitable accompaniment for both the narrator and the reader.

The broken line (4)' in Figure 4.2 is a fictional version of (5) in figure 4.1. Contemplating the reader's event-recognising process involved in (4)', as well as (5), means contemplating the problem of 'What is story event?' or 'What happened in the story?', and it is closely related to the problem of how graphological sequencing in narrative discourse can be decoded in terms of event detection. Here, we will confine ourselves to saying that in recognising story events the reader need not stick to the linguistic characteristics materialised by the original encoder (narrator); it would be misleading to assume in a rigid manner that there is a noticeable parallel between formal features of linguistic expressions and the event-state distinction. Chapters 5 and 6 will be devoted to a rigorous inquiry into the relation between textualisation in narrative discourse and event recognition.

4.1.3 Fabula and sjuzhet in reality and fiction

When contrastively viewed, Figures 4.1 and 4.2 seem to tell us some important aspects of the fabula-sjuzhet scheme in reality and fiction. In this section we attempt to summarise them.

We observed in Chapter 1 that in narrative poetics, compared with sjuzhet, fabula cannot necessarily be defined in a clear-cut way. But roughly

speaking, there are two different notions of fabula: one is that fabulas are non-verbalised, objectively identifiable events that exist prior to narrative presentation (cf. Culler, 1981: 171); and the other is that fabula is concerned with some embryonic level of verbalisation of story events (cf. Toolan, 1988: 9).

Now, when we apply the former notion of fabula to Figures 4.1 and 4.2, which represent historical narration and fictional narration respectively, we understand that in 4.1 the fabula-sjuzhet scheme holds good, whereas in 4.2 it does not; what is to be noted in fiction is that there occur no events that should be prior to the event-telling in the form of narrative. It is when we try to apply the latter notion of fabula that we feel we are confronted with a theoretical problem. One would recognise the difficulty of finding a theoretical necessity to set up fabula as against sjuzhet if fabula is considered to be a kind of skeletal description of story events. Whether historical or fictional, a narrative does not have to entail any embryonic, unaesthetised level of event description as a preliminary to sjuzhet; under certain circumstances a writer might engage *from the beginning* in a sjuzhet production - a fully embroidered and aesthetised story-event description. This seems to suggest a fuzzy status of fabula in the narrative act; one will have to admit that there is no good reason to think of fabula in the latter sense as a necessary element in story-telling.

It is now made clear that fabula in the latter sense is not to be taken as a necessary predecessor of sjuzhet, but we have no intention of dismissing as entirely useless the notion of fabula as a form of basic, skeletal story-event description. In the following few sections we attempt to discuss the significance of fabula as a perspective-free story-event description, which is closely associated with our commonsensical concept of *story's autonomy*.

4.1.4 The confusing aspect of story

Narrative poeticians have been haunted by a certain set of tantalising questions such as 'What is story? or 'What is narrative?' or 'Are story and narrative the same or not? ' In this section we take a brief look at how 'story' has been vaguely conceived of in the literature of narrative poetics.

The definition work of story sounds almost always mystifying and frustrating. Wales (1990: 431) writes, 'In ordinary usage (story) refers to a NARRATIVE, whether fact or FICTION, which is regarded noteworthy of being told' (parenthesis is mine). According to this definition, story is practically the same with narrative discourse, i.e. text.

Such an ordinary and synthetic concept of story will be challenged by a peculiarly analytic attitude shared by a number of narrative theorists. In contrast with the traditional dichotomy, i.e. fabula (story) and sjuzhet (discourse), in recent years the three-level, more complicated analysis of narrative has been launched by some scholars such as Genette (1980), Bal (1985) and Rimmon-Kenan (1983). The two systems proposed by Rimmon-Kenan and Bal can be shown respectively as follows:

Story - Text - Narration (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983)
Fabula - Story - Text (Bal, 1985)

In her system Rimmon-Kenan (*op. cit.*: 6) defines story as 'the narrated events and participants in abstraction from the text'. This definition seems to emphasise the abstract nature of story, but it is not clearly shown how and in what form the abstractness of the story is available to the author/narrator and the reader. And it is very difficult to understand how her 'story' is to be differentiated from her 'text' and 'narration' when she refers to text as

'what we read' and narration as 'the act or process of production' (*ibid.*: 3). More mystifying is Bal's scheme. She explains her three-layer system in the reverse order by starting from her 'text' (*op. cit.*: 5): 'A narrative text is a text in which an agent relates a narrative. A story is a fabula that is presented in a certain manner. A fabula is a series of logically and chronologically related events that are caused or experienced by actors'. By saying this Bal seems to suggest that at the level of story some sort of verbalisation is involved, but, like Rimmon-Kenan, she also fails to clarify what it is like, if verbalisation or speech of some kind is ever involved.

It would be plausible to point out two theoretical problems concerning such analytic concepts of narrative. One is that they are fallacious in that they tend to forget the fact that in fiction the directly available item is text (sjuzhet) only, and regard other items as equally necessary elements in narrative. The other is that they exemplify a general tendency observable in the theorising work by literary analysts to move in the direction of excessive and unnecessary subdivisions or bifurcations of narrative items without clarifying the concepts of those fragmented elements.

Narrative theorists who postulate multi-layered systems concerning the structure of narrative may argue that the ordinary, commonsensical view of story, such as Wales refers to, which identifies story with narrative, should not be taken *literally* , because we know from experience that, when a particular narrative is *faithfully* translated into another language, or retold for children, again *faithfully*, we are able to recognise the identity or the sameness of the story intact at the immanent level, despite the difference of discourse at the apparent level. Arguments like this seem to contribute to fortifying at least the solid dichotomy between fabula/story and sjuzhet/discourse, apart from the trichotomous systems such as advanced by Bal and Rimmon-Kenan. With a view to explaining that the impression of

story as solid and intact at the immanent level can stem mainly from the reader's generalisation of story events, in the next section we turn to the problem of specific/general varieties of event expressions.

4.1.5 The referentiality of event expressions

The item which is focused upon in this section is the relationship between the spatio-temporal particularity of events and the referentiality of linguistic expressions. Our argument intends to clarify the reasons why the fabula/story side is nebulous in the dichotomous narrative system mentioned in the last section by pointing out that such a dualistic view of narrative elements fails to attend to possible differences in the referentiality of event expressions.

It will be universally acknowledged that the primary characteristic of language is its generality. This peculiarity of language comes from a fact that we have no alternative but to use a limited number of words to refer to an infinite number of particular situations or states of affairs. For the immediate purpose of this section, we will concentrate upon the way in which the generality of language is related to the particularity of events.

In this thesis the ontological nature of events as spatio-temporal particulars has been repeatedly pointed out. An event is a world entity which takes place in some particular place at some particular time. But the situation can be slightly or considerably difficult when one attempts to describe the event in language. The point is that when one tries to make an event description one will find that one has a considerably wide range of wording at one's disposal from highly general to highly particular. Consider the following example:

[4]-3 Earthquake destroys whole city

A rather high level of generality of this expression will be explicated as follows. Obviously, if someone (a newspaper reporter, for instance) intends to refer to a particular event with [4]-3, ('a particular event' sounds tautological because every event must be particular, but we will use it for the moment for convenience of discussion) he can perfectly perform the job; a pragmatic situation involved in the writing and reading of a newspaper will convince the reader that a particular event is referred to by [4]-3, especially when it is headlined. But it will soon be understood that this particular expression is not specifically tied to that particular event. The same expression, it must be noted, has a potentiality of being used to refer to some other event of the same kind, if it ceases to refer to the event reported in the newspaper. This can be thought of as a *general account* which could apply to many particular incidents.

Though language expressions are essentially generic-oriented, it does not follow that there is no way of making a particular expression refer to a single, specific event in an exclusive manner. It will be possible if one attempts to use definite, specific expressions instead of indefinite, non-specific ones, and adopt proper nouns rather than common nouns. Thus, the eventhood which corresponds to [4]-3 can be far more specifically represented as in:

[4]-3' A very severe earthquake (6.4 on the Richter scale) destroyed the whole city of Izu, Japan, on the 12th of October, 1993.

On the phrasal level, generality can still be observed; the noun phrase 'A very severe earthquake', the verb phrase 'destroyed the whole city' can refer to other entities. But on the sentence level, i.e. when viewed as a proposition, [4]-3' can be said to refer uniquely to a single, particular event.

The particularity and generality of event expressions can be pictorially represented as follows:



Figure 4.3

It is to be noted that particularity and generality are gradable concepts. This means that the more general an event expression sounds, the more entities it can refer to. For example, if [4]-3 is re-written as 'Natural disaster destroys the whole city', then it will have far more entities as candidates to be referred to. Conversely, if the subject is turned into 'Earthquake (7.0 on the Richter scale)', a more specific one, then corresponding entities will be severely restricted.

Reflecting upon the relationship between the referential functions of language and the level of abstractness of individual expressions will lead us to the understanding of our ordinary sense of *identity* or *sameness*, and it will become also possible to grasp the meaning of *difference* or *change*, which, together with the former two, consists of the two sides of the same coin. By shedding light upon these, we will argue in the next section that the so-called autonomy of story is entirely dependent upon the level of particularity /generality of the event expressions one will employ to refer to particular events, and that it is narratologically meaningful to set up fabula as

a form of event description the generality of which is so high that it can commonsensically be called perspective-free event description.

4.1.6 Story's "fluidity" on the generalising scale

The main purpose of this section is to argue from a commonsensical viewpoint that, as a kind of gradable construct, story can be captured either on the high-generalisation level, which might lead one to take a kind of dualistic view regarding story as distinguishable from discourse, or on the low-generalisation level, which, by contrast, might induce one to take a monistic view identifying story with discourse. We attempt to argue that either view is possible, and that it is counterintuitive to insist that only one of them is true and theoretically valid.

The starting point of our discussion is to point out the somewhat counterintuitive English distinction betweeen story and discourse (text). Perhaps the biggest problem with this dualistic scheme is that the presupposition that story cannot be discourse itself seems to be taken for granted, and that it will automatically reject a monistic view which tends to identify story with discourse.

With respect to the abstract nature of story supposed to be existent at the immanent level of discourse, Rimmon-Kenan (1983: 6) says, 'Being an abstraction, a construct, the story is not directly available to the reader'. Such an abstract form of the story, she argues (*ibid*: 7), is something that is identifiable when a narrative is retold or represented in another medium. But a drawback of such a theoretically rigid notion will be understood by considering the following discourse:

[4]-4 One day a young man found a very big diamond in the woods. He sold it in the town, and became a millionaire.

The discussion of the formal characteristics of narrative is not intended in the present chapter (it will be made in Chapter 5), but one will intuitively acknowledge that [4]-4 is a narrative, telling a succession of past events. According to the story-discourse scheme, there must be a story at the immanent or "deep" level of this discourse. But what is it like? If the story is something abstracted from the discourse, it has to be something general. But our observation in the last section of the level of particularity/generality in language expressions will lead us to believe that event expressions in [4]-4, though referring to particular events, exhibit a high level of generality, and that it is not necessarily practical enough to try to conceive of a further form of abstraction with respect to those narrated events. Perhaps the most general form of event expression imaginable concerning [4]-4 will be 'Something happens to someone'. No-one would deny the absurdity of arguing that such an extremely abstract event expression is a form of the story to be fleshed out and aesthetised in the form of discourse afterwards. Our claim is that, when intuitively viewed, [4]-4 is a narrative discourse, and at the same time a story. In [4]-4, both the story and the discourse are directly available to the reader. Or more exactly speaking, as far as [4]-4 is concerned, it will suffice to say that it is a narrative. There is no practical need for setting up an illusory construct as distinct from the discourse (narrative) itself.

Our argument about [4]-4 may seem to suggest that we are from a monistic point of view insisting upon the identity of discourse with story. But we are not. Our intention is to point out that those people who believe in the story-discourse dualism did not realise, in setting up the theoretical system, that they had failed to think of a possibility that there can be highly general-sounding narratives like [4]-4, for which it does not make much sense to squeeze out further abstracted, or less particular, event expressions as the story.

In discussing [4]-4 we considered a particular situation in which taking a "monistic" view can be looked upon as a practical and commonsensical choice. But we are not insisting upon a strong and rigid monism, which seems to be well exemplified by Todorov's following remark:

> Meaning does not exist before being articulated and perceived.... there do not exist two utterances of identical meaning if their articulation has followed a different discourse. (1967: 20. Ron's translation, quoted in Rimmon-Kenan (*op. cit.*: 8))

This monistic view is clearly based upon the assumption that story is inseparable from discourse, and is dependent upon the medium, i.e. language. According to such an extremely strict concept of story, different wording of any kind might mean a different story-telling (discourse). Take [4]-4 for instance, a pure monist would claim that the following discourse represents a different story from [4]-4:

> [4]-4' One day *an old man* found a very big diamond in the woods. He sold it in the town, and became a millionaire.

Compared with [4]-4, there can be observed a phrasal difference; in [4]-4' 'an old man' is used for 'a young man' in [4]-4. One could argue that monists who insist that [4]-4 and [4]-4' are different stories because of the phrasal difference conceive of story on the least generalised, or the most particularised level. One could imagine that their response to narrative texts is likely to be a highly metalinguistic one. And such a strictly monistic view of narrative structure might reject the so-called *translatability*; when confronted with a translated version of a particular narrative, pure monists may react in a markedly metalinguistic way and maintain that a translated version is a totally different thing owing to the difference of the language.

Such a monistic view of story and discourse may be just possible, but common sense will tell us that it is not the only way of looking at narrative. If one believes in story's fluidity on the generalising scale, and conceives of story on a highly generalised level, one will feel it is a practical choice to claim that the following two discourses represent the *same* story despite the differences in *content*:

[4]-5 (a) One summer day a young man bumped into an old witch on the road. The witch said to him, 'I'm so thirsty.' The young man gave her a can of beer that he had. She drank it and said, 'You're a very fine young man. I'll give you this inexhaustible can of beer in return.' The witch's gift made the young man very rich.

(b) One winter day an old man came across a young witch in the meadow. The witch told him that she was terribly hungry. The old man gave her a sandwich that he was about to eat. She devoured it. After the meal, she told him how kind he was, and gave him a magical lunch box which offers him any food he wishes.

Perhaps it is when a particular narrative is compared with another one that making a dualistic distinction between story and discourse can be felt to be a practical and reasonable choice. We already referred to a monistic view according to which [4]-5 (a) and (b) are taken as totally different stories. Now we contemplate a situation in which the two narratives given above can be viewed as representing the same story. Generally speaking, it could be argued that as the reader goes more and more general, the identity of a story among different tellings will be more easily recognised, and that, conversely, as the reader sticks to minute particularities more and more, his criteria for recognising the identity will be more strict. If we try to think of the story structure of [4]-5 (a) and (b) on a highly generalised level, then it will be

possible to abstract the same story events out of the two narratives as follows: *A man sees some supernatural being in trouble. Then the man shows a small kindness to the entity at its request. Then it appreciates his kindness and gives him good luck in return.* It is to be acknowledged that when the story structure is abstracted on such a highly generalised level as exhibited in the italicised wording, one can be convinced that the two narratives in [4]-5 represent the same story.

In the next section we make an argument for the narratological significance of refering to the highly generalised story-event descriptions such as the italicised one above as fabula - a concept of story at a certain level of abstraction.

4.1.7 Fabula and the autonomy of story

The discussion in this section will be focused upon the following three points: 1) When we contemplate the relationship between story and discourse, we can grasp story at a more or less general and abstract level in contrast to discourse, which can be said to be uniquely particularised; 2) But this doesn't mean that as two different entities story and discourse are to be distinguished from each other in a dualistic way: if story is conceived of at the maximally particularised (unique) level, then it coincides with discourse; 3) fabula can be construed as a highly generalised, perspective-free variety of story.

With those three points of argument mentioned above in mind, we consider the following pictorial presentation of the structure of story/discourse which is intended as an alternative to the multi-layered schemes postulated by Bal or Rimmon-Kenan (see 4.1.4):

The structure of story/discourse



Figure 4.4

What is most noticeable in this presentation of story/discourse is that story is not conceptualised as against discourse. The implied presupposition is that a particular narrative discourse is invariably a particular story, which is indicated by 'Discourse = Story' on the right hand side. Note that this does not necessarily reflect a monistic attitude as a dogmatic stance. The point is that in terms of narrative convention the reader will intuitively acknowledge that a narrative discourse (text) is a story.

The fundamental philosophical message underlying Figure 4.4 is that as far as the relationship between narrative discourse and story is concerned it is not commonsensical to try to contemplate it from a dogmatic point of view - whether monistic or dualistic. In this respect, the exceptional and extreme case is the pure monism. As already observed, a pure monist, who dogmatically identifies discourse with story, would take it that any change in a discourse, no matter how minor it is, will make the story different. The monism naturally rejects the idea of *story's autonomy*, which means the survival of the identity (or the sameness) of a story among different versions of it. One would not be able to dismiss such a strong belief as invalid and

nonsensical, since there are actually some people (cf. Todorov) who take things in a monistic way, but it could be said that it is not a normal and commonsensical viewpoint of the discourse-story relationship. This is why in Figure 4.4 the monism, which does not accept story's autonomy, is encircled by the broken line indicative of exceptionality or optionality.

Concerning story's autonomy, it is worth noting that it ought to be acceptable even on the right hand side, i.e. right under 'Discourse = Story'. This situation can be explained as follows. Provided that identifying discourse with story is conventionally or intuitively acceptable as a normal stance, such a commonsensical view of narrative is to be distinguished from strong monism. This means that the concept of discourse being the same as story is compatible with the concept of story's autonomy. In an ordinary situation, a reader with such a normal view of narrative structure would not feel the story is different if, in a retold or abridged version, the discourse somewhat changed, and the change is felt to be so minor that it virtually has no effect upon the overall structure of the narrative (story). But this is not to be recognised as dualism in a strong sense of the term. Of crucial importance is that commonsensically it is irrelevant to adopt a purely dualistic view according to which, as substantial entities, discourse is a kind of finished product and story, a kind of raw material. Such a commonsensical stance is indicated by '(Story)', which, as a kind of mental construct optionally created by the reader, is supposed to "slide" on the particularity/generality scale in either direction, depending on the situation.

Concerning story, 'Story' and '(Story)' can be distinguished from each other by the vertical solid line in Figure 4.4. Compared with the uniqueness (maximum particularity) of 'Story' identical with 'Discourse' ('Story' is not parenthesised because it is as substantial as 'Discourse'), '(Story)' is more or less generalised, and such generalisation tends to be activated by the reader

particularly when he compares a narrative with another one, or when he compares the original discourse with its different versions, to see whether they are the same or not. It is to be recognised that the impression of the *sameness* of the stories tends to depend upon the level of generality/particularity of event expressions which the reader may attempt on his own. Suppose there are three narratives A, B, and C as follows:

[4]-6 A. One day *an old woman* went to the town and did some shopping.
B. One day *a young woman* went to the town and did some shopping.
C. One day *an old man* went to the town and did some shopping.

If we attend to A and B, we understand that in order to recognise that the two narratives are the same stories we will have to generalise 'an old woman' in A and 'a young woman' in B and obtain 'a woman' as a generalised expression. By so doing we can regard A and B as the same stories, but that level of generalisation does not enable us to see A, B and C as identical with each other, since between A/B and C the difference of sex is there. It is clear that if we want to look upon the three discourses as the same stories, a higher level of generalisation will be required for the italicised expressions in them. Presumably expressions like 'someone' will be needed for such a high level of generalisation. Only then will the three narratives in [4]-6 be regarded as the same stories.

Now it would be meaningful to make some reference to '(Fabula)' in Figure 4.4. Practically speaking, one determining factor of the degree of particularity or generality of '(Story)' must be its length in graphological terms; the shorter it is, the more general (or less particular) it will be. It would not be very easy to define exactly how general '(Fabula)' is, but Figure 4.4 suggests that '(Fabula)' is a highly generalised form of '(Story)'.

As one example of fabula, we would like to give the italicised discourse which was abstracted out of |4|-5 (a) and (b). That discourse can be said to be characterised by its neutral/objective-sounding wording, which may well be reckoned as perspective-free; there can be observed no particular word which might be assumed to reflect some particular agent's point of view or focalisation, whether literal or psychological. (Ontologically speaking, any event description is a product of the verbalising act of some conscious agent whose point of view must be subjective, but narratologically, such a purely ontological view need not be taken literally.)

Perhaps the most important narratological significance of fabula is that it can contribute to making typologies of story events in narrative. One typical example of story-event typology can be found in Russian formalist Propp's *The Morphology of the Folktale* (1968: originally published in Russian in 1928). What he calls 'functions' in it are highly generalised, neutral/objective-sounding event descriptions which may well be referred to as fabulas (e.g. 'The villain makes an attempt at reconnaissance' 'The villain receives information about the victim'). The following remark by Bremond, according to whom what Propp did in that work was a study of an autonomous layer of meaning, can be suggestive of what fabula as a mental construct is like:

> The subject of a tale may serve as an argument for a ballet, that of a novel may be carried over to the stage or to the screen, a movie may be told to those who have not seen it. It is words one reads, it is images one sees, it is gestures one deciphers, but through them it is a story one follows; and it may be the same story. (Bremond, 1964: 4. Ron's translation, quoted in Rimmon-Kenan (1983: 7))

One important implication of this remark will be that conceiving of story events at such a highly generalised level of verbalisation as to be called

fabula necessitates the loose conceptualisation of identity or sameness, which will be of vital importance, for example, to the contrasive or comparative study of narratives on a cross-cultural basis.

4.1.8 Conclusion

Our discussion in 4.1 concentrated upon the fallacious aspects of the narratological dualism which ideologically distinguishes fabula/story from sjuzhet /discourse. The points of our discussion can be summarised as follows.

When fabula is taken as events, and sjuzhet, as event descriptions in narrative the fabula-sjuzhet dichotomy holds in historical narrative, but not in fictional narrative, since in the latter no events actually occur. What is available in fictional narrative is sjuzhet (discourse) only.

The hypothetical argument that fabula can be assumed to be some embryonic event description as a predecessor of sjuzhet as the finished product is not necessarily theoretically acceptable. The main reason is that no-one can deny a possibility that in the actual process of writing narrative the author-narrator will skip the fabula-writing and engage *from the beginning* in producing sjuzhet.

The story-discourse dichotomy as the English version of the fabula-sjuzhet scheme may be looked upon as an example of an unhappy choice of expressions, because the theoretical implication that discourse is to be differentiated from story is counterintuitive, thus not commonsensically acknowledgeable.

What counts in contemplating the structure of narrative fiction is to

recognise that taking a strong philosophical stance (e.g. monism or dualism) can be misleading and impractical. This will be understood by the fact that a commonsensical and perhaps a monistic view that discourse is story (the idea that a particular narrative discourse is a particular story) is compatible with a kind of dualistic view that story can be autonomous (the idea that the identity of a particular story can survive discoursal varieties).

When one thinks of the story structure (story-event sequence) of a particular narrative discourse, one will find that at the most particularised (unique) level the story structure coincides with the original discourse; the story event sequence that one recognises is exactly what is textually realised in the original discourse. And at the same time, trying to keep the sameness of the story, one can think of the story structure at a more or less generalised level, and in that case one will be attempting one's own story-telling as a mental construct.

In terms of story-event recognition, i.e. story recognition, it will be of narratological interest to set up fabula as a form of story-event description at a highly generalised, perspective-free level. Setting up fabula is concerned with the considerably loose conceptualisation of identity or sameness. One narratological significance of making fabula will be that it contributes to seeing similarities among apparent discoursal dissimilarities in narratives; fabula-making will enable one to make typologies of story events in narrative.

Lastly, story-event recognition, i.e. story recognition at a more or less generalised level has a lot of bearing upon the reader's involvement with *event unification*, which will be focused upon in Chapter 6.

4.2 The eventhood of narration

4.2.1 Narratorial perceptibility in event description

Chatman (1978: 45) gives useful classifications of story events. According to him, there are four kinds of events in narrative discourse: 1) non-verbal physical acts (e.g. 'John walked through the park'); 2) speeches (e.g. 'John said, "I'm hungry"' or 'John said that he was hungry'); 3) thoughts (mental verbal articulations, e.g. 'John thought, "I must go"'); 4) feelings, perceptions, and sensations (which are articulated in words, e.g. 'John felt uneasy', or 'John saw the man lying dead') For the immediate purpose of the present thesis, however, it would be meaningful to unite 1) and 4) under the rubric of *non-verbal events* and 2) and 3), *verbal events*.

In this section we take a general look at the problem of narratorial perceptibility with respect to the discoursal presentation of non-verbal events by the narrator, which has traditionally been referred to as diegesis. Our observation in this section will be contrasted with that in 4.3 where we are going to contemplate narratorial perceptibility in verbal events in narrative discourse, i.e. speech/thought presentation (or mimesis).

Identifying the ontological/linguistic nature of story events is one of the most immediate concerns in the present thesis, and, as will be clarified in Chapters 5 and 6, story events can reasonably be taken as phenomena of discoursal circumstances in narrative. Our general argument is that in order to see whether a particular discourse is a story event or not one will have to look at it in the discoursal environment in which it finds itself, and that the eventhood of a particular discourse is not to be thought of only in terms of the lexico-grammatical features (including aspectual choices) it has on its own.

The discoursal item which we are going to spotlight in this section is what

might be termed 'internal-event discourse'. When we discussed Dowty's TDIP (Temporal Discourse Interpretation Principle) in Chapter 2 we observed his claim that narrative time updates even after the so-called state clauses. We reproduce the example given by Dowty for ease of reference:

[4]-7 (a) Mary entered the president's office. (b) A copy of the budget was on the president's desk. (c) The president's financial advisor stood beside the copy. (d) The president sat regarding both admiringly. (e) The advisor spoke. (Dowty, 1986: 49)

Our discussion in 2.3.1 suggested that the statives from (b) to (d) in [4]-7, which may well be interpreted as focalised sentences, following (a) as a focalising clause or a *window opener* (cf. Fehr (1938), Brinton (1980)), are to be distinguished from other statives which do not contribute to the update of narrative time. Let us reproduce Hardy's example, which we gave in Chapter 2, as one such genuine stative discourse:

[4]-8 The village of Marlott lay amid the north-eastern undulations of the beautiful vale of Blakemore aforesaid, an engirdled and secluded region.... (Hardy, *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*: 48)

In terms of temporal dynamics, the difference between (b), (c), (d) in [4]-7 and [4]-8 is that while the former can be thought of as implicating internal events, i.e. some internal perceiver's cognising acts the verbal presentation of which will be 'She saw', 'She recognised', etc., while the latter has nothing to do with such eventhood of internal focalisation.

The context-dependent nature of internal eventhood is clear in that it is an event which tends to be identified as such only in its relation to the neighbouring discoursal environments. Compare the following examples:

[4]-9 John kicked the ball.

[4]-10 The door was painted red.

As argued in Chapter 2 (see 2.2.3), it can be misleading to assume that some lexico-grammatical characteristics *inherently* represent eventhood or statehood, but one will acknowledge that the dynamicity recognisable in the verbal predicate 'kicked the ball' in [4]-9 will work as a kind of magnetism inducing the reader to contextualise it primarily in a one-off situation and read it as an event description; one will find it a marked reading to contextualise it in an iterative or habitual situation in which it is difficult to see eventhood (cf. 3.5). By contrast, the lack of dynamicity discernible from the verbal predicate 'was painted red' in [4]-10 will normally lead one to contextualise it primarily in a static situation (some might argue that the stative reading of [4]-10 is to be called decontextualised reading, but in our understanding, it is not decontextualised particularly from an ontological point of view; the fact is that, if someone says that, when looked at in a decontextualised situation, [4]-10 is a state clause representing no eventhood, he is actually reading it in a particular context in which thinking of internal eventhood is irrelevant). And it could be said that reading it as representing an internal event, implying some internal viewer's perceiving/cognising act, will require a marked contextualisation.

Now supposing that in [4]-9 and 10 the voice can be attributed to the narrator in a particular narrative, and that [4]-9 represents a prototypical one-off event, and [4]-10 implicates an internal event (an one-off event) despite the static structure at the grammatically apparent level, one will realise that the distinction between the two clauses is somewhat similar to the distinction between tagged and non-tagged speech forms (for the detailed discussion of tagged and non-tagged speech presentations see 4.3). By tagged speech we mean examples as follows:

[4]-11 (a) John said, 'I'm terribly hungry'.
(b) John said that he was terribly hungry.

In the above examples, the narratorial voice 'John said' operates as a clear event-indicator, which can be a direct answer to the question 'What happened?' These clauses have traditionally been classified as Direct Speech and Indirect Speech respectively. And by non-tagged speech we mean examples as follows:

[4]-12 (a) I'm terribly hungry.
(b) He was terribly hungry.

Speech forms such as the clauses in [4]-12 have traditionally been referred to as Free Direct Speech and Free Indirect Speech respectively. These speech forms are characterised by the lack of reporting clauses, i.e. the tag such as 'He said' or 'He thought', clearly indicative of the presence of the narrator as the event cogniser.

As will be discussed in 4.3, in terms of event description in narrative discourse narratorial perceptibility in [4]-11 is generally more explicit (or less implicit) than in [4]-12.

Now back to [4]-9 and 10, which are examples of narration, one could refer to the corresponding difference of degree in narratorial perceptibility with respect to the two clauses. [4]-9 is comparable to the two clauses in [4]-11; both in [4]-9 and [4]-11 the narrator as the event describer is rather explicit. Whereas [4]-10 is comparable to the two examples in [4]-12 in that in them the narrator as the event describer is implicit.

The problem of internal eventhood is closely connected with focalisation, i.e.

the problem of 'Who sees?' in narrative discourse. In the next three sections we look at some peculiarities of this narrative phenomenon.

4.2.2 Focalisation as a new version of point of view theory

The term 'focalisation' was introduced in Genette (1980) as an attempt to separate vision from voice. Genette refers to the theoretical drawback of most studies of point of view:

> ... most of the theoretical works on this subject (which are mainly classifications) suffer from a regrettable confusion between what I call mood and voice, a confusion between the question *who is the character whose point of view orients the narrative perspective?* and the very
>
> different question *who is the narrator?* - or, more simply, the question *who sees?* and the question *who speaks?* (1980: 186)

One typical example of a confusing point-of-view discussion can be found in Booth (1967: 91), who refers to the "effect" of the *The Ambassadors* by James: '...Strether in large parts "narrates" his own story, even though he is always referred to in the third person'. Here he is obviously paying no attention to distinguishing between point of view and voice. Bal, who, as well as Genette, claims the validity of the separation of vision from voice, severely criticises Booth; she argues that it is absurd to claim that in *The Ambassadors* it is Strether who is telling his own story, though it is a third person narrative; she explains the absurdity by referring to the following sentence (1985: 101):

> Elizabeth saw him lie there, pale and lost in thought.

Bal says that it does not make sense to claim that the phrase 'pale and lost in

thought' in the above example is spoken by the character Elizabeth, though Elizabeth is clearly the bearer of perceptual point of view.

It could be said that the greatest difference between focalisation theorists such as Genette (1980), Bal (1985) and critics such as Friedman (1967), Booth (1967) is that the former think of point of view as distinct from the act of telling, i.e. narration. Chatman (1978) does not employ the term focalisation , but he also emphasises the importance of distinguishing point of view from voice. 'Point of view', Chatman argues, 'does not mean expression; it only means the perspective in terms of which the expression is made' (*loc. cit.*). It is very easy to see a strong parallelism between Rimmon-Kenan, who elaborately exploited the idea of focalisation and Chatman, in what they say respectively: 'In principle, focalisation and narration are distinct activities (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983: 73); 'The perspective and expression need not be lodged in the same person' (Chatman, *op. cit.*: 153).

As we will argue in 4.2.4, in verbal narrative the problem of who is the bearer of perceptual (optical) point of view or who *literally* sees can be more controversial than the problem of who *psychologically* sees, and in my understanding the narratological significance of focalisation theory which emphasises the importance of separating vision from voice ought to be properly appreciated when one takes the meaning of vision primarily in the psychological sense.

4.2.3 Possible relations between voice and vision

The central notion of focalisation is, as we have seen, 'who sees?' as distinct from 'who speaks?'. When Genette says that the question 'who sees?' is the question 'who is the character whose point of view orients the narrative

perspective (*op. cit.*: 186), he evidently thinks of the character as the seer (or focaliser). Bal, however, does not necessarily stick to the character-focaliser (1985: 104): 'The subject of focalisation, the *focaliser*, is the point from which the elements are viewed. That point can lie with a character (i.e. an element of fabula), or outside it'. This implies a possible distinction between internal and external focalisations. Genette's concept of focalisation appears to be narrower than Bal's in that the former does not encapsulate the possibility of the *narrator-focaliser* in its scope. It seems to me, however, that as far as the meaning of vision is psychologically taken, thinking of the possibility of the narrator-focaliser, as well as that of the character-focaliser, ought to be of narratological interest.

Now, a comprehensive view of focalisation will lead us to schematise relations of voice and vision (psychological) as follows:

< Discrepant / coincident relations between voice and vision>

	Voice	Vision (psychological)
Type 1	Character	Character
Type 2	Narrator	Character
Type 3	Character [1]	Character [2]
Type 4	Character	Narrator
Type 5	Narrator	Narrator
Type 6	Narrator/Character	Character

Figure 4.5

Attempting an elaborate discussion of the five types of focalisation varieties shown above by finding corresponding examples is beyond the scope of the present thesis; we will confine ourselves to referring to what can be

considered to be most relevant to the topic under discussion, i.e. the eventhood of narration.

Toward the end of the last section reference was made to the primary significance of vision in the psychological sense in verbal narrative, and this will be verified by thinking of the theoretical awkwardness of applying the notion of perceptual (optical) vision to Figure 4.5. With Type 1, for example, it is physiologically acknowledgeable that when the voice is attributable to the character the physical vision can automatically be ascribed to him or her unless his or her eyes are closed, so that it will be of very little narratological importance to set up Type 1 as a variety of focalisation (it would not matter whether the discourse is visually-oriented or not). And with Type 3, the impossibility of Character [1]'s physical vision coinciding with Character [2]'s is obvious.

In terms of the relation between focalisation and story events, in the discussion of the present section we concentrate upon Type 2, and there are three reasons for this. One is that, generally speaking, discrepancy-types (Types 2, 3, 4, and 6) should be of more narratological interest than coincidence-types (Types 1 and 5). The second reason is that of the six types, Types 1, 3, 4, and 6 (Type 6 corresponds to Free Indirect Discourse, which is characterised by the dual voice: see 4.3.2) concern speech/thought presentation, which is not immediately relevant to our present discussion, and with respect to which eventhood holds irrespective of the involvement of some entity's focalising act. And the third reason is that, as will be discussed later, when vision is thought of in perceptual (optical) terms, whether or not the narratorial voice can be considered to reflect the character's perceiving act, that is, whether a particular discourse is classifiable as Type 2 or not, is of great importance in the light of story-event detection.

Now, let us consider the relation between focalisation (psychological and perceptual) and eventhood by looking at two examples. The aim of our discussion is to suggest that in terms of story-event recognition perceptual focalisation is more directly relevant than psychological focalisation. Compare the following two examples:

[4]-13 (a) The matron had given her leave to go out as soon as the women's tea was over (b) and Maria looked forward to her evening out. (c) *The kitchen was spick and span* : (d) the cook said you could see yourself in the big copper boilers. (e) *The fire was nice and bright* (f) and on one of the sidetables were very big barmbracks. (Joyce, 'Clay': 110) (italics are mine)

[4]-14 (a) With the maid holding the umbrella over her, she walked along the gravel path until she was under their window. (b) *The table was there, washed bright green in the rain*, (c) but the cat was gone. (Hemingway, 'Cat in the Rain': 315) (italics are mine)

Presumably, those who are familiar with Joyce's 'Clay' will agree that (c) and (e) in [4]-13 may well be interpreted as reflecting the protagonist Maria's point of view or vision in the psychological sense. The two clauses would most reasonably be reckoned as a part of 'description of setting' (cf. Chatman, 1978: 220-52), so that the voice is ascribable to the narrator. They are clear cases in which there is a discrepancy between the speaker and the bearer of the vision, i.e. the seer. What is to be noted in terms of story-event recognition is that, though (c) and (e) in [4]-13 express some visual (optical) piece of information, the discoursal environment does not lead the reader to take it that the character is working as the internal perceiver (focaliser), namely, as the cogniser of an internal event. To put it another way, it is unlikely that the visual information of the two clauses entails some

internal focaliser as a bearer of a particular angle of vision (in optical terms), so that, with them, thinking of internal eventhood is irrelevant.

By contrast, the clause (b) in |4|-14 seems to be non-focalised in the light of psychological vision; it would be difficult to assume that the protagonist's psycological point of view is clearly reflected in it. In terms of physical vision, however, it will probably be labelled as Type 2, if it is feasible to assume that the last part of the sentence (a) 'until she was under their window' is a window opener or a focalising discourse. If so, the clause (b) can be taken as an example of implicit narratorial perceptibility in terms of story-event description.

The ongoing discussion will lead to a general observation that, as far as the relation between focalisation and eventhood in narrative discourse is concerned, it is the presence or absence of internal focalisation in the optical sense that is immediately relevant to the detection of story events as some internal cognisers' perceiving acts. This seems to suggest that focalisation in the psychological sense is not a determining factor in the recognition of story events.

Before leaving this section, it would be worth pointing out a kind of ambiguity one will feel when coming across clauses such as [4]-14 (b). When the reader comes to |4|-14 (b), he will for the moment be left unsure about whether the state clause represents an internal event or not; it is not necessarily easy to know whether the discourse is a description of setting by the narrator for which speaking of a focalising (optical) act by the character is irrelevant or a grammatically implicit version of '*She recognised/observed that* the table was there, washed bright green in the rain' One must recognise that such ambiguity stems from two factors: one is the lack of explicit presentation of event expressions denoting the character's cognising

act such as 'She saw' or 'She recognised'; and the other is that the vague and nebulous presentation of point of view in physical terms is the intrinsic weak point of verbal narrative.

In the next section, we make brief observations concerning some typical problems with focalisation. Particular attention will be drawn to the contrast between filmic narrative and verbal narrative in the way in which angle of vision is available to the audience/reader.

4.2.4 The problem of 'Who sees?' in verbal narrative

No-one will deny that the literal meaning of 'Who sees?' is: 'Who obtains visual pieces of information?'. In this section we focus our attention upon how the literal sense of *seeing* can and should be considered in relation to the medium-through representation of story-world entities in narrative discourse. Our discussion will shed light upon some ambiguous aspects of internal eventhood which we outlined in the preceding sections.

The non-visual characteristic of verbal narrative is well illustrated in Chatman (1978: 101):

> In verbal narrative, story-space is doubly removed from the reader, since there is not the icon or analogy provided by photographed images on a screen. Existents and their space, if "seen" at all, are seen in the imagination, transformed from words into mental projection. There is no "standard vision" of existents as there is in the movies.

As Chatman suggests, the indirectness of our visual experience in verbal narrative is due to the fact that the story world which is set before us when we read narrative is nothing but a represented world. In the light of visual clarity, a conceived world differs from a perceived world in that in the

former, unlike in the latter, items concerned with vision, such as shape, colour, distance, or angle of vision, are all characterised by their physical indistinctness. Take *angle of vision*, for instance. When we see a film we can tell exactly from what angle a particular scene is shot; in a film, it could be said, almost every scene is shot from a particular, and uniquely identifiable angle - a camera must have been located at a particular place which must have automatically made the angle of vision for the camera. By contrast, in a scenic world conjured up by written or oral discourse the reader has no way of physically identifying a spatial locus from which the character or the narrator is observing things.

Literary/linguistic concepts such as point of view, perspective, or focalisation have been discussed in a very extensive way in the twentieth-century criticism of literary works. Attempting an overall review of those theoretical constructs is not the immediate concern in this section. What we are going to do is to have a quick look at some dangerous aspects of the assumption that angle of vision in the literal sense of the term can make sense in verbal narrative, as well as in visual arts like a film.

There are some linguists who attempt to see a parallel between linguistic forms and camera angles in the physical sense. Kuno (1987: 205)) argues that the sentence 'Bill was hit by John' does not correspond to a visual situation in which the camera is placed closer to 'John'. The same sort of discussion can be found in Kuno and Kaburaki (1975), in which they claim that in the sentence 'John hit Mary' the camera can be said to be placed at some point equidistant from both 'John' and 'Mary'. One must acknowledge that there is no necessary connection between the "meanings" of these sentences and the spatial position of the camera; if one was asked to make a filmic version of them one could choose any place to set the camera.

A more elaborate theoretical construct can be observed in Uspensky (1973) and Lanser (1981). They distinguish two different spatial ordinations, i.e. 'suprapersonal' and 'intrapersonal'. In the suprapersonal spatial ordination, 'the author accompanies the character but does not merge with him' (Uspensky, *op. cit.*: 58), whereas in the intrapersonal spatial ordination the narrator's optical locus is completely adjusted to that of the character, and there is no distance in between (Lanser, *op. cit.*: 198) . One will soon realise that these optically-oriented distinctions are purely physical, and most congenial to visual arts in which point of view holds in a most authentic and prototypical way. Summing up, there is no intrinsic relationship between the visually presented world and the verbally presented world in terms of optical angles from which items are considered to be shown or described. A film director could employ any particular camera angle to produce a visual version of a particular verbal expression.

It could be argued that, generally speaking, it is not 'who literally sees?' but 'who psychologically sees?' that is congenial to verbal narrative, whereas, the opposite might be true with filmic narrative. In verbal narrative there will be three conventional ways of identifying 'who literally sees?':

1) Verbal predicates representing some internal focaliser's perceiving act are explicitly given in narration (e.g. 'he saw', 'she recognised').

2) A particular visually-oriented discourse can be read as a perceptually focalised one if it is reasonable to assume that it is preceded by a window opener or a focalising discourse.

3) In a certain discoursal environment in which a particular discourse can be interpreted as exhibiting some individual flavour that is ascribable to the character, one can take it that the discourse reflects a perceptual focalisation by some internal focaliser.

The three criteria postulated above are all concerned with narratorial description of internal events (perceiving acts by the character). The problem is, however, that they are not as stable as they look. Apart from 1), 2) and 3) can be ambiguous, since it is not always easy to identify linguistic features of window openers or individually-flavoured expressions. In [4]-14, for example, the subordinate clause 'until she was under their window' might be taken as a window opener, and if so, (b) in [4]-14 will be an example of 2). In that case, the internal eventhood of (b) can be said to be confirmable without having to decide whether the expression 'bright green' in the clause (b) 'The table was there, washed bright green in the rain' reflects some personal point of view (figurative) of the protagonist. But if one thinks that the status of the subordinate clause 'until she was under their window' is doubtful as a window opener, then one will have to go to the criterion 3) to see if the following discourse represents an internal event or not, and in that case, one will have difficulty, as already mentioned, deciding whether the clause (b) includes any linguistic signs considered to be indicative of the protagonist's personal viewpoint in the figurative sense.

Ambiguity of this kind is closely associated with the intrinsic nature of language as a "common property". The relation between the generality of language and point of view or focalisation can be recounted as follows. As already discussed in 4.1.5, the primary characteristic of language lies in its generality. This means that the phraseological choice, whatever it is, is not as powerful as optically presented angles of vision in visual arts as a device showing the uniqueness of the spatial locus. No matter how idiosyncratic an expression may sound, it is not necessarily to be ascribed to one single, uniquely identifiable person.

4.2.5 Conclusion

In 4.2 we had a general look at the problem of the eventhood of narration,

spotlighting the relationship between focalisation and eventhood. Our observations can be summarised as follows.

In terms of narratorial perceptibility in narration, it is not entirely impossible to posit a certain kind of visually-oriented stative discourse in which the narrator as the event describer can be considered perceptible at the implicit (immanent) level. The eventhood of such discourse is characterised by its internality, i.e. a character's perceiving act, and by its context-boundedness.

The most salient feature of focalisation theory postulated by some scholars is its claim that voice is separable from vision. But it is to be noted that the intrinsic nature of verbal narrative as a linguistic form which represents a conceived world, not a perceived one, will naturally lead one to assume that, in verbal narrative, 'who psychologically sees?' should make more sense than 'who literally sees?'

In principle, internal eventhood is primarily concerned with 'who literally sees?', and a problematic and confusing situation in verbal narrative is that in some cases one will find it necessary to decide whether or not a particular discourse reflects a psychological point of view held by some internal focaliser in order to see if it represents an internal event. This is why the meaning of 'who sees?' tends to be ambiguous and "contaminated" in verbal narrative. Considering the ontological fact that vision in optical terms is less relevant in verbal narrative than in filmic narrative, whether a particular discourse can be considered to represent an internal event or not tends to be indeterminable.

4.3 The eventhood of speech/thought presentation

4.3.1 Speech as a showing of the story world

Narrative does not always consist only of narration, i.e. the narrator's telling. Rather, it is quite usual that a considerable part of a narrative is the character's speech/thought presentation. In the field of literary criticism the two modes of narrative discourse have traditionally been referred to as diegesis (narration) and mimesis (speech/thought presentation) respectively. The aim of the present section is to outline the general feature of speech/thought presentation as a way of showing the story world directly to the reader.

It is possible to postulate a number of varieties of speech/thought presentation (hereafter S/T presentation) according to the degree of narratorial presence or perceptibility. A traditional system of S/T presentation (e.g. Leech & Short, 1981; Short, 1982) can be shown as:



(NRS/TA = Narrative Report of Speech/Thought Acts; ID = Indirect Discourse; FID = Free Indirect Discourse; DD = Direct Discourse FDD = Free Direct Discourse)

Figure 4.6

The most noticeable aspect of S/T presentation is that it makes sense to speak of directness and indirectness in the way in which the character's verbal acts are presented. This peculiarity of S/T presentation can be contrasted with the intrinsic indirectness of narration. What we mean by the intrinsic indirectness of narration is the narrator's medium-through presentation of the story world entities. It would be feasible to divide the constituents of the

story world into two different groups: non-verbal and verbal entities. Crucial is the fact that it is non-verbal entities that have no choice but to be presented to the reader by means of a medium, i.e. language. Only through the narratorial voice will the reader know about entities such as the crash of a car, the sound of the blowing wind, the killing of an old woman. In reality, one can experience those physical, non-verbal entities with no language involved. It could be said that in such real situations one is *directly* related to the world. In narration, however, such non-verbal entities are given to the reader as entities represented by means of language; they are encoded in some lexical and syntactic form. In that sense, the reader's experience of the non-verbal entities is inevitably *indirect,* so that it makes little sense to speak of the indirectness involved in the narration of non-verbal entities, since the indirectness is self-evident. This means that, as far as narration of non-verbal entities is concerned, discussing the direct-indirect contrast is almost meaningless.

By contrast, verbal entities, i.e. linguistic acts performed by the characters do not have to be filtered through the narratorial voice; they can be "shown" to the reader. Here a question might be posed with respect to the quality of the directness of S/T presentation. Some might argue that in narrative discourse the narrator's presence is ubiquitous, since every bit of discourse, including the character's speech, is after all written by the narrator. To counter such an excessively reality-conscious stance, one can say that holding that extreme view of narrative might mean dismissing a useful fictitious concept as insignificant. Take Free Direct Discourse, for example. It is true that in narrative what is presented as an FDD is not direct in the strict sense of the word; the reader can hear no phonetic sound of the original speaker, and the graphological sequence realised in the form of discourse can be taken as the narrator's "translation" of the original speaker's phonetic products. But it must be emphasised that making a distinction between directness and

indirectness in S/T presentation is useful and meaningful in that language is mediated by language. It should be quite normal and realistic for the reader to feel as if he were listening to the playback mode of a taperecorder when he comes across FDD, namely, a non-filtered, direct presentation of the character's speech in narrative discourse.

In the following few sections we turn to the problem of how S/T presentation can be assessed in terms of story events. Based upon the perceptibility of the narrator as the cognising agent who verbally suggests that a particular chunk of discourse be taken as an event, a rearrangement of the traditional system will be attempted.

4.3.2 Non-tagged speech

As far as S/T presentation is concerned, the presence or absence of tags or reporting clauses can be a crucially important element in the light of the explicitness or implicitness of event indication by the narrator. Tags may well be counted as the indices of the narrator's recognition of verbal entities (the character's speech) as an event or events. When a speech form is presented without a tag, it is not an event description itself; the narrator's cognising act is indicated at the most implicit level, as far as the eventhood of the speech is concerned. Such a speech form may be called *non-tagged speech* (The term 'speech' here includes 'thought' in a generic way.) We suggest that FDD and FID should be the two varieties of non-tagged speech. Particular attention must be drawn to the fact that this categorisation does not correspond to the traditionally accepted concept of narratorial presence.

FDD is the most free form of speech presentation. Look at the following example:

[4]-15 'You have everything.'
'And what do you lack?'
'Everything but work.'
'You have everything I have.' (Hemingway, 'A Clean, Well-Lighted Place': 383)

With the four clauses shown above, there are no tags found. The reader will feel the dialogue is shown verbatim before his eyes with virtually no intervention by the narrator unless he is too realistic and becomes sensitive, for instance, to the quotation marks and the vertical arrangement of these clauses which helps the reader to know there was someone who wrote them down in this particular way. It is evident that the chunk of discourse given in [4]-15 is not the linguistic form appropriate as an answer to the question 'What happened?' Therefore, none of the four clauses is an event description; they are verbal entities shown directly to the reader, just as perceptible items like a girl's dancing is seen by someone in real life. It is the reader who will have to assess what is going on there. It might be safe to say that in presenting FDD the narrator has completely neglected his job of conveying to the reader the eventhood of the speech, so that the burden of event detecting, as it were, is shifted onto the reader.

Now we turn our attention to FID, the other variety of non-tagged speech. From a formal point of view, FID differs from FDD in that in FID the direct words are transmuted in the process of reporting: normally the present tense is back-shifted to past; first person and second person pronouns become third person. The stylistic effect of FID lies in the blending of the character's focalisation and the narrator's voice. Pascal (1977) refers to such peculiarity of FID as the 'dual voice'. One example:

[4]-16 She must escape! Frank would save her. He would give her life, perhaps love, too. But she wanted to live. Why should she be unhappy? (Joyce, 'Eveline': 41)

Clearly, the narrator's "hand" is more perceptible in FID than in FDD. In [4]-16, the third person pronoun 'she' and the back-shifted modal verb 'would' can be judged to emanate from the narrator, rather than from the character. In terms of event description in narrative, however, it is important to note that narratorial presence of this kind has almost no bearing upon the presence of the narrator as the event teller. As well as in [4]-15, the graphological sequence in [4]-16 can not properly be regarded as a linguistic realisation of a direct answer to the question 'What happened?', so that the sequence itself is not a direct description of story events.

In short, it can be maintained that chiefly because of the lack of reporting clauses FID has good reason to be treated in the same way as FDD. Both speech forms share a common characteristic of directly showing the story world entities, though the directness differs in degree. They equally exhibit the utmost implicitness in terms of event telling; they can be thought of as elements out of which the reader might construct the eventhood of what is uttered, and how the utterance is made.

4.3.3 Tagged speech

The other form of S/T presentation can be categorised as *tagged speech.* A common feature of tagged speech is that it is normally accompanied by a tag, i.e. a reporting clause. The primary function of a tag can be said to indicate that a verbal act was performed by someone in the story. In a traditional scheme there are two distinct speech forms with a tag, i.e. DD and ID. In this section we contend that, as far as the narrator's involvement as the event indicator with verbal entities in the story world is concerned, there is no need to distinguish the two forms, and that the traditional concept of narratorial presence which has been employed to make that distinction is irrelevant.

Let us start our discussion by comparing these examples:

[4]-17 John said, ' I will die here today.'
[4]-18 John said that he would die there that day.

Normally, the degree of narratorial filtration is considered higher in ID than in DD. In [4]-18, which is an ID, there is a shift of tense, person and adverbials from proximity reference to distance, and the shift is ascribable to the narrator. But if one attends to the tag attached to each of the two sentences and recognises it as an index of the narrator's cognising act which can be reckoned as telling the reader what happened, then one will see that there is virtually no difference between [4]-17 and [4]-18, and that, in [4]-18, the way in which the narrator manipulates the original speaker's direct words in the embedded clause has hardly any relation to the narratorial trace as the event teller which can be observed in the matrix clause.

What needs our special attention is the semantic feature of the tag. Presumably, one of the most common verbs used in a reporting clause will be 'say'. One must note the "emptiness" or the marked generality of the meaning of this verb. How general it sounds will be understood by imagining a situation in which someone attempts a very generalised event description which goes 'John did something' where the world entity perceived by the speaker should more specifically be described as 'John murdered Rebecca'. Whether 'John did something' in that particular situation can be conceived of as a proper, substantial event description or not might be a pragmatic problem, but one must admit that under normal circumstances it hardly makes an answer to the question 'What happened?'

Three significant implications may be pointed out with respect to the formal features of tagged speech. Firstly, when the narrator employs remarkably

general verbs in the tag, such as 'say' or 'tell', and the tag consists only of the subject and a generic-sounding verb as in 'he said', the degree of narratorial involvement or presence as the event teller is almost as low as it is in non-tagged speech. Secondly, the degree of narratorial presence may vary according to the substantiality of the "meaning" of the tag. Look at the following example:

[4]-19 'They told me something,' said Harriet rather hesitatingly.
(Austen, *Emma*: 240)

In this example, the generic impression of 'said' is considerably mitigated by the specific-sounding adverbial phrase 'rather hesitatingly'. In this respect, it could be argued, the substantiality of narratorial presence as the event teller is higher than if the tag had been presented merely as 'said Harriet'.

Lastly, when the focus is placed upon the extent to which the tag is substantialised, it will be found that the traditionally accepted mounting order of narratorial presence from DD to ID can be reversed. Compare the following examples:

[4]-20 John protested, 'I won't go to work today'
[4]-21 John said that he wouldn't go to work that day.

Despite the direct showing of the original speaker's words in the reported clause in [4]-20, a noticeably charged verb 'protested' in the tag can be reckoned as good evidence that the narrator rather actively performed his job as the event teller. On this point, the narrator in [4]-20 is more perceptible than he is in [4]-21, where he seems to be more concerned with interfering with the character's voice (in a neutral way) than with conveying to the reader a meaningful message about what happened.

With the embedded clause in an ID, there can be a lot of doubt as to how faithful the narrator is to the wording of the original speaker. A classic discussion can be found in Quine (1976: 185-96), in which the distinction between the so-called 'transparent reading' and 'opaque reading' is brought into focus. It is true that in the ID sentence 'Oedipus said that his mother was not his mother' the contradictory content of the embedded clause will convince the reader that the narrator's control over the original speaker's voice is more than the transformation of proximal reference to distance, but in most cases (particularly in fictional situations) there is no way of knowing exactly how intervening the narrator is, and the reader will have no alternative but to take it that the character's original speech is more or less directly (or indirectly) conveyed in the embedded clause. Let us close our discussion in this section by confirming that no matter how manipulative the narrator is in the embedded clause in an ID, it has no direct bearing upon how perceptible he is in the tag as the event describer.

4.3.4 NRS/TA

When verbal entities in the story world are presented by the narrator in the form of NRS/TA (Narrative Report of Speech/Thought Acts), the reader will generally feel that the narrator's filtering process is most conspicuous. Consider the following examples:

|4|-22 (Ignatius Gallaher puffed thoughtfully at his cigar) and then, in a calm historian's tone, he proceeded to sketch for his friend some pictures of the corruption which was rife abroad. (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 85)

|4|-23 (Meeting her a third time by accident) he found courage to make an appointment. (Joyce, 'A Painful Case': 122)

When reading sentences like |4|-22 and |4|-23, the reader will infer that

some speech acts were performed by the characters, but he can not see what they were like; the character's original wording is almost completely buried under the narrator's filtration, i.e. his cognising act, so that the reader has no way of retrieving even a fragment of the original speech. The narrator's total involvement with the story world entities, as manifested in NRS/T, is comparable to the way in which he acts upon non-verbal entities and narrates them. When the narrator performs a cognising act and verbalises a certain entity as 'John walked', he can be said to be as wholly responsible for his verbalising act as he is when he cognises the same entity as 'John lifted his left foot two inches off the ground while swinging it forward and, displacing his centre of gravity....'

The traditional schematisation of narratorial presence indicates that the narrator is more perceptible in NRS/TA than in tagged speech, i.e. DD and ID. But when the concept of 'narratorial presence' is more specified, or narrowed down, and applied to the way in which the narrator is concerned with semantic substantialisation of his event telling, it will be found that the borderline between NRS/TA and tagged speech is not necessarily clear-cut. In general, the narrator's presence as the event teller may well be higher in NRS/TA than in tagged speech, particularly when general-sounding verbs like 'say' or 'tell' are the only constituents of the predicates in tags. But as already observed, tags can be noticeably "coloured" or substantialised in various ways, and when the degree of substantialisation in tags is considerably high, as one can see in D.H. Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers*, for example, then it might be even possible that the narratorial presence as the event teller is higher in tagged speech than in NRS/TA. When the reader finds a very event-conscious narrator in DD as in:

[4]-24 'You told her, then?' came the sarcastic answer. (Lawrence, *Sons and Lovers*: 389)

then, the narratorial "hand" will be felt to be more conspicuous than when he came across a less specific NRS/TA version of [4]-18 which goes 'His mother said something briefly'. This implicates that, as far as the degree of the narrator's involvement as the event cogniser is concerned, the well-accepted order of narratorial presence can be reversed between tagged speech and NRS/TA, just as it can be between DD and ID. In that respect, it does not make much sense to draw a clear distinction between tagged speech and NRS/TA; a possible reason for making the distinction between the two - if there is any - might be that tagged speech is formally characterised by the presence of reporting clauses, whereas NRS/TA is not.

4.3.5 Conclusion

Our discussion in 4.3 was an attempt to reformulate the traditional schematisation of narratorial presence in terms of the eventhood of S/T presentation. The criterion for postulating an alternative scheme was the degree of the formally detectable involvement of the narrator as the event cogniser. Our new scheme can be shown as follows:



Figure 4.7

The noticeable characteristic of Figure 4.7 is, as mentioned before, that the concept of narratorial presence is specifically taken as that of the perceptibility of the narrator as the event cogniser. And Figure 4.7 contrasts markedly with Figure 4.6, which is a traditional system of S/T presentation in that the former exhibits a quality gap between Non-Tagged Speech and Tagged Speech/NRS/TA, whereas the latter adopt the notion of *cline* in the representation of the mounting order of narratorial presence ranging from FDD to NRS/TA. A reasonable explanation of the quality gap observable in Figure 4.7 will be as follows. When narratorial presence is construed as the perceptibility of the narrator as the event cogniser, Tagged Speech and Non-Tagged Speech are to be differentiated from each other in terms of quality, since the reporting clause (or the tag) in the former can make a direct answer to the question 'What happened?', whereas speech/thought presentation with no tag in the latter can only make an implicit answer to the same question. It would be reasonable to argue that the perceptibility of the narrator as the event teller is higher in Tagged Speech in which the narrator describes an event in the form of proposition than in Non-Tagged Speech in which the narrator does not refer to what happened (e.g. John said) in an explicit way.

Another important characteristic of Figure 4.7 is that Tagged Speech is placed in the same domain as NRS/TA, and the most immediate reason for this is that the tag in Tagged Speech (e.g. 'John protested' in 'John protested, "I won't work today"') can make a direct answer to the question 'What happened?' in exactly the same way that NRS/TA (e.g. Lucy complained about her small salary) can be a formally appropriate answer to the same question.

Now the individual items in Figure 4.7 can be accounted for as follows.

To begin with, the vertical solid line distinguishing between non-tagged speech and tagged speech & NRS/TA operates as a borderline separating the non-gradable domain of implicitness of non-tagged speech from the gradable domain of implicitness/explicitness of tagged speech and NRS/TA.

Secondly, the reason why FDD and FID are parenthesised on the non-tagged speech side is that there can be no practical need to distinguish the two speech forms in terms of the perceptibility of the narrator as the event cogniser. The same goes for DD and ID on the tagged speech side.

Thirdly, the possibility that both tagged speech and NRS/TA can be almost as implicit as non-tagged speech in the light of the narrator's event cognition is designated by the two opposite directing arrows on the left side of the figure which suggest that the narratorial involvement can be maximally implicit even in tagged speech and NRS/TA.

Lastly, the co-existence of tagged speech and NRS/TA on the left side of the figure suggests that, as far as the implicit/explicit level with respect to the narratorial presence under discussion is concerned, the gradability of the two forms can be similar to each other.

One important implication in our argument in 4.3 is that the reader can play a significant role as an event cogniser, particularly when coming across non-tagged speech, which can be taken as shown to the reader "unprocessed" by the narrator. This is closely related to the problem of event sequencing in narrative discourse. The relationship between the graphological sequence in narrative and the event sequence will be the focal point of discussion in Chapter 6.

As a preliminary to Chapter 6, in Chapter 5 we attempt a linguistic

investigation of the relation between perspective, aspect, and the event/non-event distinction mainly on the sentence-grammar basis. One of the focal matters of interest in Chapter 5 is to reveal the theoretical drawbacks of meta-time approaches employed by formal analysts of narrative discourse.

Chapter 5 Perspective, aspect, and narrative dynamics

This chapter is a linguistic and ontological inquiry into narrativity or narrative dynamics. We aim at: 1) showing that, from a formal point of view, eventhood in a particular linguistic expression is to be discussed in terms of the expression's function as a temporal-sequentiality indicator; 2) clarifying that an ontological approach to the relation between eventhood and the notion of presentness is crucially important in order to appreciate narrative dynamics properly. The discussion will be generally based upon the ontological observations of time, event and change that we made in chapter 3. Our fundamental contention is that it is a linguistic/ontological mistake to assume particular lexical/grammatical features to be inherently associated with eventhood, and that perspectival restrictions (temporal ones) are responsible for the choice of the aspectual features of contextualisation in determining whether a particular expression can be interpreted as an event or not. With a view to elucidating the nature of temporal perspective that is a key element in our discussion, the two facets of presentness will be focused upon.

5.1 The two facets of presentness

5.1.1 A preliminary orientation

The following dialogue well exemplifies the problem of the grammatical approach to events, which we are going to examine critically in this chapter:

Ted: John is working now. (People know John is very lazy.)
Joan: Is he? What a change! What a big *event* !
Alex: No, No, that is a *state* , not an event.

At first glance, there seems to be no important problem involved here, but in fact the discrepant reactions of Joan and Alex to Ted's utterance have highly complicated and controversial connotations of linguistic and ontological depth. These two differing responses, it could be said, reflect the two interlocutors' different views of the world.

It will be agreed that Joan's reaction is rather normal and commonsensical, compared with Alex's, which is highly marked and unusual. It is the Alex-type point of view that has been shared by most of the formal analysts of narrative dynamics, whose main concern is to contrive a typology of "linguistic" events (and states), on the dualistic assumption that it is possible and reasonable to set up "linguistic" events as distinct from real world events.

One of the significant implications involved in the dialogue above concerns the linguistic and ontological problem of whether it is legitimate to acknowledge a certain fixed and stable relation between intrinsically semantic features, such as events and states, and the grammatical form of language. And another implication is concerned with the way in which the present time, or presentness can and should be viewed in terms of the A-series, i.e. the past-present-future scheme which, as we discussed in Chapter 3, is considered to constitute the human sense of time.

The main objective in this chapter is to prove, on the basis of the ontological discussion we made in Chapter 3, that the Alex-type view of the world can in no way be justified, and to put forward a theoretical framework that will enable the reader of narrative to recognise the eventhood of states of affairs such as verbally expressed by Ted's discourse. What will be emphasised in the course of discussion is the flexible and commonsensical role of the reader as the *event detector* in narrative discourse, which tends to exert a

perspectival and grammatical "yoke" upon the reader (particularly upon the formally-trained reader) in recognising narrative dynamics.

5.1.2 Spurious eventhood

The essential relation between time and change was discussed in Chapter 3. Our awareness of time depends upon our awareness of change or event. No-one will deny this, but one might ask a rather naive question: 'If change or event is essential to time, then what happens to time when there is no change, that is, when our consciousness focuses on the statehood or objecthood, not on the eventhood, of some entity?' For instance, Moens (1987: 43) defines states as follows: 'States are "unbounded", although they seem to extend in time - no reference is made to their start and end points.' Here it is pointed out that states are also *temporal* , and we must agree that this is an empirical truth; as everyone knows, *duration* or the length of time is a very important notion when we make reference to temporal phenomena in the world. Then how is it possible to account for the temporal characteristics of non-events like states?

The answer to this question seems to lie in what I call *spurious eventhood* of the transition of time points in the clock sense. It is to be noted that the notion of 'clock-time' implies the notion of transition or change. We know, for example, that 8:30 is followed by 8:31, or that 1993 A.D. is followed by 1994 A.D.. It appears reasonable to assume that the transition of time points like these can be thought of as change or event, because it is possible to claim that an identical entity called *time point* undergoes change each time the point of time "moves". If we accept this as wholly true, then things will become contradictory; we will have to say that states are also events, because states have some extension of time that is made up of time points in the clock sense. But in our understanding, events and states are two distinct

cognitive/perceptual activities, and should be differentiated from each other. The crucially important point is that time points are construed as representing *time itself*, and are by no means states of affairs in the normal and ordinary sense. The change of time points is not as substantial as the change of states of affairs such as someone's facial expressions or the bank rate. This is the reason why I call it *spurious;* it is no proper change or event. It must be acknowledged that when we recognise a change in something, the change we perceive is the change that happened to the something, not the change that happened to the point of time. Under normal circumstances, this spurious eventhood is entirely backgrounded in our consciousness, and this explains why we can recognise and say that something is in a certain state, with no perceivable change, and that the state will extend in time.

Now getting back to the ontological principle claiming the intrinsic relation between time and change, we must pay attention to the fact that by accepting the change of time points - as part of our temporal experience - the truthfulness of the ontological principle can be confirmed. People often say, 'Nothing has changed; only time has passed.' At first blush, this saying seems to work against the principle that insists upon the essential relation between time and change, but we could paraphrase it as: 'No state of affairs has changed, but the point of time has changed.' In summing up, it would be feasible to argue that, as far as normal events, involving things and objects, are concerned, we perceive time in the change that occurred to a particular entity (in this case the change of time points is not focused on in our consciousness), and that, as far as states are concerned, we perceive time in the spurious events consisting of the change of time points. (Note that the point of time can be elastically conceptualised such as 'the moment', 'the hour', 'the day', 'the year'.) This means that in any case change is essential to time; where there is change, there is time, and vice versa.

It is now clear that the ongoing discussion will lead us to the observation that the spurious eventhood we have been mentioning so far is the backbone of our awareness of the so-called eternity, permanency, eternal truth of mathematics, or objecthood. When we say X is eternal, it is virtually tantamount to saying that X's eternity is guaranteed through the ever-changing time points. We might be able to say that it is particularly when we think of markedly changeless, ever-stable quality of something that the spurious eventhood can be foregrounded in our mind. Semanticists and grammarians may label the proposition: 'God is just' as 'eternal truth' (cf. Lyons, 1977: 680), but what is to be remembered is that such labelling is supported by the awareness of the spurious eventhood.

5.1.3 The relative and absolute nature of the A-series

MacTaggart's theory of time (1927) shed light on the ontological nature of time. Presumably, one of the greatest observations he made is that change entails the cognitive/perceptual activity on the part of a conscious being. But his theory is not without problems. Firstly, he refers to events like 'the death of Queen Anne' in the B-series. It is an ontological mistake to mention events (recognised changes) in the B-series in which things and objects are located at fixed points of time in an absolute manner. In our understanding an event is impossible without the cognition of change, and change is an intrinsic feature peculiar to the A-series. The second problem, which is the focal point in the present section and the next, concerns his inadequate awareness of the ontological characteristics of each of the three determinations, i.e. past, present, and future. What he overlooks are: 1) the inherently relative and at the same time absolute nature of the three determinations; 2) the *active* nature of presentness; 3) the two possible varieties of past, present, and future. In the present section we concentrate on 1) and 2).

The discussion of the three points given above will elucidate the characteristics of 'story present', 'character now', 'narrative time' or 'reference time', the investigation of which is the immediate purpose of the present thesis.

MacTaggart rightly pointed out the relative characteristic of the three determinations, i.e. past, present. and future by saying that the meaning of one of them is entirely dependent upon that of the two (*ibid.*: 20). But he failed to clarify the absolute nature of the A-series.

What we mean by the absolute nature of the A-series is concerned with its *regional absoluteness*. Once we single out a particular point of time as the present, the time before is absolutely the past, and the time after that is absolutely the future. And more importantly, once we set up the three temporal regions, it becomes irrelevant and pointless to subdivide each region into the sub-past, the sub-present, and the sub-future.

The reason why this is the case might be inferred from the active role of the present, as compared with the passivity of the past and the future. The focus-carrying nature of the present will be understood when we draw attention to the fact that, if we take a particular point of time as the present, the past and the future are automatically set up. In other words, the past and the future make sense only in relation to the present. This seems to suggest that the three determinations are not equal in status in our minds. Taking the consciousness-involving nature of the A-series into account, it would be argued that presentness is inexplicably intertwined with what might be termed 'the focus' or 'the focalised part' of human concsiousness. This will account for the fact the three temporal determinations are absolute entities which reject being subdivided into sub-determinations. The present, as distinct from the past and the future, has an absolute function as the

focus, so that it is meaningless and irrelevant to make the focus dual by decomposing the present into the three sub-determinations.

5.1.4 The time-point A-series vs. the significant A-series

With the assumption that the present is the focus or the centre of the past-present-future series, we will be able to posit two kinds of event series. We call them *the time-point A-series* and *the significant A-series* respectively.

By the time-point A-series we mean a temporal series in which the movement of time points can be thought of as representing the renewal or change of presentness. As we observed in the last section, this is not the series of real events; the transition or movement of time points in the *chronos* sense only represents substitutionary eventhood with no involvement of the change in substantial states of affairs.

When St. Augustine referred to the all-at-oneness of past, present, and future, saying: 'The present of past things is the memory; the present of present things is direct perception; and the present of future things is expectation' (St. Augustine, 1961: 267), he was presumably contemplating past, present, and future in the time-point A-series. When he thought about the present, what he had in mind was the perceptible quality of the ever-fleeting presentness as a punctual point of time (though, I believe, the concept of nanoseconds would have made no sense in his days).

By contrast, the significant A-series is a story-like series of events in which the present can be distinguished from the past through the change in states of affairs in the world, either real or fictional. The most salient feature of this temporal series is that the consciousness of *significance* of some kind makes a temporal distinction between the past and the present. Let us imagine an

astronaut staying in outer space for the first time in his life. If he captures this situation on the conscious level and gives it a verbal expression like: 'I'm *now* in outer space', it is undoubtedly an event description. Judging from the situation or the *context* in which the expression is given, the eventhood it refers to should be clear to the astronaut himself ('the character' in a narrative sense). And the eventhood should be also clear to those people ('the reader', again, in a narrative sense) who, with the contextual knowledge, hear or read what the astronaut said. Note that the temporal adverb 'now' can help both the speaker and the listener to recognise in an accentuated way that the situation is different at the present time from what it used to be.

Ontologically speaking, an event is marked by an awareness of *temporal sequentiality*. And in the astronaut's case, the temporal sequentiality is to be perceived in the contrast of two different phases for the astronaut, i.e. the time when he was on earth, and the time when he is in outer space; the former will be labelled as 'the past' in contrast to the presentness of the latter.

The crucial point to be emphasised concerning the two kinds of presentness, one in the time-point A-series and the other in the significant A-series, is their difference in dimensional quality. It must be recognised that the difference between the two NOWs is not the difference in duration or physical length of time. Reference to points of time may seem to suggest the punctual and rather atomic nature of the present time in the time-point A-series, but, as already pointed out in 5.1.2, it need not be atomic. Depending upon the situation, the point can vary in length. On the other hand, one may have an impression that the significant NOW is generally lengthy or extended, compared with the time-point NOW, but it can be momentary in terms of duration. For example, if someone has finished

writing a project, the moment can be perceived as an event that constitutes a new present time for him. What is worth noting is that it is in the time-point NOW that the notion of duration in the physical sense matters and is directly relevant, and that in the significant NOW, duration in the physical sense is insignificant and rather irrelevant. And what is peculiar to the significant NOW is that the sense of now-ness is squeezed out of one's awareness of eventhood in a particular state of affairs as one goes along in life; this awareness of eventhood will not presuppose one's being conscious of NOW as a time point in the physical sense.

Lastly, it is to be noted that NOWs in the significant A-series are not necessarily linear in their arrangement. Getting back to the astronaut's case, we could argue that, though his staying in outer space makes a NOW for him in a significant A-series, his seeing a meteor passing by the spaceship, for instance, can constitute a new NOW, i.e. a new event for him in another significant A-series, without affecting the presentness, or the eventhood, of his staying in outer space. Due to the cognitive principle of selectivity that we discussed in 3.5.1, he cannot perceive the two different NOWs at the same time; when he attends to one, the other will be backgrounded. But he might be able to assert that (at the time he saw the meteor) the two NOWs, though oscillating in mind, "exist" for him.

One of the most important points of argument in the present thesis is that narrative is less associated with the time-point A-series than with the significant A-series, and that the inquiry into how to detect story events must be made in terms of the temporal series of significant NOWs. With the characteristics of the two series of time discussed so far in mind, we look into the problem of narrative perspective in 5.2.

5.1.5 Conclusion

5.1 was intended as an improvement or elaboration upon the time theory advanced by MacTaggart. In order to describe properly the relation between time and event we postulated the two past-present-future schemes, i.e. the time-point A-series and the significant A-series. The former, concerned with our awareness of meta-time, or time itself, is the series of objectively measurable time points that can be conceptualised independent of actual states of affairs in the world, and the latter, concerned with our awareness of object-time, is the series of real events responsible for our sense of temporal sequentiality *in* actual states of affairs. The focal point of the discussion was that presentness literally occupies the central place in the past-present-future scheme, and is to be given priority over the past and the future.

5.2 Narrative perspective and event description

5.2.1 A parallel between narrative and reality

The aim of the present section is to attempt a general discussion of some similarities between narrative (or story) and real life as a preliminary to the examination of the peculiarities of narrative perspective.

Culler (1975: 189) refers to the existence of the fundamental convention of narrative fiction as follows:

> ... For the basic convention which governs the novel - and which, *a fortiori*, governs those novels which set out to violate it - is our expectation that the novel will produce a *world* (italics are mine).

This observation by Culler bears strong resemblance to what John Fowles says from a writer's point of view: '...we wish to create worlds as real as,

but other than the world that is. Or was' (1972: 86). The veracity of their remarks will be confirmed in the actual process of reading narrative; the reader will normally be able to see the world, or the "reality", of fiction unfolded before his eyes. The concreteness of the created world, as a spatio-temporal particular, is suggested by Traugott and Pratt (1980: 248) when they define narrative as: 'essentially a way of linguistically representing past experience, whether real or imagined.' Narrative fiction comprises events as "real" as those which actually occur in the real world. And, as Mendilow (1952: 35) says, this creation of reality or a real world is made possible only through the close cooperation between reader and writer.

The story world and the real world in which we live look very similar to each other in so far as they are both spatio-temporal constructs. However, the illusory nature of narrative, as the medium representing a world, has often been pointed out. Mendilow (*op. cit.*: 81) refers to the illusion-creating function of language in narrative as follows:

> Language cannot convey non-verbal experience: being successive and linear, it cannot express simultaneous experiences; being composed of separate and divisible units, whether of words or groups of words, it cannot reveal the unbroken flow of the process of living. Reality cannot be expressed or conveyed - only the illusion of it.

Wales (1990: 300) also mentions the illusory quality of narrative: 'That literature can give a reflection of life is only an illusion, since words must replace the actions.' What both Mendilow and Wales emphasise is the gap or discrepancy between a symbolised representation of the world through linguistic signs and the world itself.

It is true that the graphological sequence of linguistic signs that constitutes narrative is not the world itself; it just *represents* a world. In narrative,

nothing is perceptible, tactile, or tangible, quite unlike the real world. On this point we must acknowledge that Wales is right. But what Mendilow says seems to deserve careful consideration. Our contention is that narrative reflects a very important aspect of reality or fictional reality, and that it is not to be dismissed merely as an illusion of life.

The tendency to try to see a clear-cut contrast between narrative and reality can be also observed in the following remark by Mendilow (*op. cit.*: 42) with respect to what he calls the artistic economy of narrative: '...all the longueurs, the heterogeneity and the irrelevances of life, the casual as distinct from the causal events, are eliminated in accordance with the principle of artistic economy'. The lack of artistic economy in real life is referred to as follows: 'Real life' is a kind of chance-medley, consisting of many unconnected scenes' (Baubauld, 1810: 55, quoted in Mendilow, *ibid.*: 47).

The discrepancies between narrative and real life, as mentioned above, should not be overrated if we call our attention to the consecutivity, discontinuity, or selectivity of our verbal behaviour that can be best simulated or represented by the graphological linearity in narrative discourse. Reality is the world we experience, and our experience consists of sensation, perception and cognition. Among these three, only sensation concerns simultaneity or contemporaneousness of our experience; it is our common experience that more than one item can come into our eyes at the same time when we see a particular area, a garden, for example. But when it comes to perception or cognition, the principle of 'one thing at a time' governs, as we observed in Chapter 3 where the selectivity of human perception was brought into focus. 'Perception', Gross (1987: 98) says, 'is an active process which involves selection, inference and organisation.' If so, we would be justified in claiming that perception is closely related to our verbalising act in that it helps to make the world discontinuous both spatially

and temporally. (On this point it must be admitted that perception and cognition, which concern our awareness of *objects* and *facts* respectively, are not as distinct from each other as one might suppose). From this we can conclude that as a mirror of reality as something to be experienced on the level of sensation, narrative is nothing but a poor instrument (narrative does not lend itself to expressing what Banfield (1982) calls 'non-reflective consciousness' simply because things are *verbally* expressed), but that narrative, viewed differently, can be reckoned as reflecting real life with a high fidelity because of its graphological, unidirectional presentation that simulates non-simultaneous, consecutive verbal activities of human beings.

Mendilow places a great deal of emphasis upon the artistic economy of narrative in comparison with the irrelevancies-ridden aspect of real life. But this gap should not be too accentuated, either. Sperber and Wilson (1986: 119) argue that people's intuitions of relevance make them distinguish relevant from irrelevant information. Assuming that real life consists of the co-relation between the external world and ourselves, we could argue that when our consciousness acts upon the world, the relevance-seeking mind operates, and that to the extent that the mind works, the world tends to be captured as something connected; significant, homogeneous, and causal but not casual. Of course such mental behaviour is not necessarily artistic (this is where real life greatly differs from narrative in which perspectival choices of various kinds, made by the author-narrator, can contribute to making the text sound artistic), but real life, seen from that perspective, will come close to narrative in that both have a common attitude toward seeing a kind of unity or coherence in states of affairs. It is possible to observe a parallel between real life and narrative when Fowler (1986: 64) says: '...texts tend to be cohesive, to stay on the same topic.' What Fowler says is in line with Friedman's remark (1967: 131): '...the very act of writing is a process of abstraction, selection, omission, and arrangement.' Any narrative, as a text,

tends to stick to the same topic in a particular spatio-temporal framework, and it might be argued that real life, as far as our discontinuity-oriented, relevance-minded consciousness operates, tends to be on the same topic, similarly in a particular spatio-temporal framework in which we live.

5.2.2 Existential perspective

In the preceding section we discussed some similarities between narrative and real life. In this section we turn our attention to the problem of perspective as another aspect of resemblance between the story world and the real world. Putting aside the problem of perspective in narrative, which we are going to examine later, in the present section we discuss what might be termed *existential perspective*, which designates our live and on-the-spot point of view in real life from which we describe events we notice in and around ourselves.

In real life we are inherently tied to HERE and NOW. Both 'here' and 'now' are deictics, so that they actually designate different spatio-temporal loci as we go along in life. Jespersen (1924: 258) points out that NOW need not be a mathematical point; it can have some duration, just as HERE can vary in size according to circumstances. When referring to the possibility that NOW can be extended in time, Jespersen must have had no clear distinction in mind between the presentness in the time-point A-series and that in the significant A-series, which we discussed in 5.1.4. Presumably he was alluding to the durational variety of what we call the time-point NOW. Whether the presentness we feel is a time-point one or a significant one, and whether its duration is atomic or extended, we have no alternative but to live with our NOW until we die. Of course we are not always event-conscious in our life. This means we do not recognise renewed now-ness or eventhood all the time, and this is because we do not always consciously act

upon the world. As we observed in Chapter 3, one's event recognition is closely related to the working of the mind conscious enough to verbalise things. Therefore, on the preconscious or unconscious level no clear notion of present as against past or future would be possible. In other words, our sense of time is backgrounded on the preconscious or unconscious level. But as long as we become event-conscious, time is with us. What we mean by existential perspective is *a point of view from which we feel NOW synchronously in real terms*. This perspective excludes the retrospective sense of NOW which is now the past, such as in: 'At that time the event made a new NOW for me.' And needless to say, such synchronous now-ness entails a spatial counterpart, i.e. the here-ness. This now-ness is the intrinsic temporal perspective that is inseparable from our life, our existence, so that it is *existential* for us.

If one attempts to find a narrative version of existential perspective, one may feel that it is almost identical with what narrative theorists call 'internal perspective' (Fowler, 1977), 'synchronous point of view' (Uspensky, 1973), or 'internal focalisation' (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983). One important difference between existential perspective and those narrative concepts is that the former is a variety of one's temporal stance in event description, whereas the latter are concerned not only with temporal perspective but also with what Chatman (1978: 151-152) calls 'figurative point of view' such as ideology and conceptual systems (the difference between the two will be referred to again in 5.3.1). Existential perspective is a temporal perspective of someone actually living, and this is where it greatly differs from narrative concepts like internal perspective or internal focalisation. Being genuinely synchronous, and not retrospective, existential perspective is the dynamics-oriented awareness of the present time that is renewable each time a new event is recognised.

5.2.3 Existential-perspective event description

Existential perspective is a temporally immediate point of view from which to describe an event constituting the synchronous now-ness for the describer. Its linguistic/ontological characteristics will be generalised as follows:

(a) The temporal immediacy of Existential-Perspective Event Description (hereafter EPED) entails Existential-Perspective Deictics (hereafter EPD) such as 'now' or 'just now' which, either explicitly expressed or just implied, indicate the describer's awareness of transiency or temporal sequentiality that is quintessential to eventhood.

(b) EPED has an absolute nature as a linguistic expression. This means that on the intra-/extra-sentential level EPED does not lend itself to achronological or panchronic representation. This is because the temporal immediacy of EPED normally does not give the describer the time to *edit* in a retrospective way the event(s) he is rendering.

Of the two characteristics mentioned above, (a) is mainly concerned with the sentence-based linguistic/ontological features of EPED, and (b) is focusing upon its discoursal nature. In the following few sections we will look into (a) and (b). The focal point of argument is that contextualisation is a necessary condition for a particular linguistic form to be recognised as an event description, and that there can be perceived a co-relation between the series of now-ness in EPED on the discourse level and the series of story present in narrative discourse. We will investigate the characteristics of EPED on the assumption that doing so will help to elucidate the nature of narrativity or narrative dynamics, which is our immediate purpose in the

present thesis.

5.2.4 Existential-perspective deictics (EPD) and context

The aim of this section is to show that a sentence can be taken as an EPED, irrespective of whether the now-ness implied in that sentence is to be counted as a time-point NOW or a significant NOW, depending upon the context. (For the purpose of the thesis, we will concentrate upon 'now' of the 'here-and-now' of EPED, since the spatial deictics are less relevant than temporal ones in terms of event detection).

To begin with, let us make a general comment on the relation between EPED and EPD. As far as the relation between the two items introduced in (a) in 5.2.3 is concerned, what matters is whether one recognises a particular state of affairs as *temporal enough* to allow the interpretation of EPD such as 'now' or 'just now' being implicated. What is meant by *temporal* is the describer's (and consequently the reader's) awareness of temporal sequentiality, i.e. the sense of some new situation being initiated, continuing, or terminated. Crucial is the fact that being temporal does not necessarily mean being temporary. Temporariness is closely associated with the notion of boundedness, which means that something has comparatively short duration, starting and ending at relatively precise points in time. In our understanding, however, boundedness is not a necessary condition for a particular state of affairs to be labelled as an event. *Eventhood holds when it is recognised that a new situation is started or ongoing.* This is because the awareness of something new is going on will lead to the awareness of a change of state. Another important thing to be noted is that both the time-point and significant NOWs are responsible for the sense of a particular state of affairs being temporal. Now we look into the relation between EPD and context more elaborately.

Let us first think of a situation in which 'now' as an EPD can be reckoned as belonging to the significant A-series. As will be discussed in more detail in 5.2.7, the present progressive has good reason to be thought of as a prototypical or superordinate grammatical form realising an EPED in terms of tense and aspect. One example:

[5]-1 I'm (now) eating lunch in the kitchen.

If the now-ness felt by the describer called 'I' is a significant one, there are two important characteristics to be attended to. One is the lack of the so-called *framing effect*, and the other is the irrelevance of distinguishing between *speech time* and *event time*. The framing effect of the progressive, as we will observe later, concerns the time-point A-series, i.e. the consciousness of time as the series of objectively measurable points of time. In [5]-1 the whole situation of eating lunch constitutes the sense of now-ness for the describer, which automatically distinguishes itself from the past situation in which the eating of lunch had not occurred. The second point is that in the significant A-series it makes no sense to distinguish between speech time and event time. It is when NOW is conceived of in the time-point sense that conceiving of the two times as distinct entities will be meaningful. Again, the notion of speech time is intimately associated with that of the framing effect of the progressive and other grammatical forms generally considered to function like the progressive. Let us leave our discussion of [5]-1 as a case in which contextually NOW is a significant one by confirming that the eventhood implicated in that sentence is "objectively" clear to us.

Secondly, we contemplate a case in which 'now' as an EPD is contextually considered to belong to the time-point A-series. As a rather special context, one can imagine a situation in which [5]-1 is an answer to the question by

someone who made a phone call to the describer: 'It's half past twelve *now*. What are you doing *now*, John?'. Obviously, 'now' that appears twice here is a time-point NOW; in the questioner's mind the NOW as a time point is foregrounded. Then, what is the 'now' in [5]-1 like as an answer to the question? It is likely that, as a kind of discoursal inertia, the describer of [5]-1 will respond in terms of the time-point A-series. In that case, the so-called 'framing effect' will be perceived; the describer's eating lunch can be taken as a situation stretching into the past and the future. But what is important is that his awareness of the time-point NOW does not prevent [5]-1 from being labelled as an event. This is simply because the whole situation is interpreted as temporary enough to be described using 'now' as an EPD. If there is contextually a good reason for 'now'(either time-point or significant) to be explicitly employed, then the 'now' is clearly working as a temporal-sequentiality indicator, i.e. an event marker.

It is to be noted that the awareness of NOW as a spurious event concerned with the change of time points lends itself to the awareness of speech time and event time as two distinct entities. One can easily notice a co-relation between this and the notion of framing effect of the progressive construction. The framing effect of the progressive has been referred to by many grammarians and linguists (cf. Jespersen, 1931: 180; Leech, 1971: 17). Jespersen, for example, illustrates the temporal frame of the progressive as follows (*loc. cit.*):

[5]-2 *He is writing*

(he has begun writing) NOW (he has not stopped writing)

It is clear that 'NOW' in the diagram is a NOW as a spurious event, i.e. a time point around which the situation 'he is writing' stretches into the past

and the future as a frame. The time-point nature of this NOW conceived of in connection with the framing effect of the progressive will be clearly understood if we draw attention to the "active role" of the present as compared with the past or the future, as we discussed in 5.1.3. The most salient characteristic of the past-present-future scheme is that the past and the future make sense only when the present is regionally demarcated. This ontological fact accounts for the *priority* of NOW in the schematisation of [5]-2. In [5]-2 the state of affairs represented in the progressive is looked upon as attendant circumstances which stretch into the past and the future with the NOW as a kind of core or centre in the describer's mind. Ontologically speaking, the 'NOW' in [5]-2 is a temporal entity which is, as it were, standing by itself independent of the progressivised state of affairs. Such presentness can be virtually identified with that of speech time. It will be pointed out later that the formal notion that the progressive is generally to be classified as a state or a process, as distinct from an event, results from a well-accepted but rigid and unrealistic view of presentness which tends to take the time-point NOW, i.e. the "objective", clock-sense NOW, as the only presentness that is empirically verifiable.

The problem with the schematisation shown in [5]-2 is that it fails to attend to the possibility that the progressivised state of affairs can constitute a significant NOW, i.e. an event in the proper sense of the term. Then, how are two varieties of now-ness ontologically connected with each other? The relation between the time-point and significant NOWs can be accounted for in the light of the focus-periphery theory (see 3.5.1). As far as the recognition of a change in a particular state of affairs, i.e. an event, is concerned, the two NOWs are not entirely exclusive of each other. When the significant NOW is focused upon in mind, the time-point NOW is held out of the centre of attention because it belongs to a different dimension. By contrast, due to the authenticity of the significant NOW attached to EPED,

even when the time-point NOW is contextually foregrounded, it does not mean that the significant NOW is entirely gone; it is, as it were, waiting to be recalled, replacing the time-point NOW. The point is that the two NOWs cannot "exist" simultaneously, owing to the one-thing-at-a-time principle of human perception/cognition.

Ontologically speaking, the greatest difference between the two NOWs is as follows: with the time-point NOW, setting up of a particular time point as the present is of utmost importance; only then would it be applied to the state of affairs - whatever it is - which then becomes recognisable as consisting of past, present and future; whereas, with the significant NOW, the recognition of change in some substantial item in the world, namely, an event, comes first, and then comes the recognition that the event constitutes a new NOW.

Lastly, let us think up a context in which [5]-1 cannot be interpreted as an EPED:

[5]-1' I'm eating lunch in the kitchen.

If the context gives a situation in which [5]-1' is an answer to the question: 'What are you doing at half past twelve every day?', then no eventhood can be perceived; no temporal sequentiality is implicated. In order for a particular state of affairs to be perceived as an event it must be a spatio-temporal particular. [5]-1' denotes iterativity or habituality, and no dynamicity is involved. In short, [5]-1' is *atemporal* as against [5]-1, which is temporal. Using EPD like 'now' or 'at the moment' for [5]-1' is contextually inappropriate and irrelevant. What is implied in [5]-1' is the describer's constant condition or state, so that it is to be recognised as a *state description*. (The ontological fallacy of event detection will be discussed in Chapter 6.)

5.2.5 EPED and coherence

In this section we discuss the ways in which our sense of now-ness is related to the linguistic and logical problem of coherence. This will spotlight some characteristics of EPED on the discourse level.

The starting point of our discussion is to remember the ontological fact that a temporal series is intrinsically *coherent*; otherwise it could not possibly be called a series. Our main interest in this section is to see, from the viewpoint of EPED, how this fact concerns the two different temporal series, i.e. the time-point and significant A-series.

As we confirmed in the preceding section, the most important feature of the now-ness in the time-point A-series is that it can *stand by itself*; the now-ness as a time point can be recognised as such without being related to a particular state of affairs in the world, and that when the now-ness is spoken of in relation to a state of affairs the recognition of the now-ness comes first, and then it is brought as a time point with respect to which the state of affairs is singled out as a topic. It goes without saying that, despite its spurious nature in terms of eventhood, this temporal series is so coherent that it can make a past-present-future scheme. For example, it is coherent enough to set up a series of May, June, and July in 1994 with June as the existential-perspective present time. Linguistically speaking, one interesting fact about the time-point series of now-ness is that, as long as coherence is maintained in terms of the series of time points as NOWs, no coherence is needed for the states of affairs to be chosen as topics to refer to in relation to the time points. The following example will illustrate this:

[5]-3 (7:30) John is now eating breakfast. (8:30) A helicopter is now flying. (9:30) A young lady is now walking toward the Castle.

Under normal circumstances it is very difficult to see coherence between the three event descriptions in [5]-3. This example exhibits the intrinsic nature of the time-point NOW type of EPED which, on the discourse level, does not concern topical unity of the states of affairs to be referred to. (This does not exclude the possibility of the time-point NOW type of EPED being combined with some topical unity of states of affairs. For instance, in the case of broadcasting at regular intervals the *status quo* of an erupting volcano, a possible rendering will be as follows: 'It's ten o'clock now. The volcano is very active at the moment. The next report will be at noon.' The crucial point is that in the case of the time-point NOW type of EPED the recognition of the time point is given top priority.)

By contrast, the significant NOW type of EPED is characterised by the topical unity or coherence of some kind that is perceivable in the sequence of event expressions. One example:

[5]-4 John is now getting dressed. He is now going downstairs. And now, he is eating breakfast.

The significant now-ness differs from the time-point one in that in the former the feeling of now-ness does not precede an event; it is invariably an event that comes first, and then it is recognised as constituting the significant NOW for the describer and the described. The story-like nature of the series of significant NOWs (cf. 5.1.4) requires some kind of topical unity in the sequence of EPED. In [5]-4 the topical unity might be termed 'a morning of the everyday life of a person called John'. In [5]-4 there is a grammatical unity in the choice of the sentence subject of each sentence, but that is just one possibility. Look at the following example:

[5]-5 A middle-aged guy is now passing by. And a Ford is now turning toward Capel Street. Now a baby is on the road.

Because of the fact that each of the three sentences in [5]-5 has a grammatically different subject it is rather difficult to assume that each 'now' is a significant NOW for each different subject, but one can easily detect a topical unity mainly from the linguistically cohesive ties, say, between 'street' and 'road'. This discourse gives an impression that the describer is viewing a street from a fixed place. Therefore, it is possible to single out 'a series of scenes in a particular street' as the topical unity concerning which a series of the significant NOWs are represented.

It is worth noting that [5]-5 suggests the essential characteristic of the significant A-series; a series of significant NOWs is possible only if the sequence of event descriptions is considered to have some coherence or some unity in topical terms. This observation leads us to recognise the possible multiplicity of the significant A-series. Consider the following example:

[5]-6 (a) I'm now living in Edinburgh.
(b) I'm now working on a project.
(c) I'm now staying at home.
(d) I'm now combing my hair.

It is obvious that when these four sentences are horizontally arranged so that they will make a graphological sequence they do not make a single A-series; they cannot produce topical coherence of any kind (this is a good example in which the linguistically cohesive tie, i.e. the sequence of personal pronoun 'I' does not contribute to making coherence). This is because each of them can be construed as belonging to a different series of significant NOWs. The significance of NOW in [5]-6 (a) to (d) is different in each case. It should be recognised that each of the four EPEDs in [5]-6 has the potentiality of becoming a part of the story-like discourse or the story-line if it is linked with another EPED which makes a renewed NOW in the same

significant A-series. [5]-6 (d), for instance, will be felt to be a part of a *story* if it is followed by 'And I'm now shaving my beard'. We must note that even if the presentness is renewed in [5]-6 (d), as exemplified above, the presentness of other significant series is never affected, simply because they have different significance. In real life, we experience very frequent input of a new significant A-series such as 'The Japanese economy is (now) slowing down' or 'John Major is (now) rapidly losing support from the general public'; they make a multiple layer of NOWs waiting to be renewed by a development or progression in our perception/recognition.

5.2.6 Tense and aspect of EPED

This section looks into the relation between EPED and grammaticality, paying particular attention to its characteristics in terms of tense and aspect. Our discussion will shed light on the context-dependent, thus grammatically "elastic", nature of EPED.

Existential perspective is not to be counted as completely identical with the so-called internal focalisation or synchronous point of view in narrative terms. Its characteristic will be better understood when it is later contrasted with the other two kinds of perspective, i.e. reporting perspective and narrative perspective (see 5.2.7-10). Here it will suffice to say that the most salient feature of existential perspective is its dynamicity, or dynamicity-orientedness. EPED is solely concerned with our sense of now-ness, either time-point or significant. As we observed in Chapter 3 (see 3.2.2), the core of our concept of time is made up of our sense of 'NEW to OLD', which we perceive in the dynamic relation between events. The perspectival focus of EPED absolutely lies in our NOW as an EPD. Our NOW is our present, which is continuously showing the impetus to recede into the past by waiting for a new NOW to replace it. This intrinsic

dynamicity of existential perspective will be well appreciated if we compare the following examples:

[5]-7 Max is (now) walking to the station.

[5]-8 Max walked to the station.

[5]-7 is an EPED, and 'now' literally exhibits ongoingness or existentiality of a living person. We feel the entire situation of [5]-7 is on the move, and that it must be continuously linked with some preceding situation (an ex-NOW) and some following situation (a renewed NOW). In other words, [5]-7 strongly induces us to detect some implicated impetus or dynamicity that might be termed *now-renewal impetus.* On the other hand, in [5]-8 we do not feel such dynamics; we feel that a past event is just described in a fossilised way. There is no existentiality or temporal immediacy perceivable in [5]-8. It could be said that [5]-7 is perspectivally *situated,* whereas [5]-8 is perspectivally *non-situated.* As we will see later, event expressions like [5]-8 exhibit prototypical perspectival stance peculiar to reporting-perspective event description. Now we turn to the problem of tense and aspect of EPED.

5.2.6.1 Present progressive

In view of the intrinsically ongoing and dynamic nature of our now-ness, the present progressive will have good reason to be taken up as the superordinate candidate for EPED:

[5]-9 John is working for IBM.

We already pointed out in 5.2.4 that boundedness is not a necessary condition

for a particular state of affairs to be labelled as an event. Eventhood holds when it is recognised from context that a new situation is started or ongoing. With [5]-9, if it is contextually clear that EPD like 'now' or 'at the moment' are implicated, the eventhood can be perceived, whether the EPD is used in the time-point or significant sense. By contrast, if context does not allow us to detect any temporal sequentiality, that is, if it is contextually difficult to assume that some EPD is implicated, then [5]-9 is atemporal, and irrelevant to eventhood. It is not an EPED; it is to be classified as a description of a state or condition.

5.2.6.2 Simple present

The perspectival focus of EPED is prototypically upon the ongoingness of a state of affairs. Taking this into account we find the simple present with *be-verb*, as well as the present progressive, seems to be a very suitable grammatical form for EPED:

[5]-10 Rachel is happy.

Grammarians will classify [5]-10 as a state (cf. Anderson, 1973: 5; Comrie, 1976: 104), but our view of dynamics will construe [5]-10 as an event if it is contextually feasible to assume that EPD like 'now' or 'at the moment' can be part of the meaning of [5]-10. This is because EPD are suggestive of temporal sequentiality that can be verbalised as follows, stressing the inchoative aspect: 'Rachel started being happy'. However, if [5]-10 is contextualised like: 'Rachel is happy. She is a happy girl. She is happy with everything in the world'. then it should be interpreted as atemporal, i.e. a state or condition; EPD are irrelevant under such circumstances. Compared with [5]-10, [5]-11 may normally sound atemporal because of its unrestrictive feature:

[5]-11 Alex is a tall boy.

But, if it is used in a rather special context as in 'Alex is a tall boy, but he was extremely short until very recently', then its eventhood will become clear.

A predictable argument against such context-oriented view of eventhood/statehood might be: 'It may be true that the eventhood of the proposition 'Alex is a tall boy' is determined by the following proposition, but [5]-11 *itself* is a state expression'. But one must realise that it can be referred to as a formally-trapped argument. In Chapter 2 we had a critical look at formalists' general tendency of seeing a parallel between particular lexico-grammatical characteristics and the event-state distinction. If we assume, as we did in Chapter 2, that language meaning is its *use* , then it would be reasonable to claim that when people say that 'be tall' is basically a state expression they have to realise that they say so after *using* it in a particular context in which EPD like 'now' cannot be part of the meaning of the proposition they have in mind. There should be no difference between 'be tall' labelled as a state and 'be tall' labelled as an event in that they are both products of contextualisation, which means *use of language* in the broad sense of the term.

Considering the fact that every event has some duration, and that the present discussion assumes that we are tied to an existential perspective, we will understand that it is quite natural and usual for us to capture eventhood primarily in what is called *imperfecive aspect* (cf. Brinton, 1988: 9). In terms of EPED, imperfective aspect can be typically realised by the present progressive and the simple present with be-verb (this does not mean that the two grammatical forms inherently realise imperfective aspect; for example, the sentence 'I'm going to London tomorrow' is not imperfective at all, and

similarly, the sentence 'I'm finished' has nothing to do with that aspect). And now we have to consider whether *perfective aspect*, as against imperfective aspect, can be suitable for EPED.

The general tendency to conceptualise presentness only as the time-point NOW seems to be well reflected in Leech (1971: 3):

> In most cases, the event probably does not take place exactly at the instant when it is mentioned: it is subjective rather than objective simultaneity that is conveyed.

What is asserted here is the objectively observable gap in time between event time and speech time. We can interpret this as saying that, exactly speaking, event time is always the past, if speech time is the present. Leech's view of eventhood is totally indifferent to the concept of the significant NOW in relation to event detection. It is clear that Leech thinks of presentness as the time-point NOW, because the contrast that he has in mind between event time and speech time can be exemplified as follows: 'It was twenty seconds to eight o'clock when the event occurred, and it was one second after that when it was mentioned.' Leech made the comment, quoted above, when he referred to sports commentaries as instantaneous use of the simple present. The point of his argument is that in sports commentaries like:

[5]-12 Napier passes the ball to Attwater

the present tense actually designates the pastness of the event *semantically*. Underlying such an "objective" view of time seems to be a taken-for-granted idea that it is the time-point A-series that makes the past-present-future scheme. It must be recognised that such a stylised view of time can be quite

misleading. One great danger is that the present time is likely to be taken as almost nonsensically atomistic. Leech argues that the simultaneity one feels between event time and speech time in cases like sports commentaries is 'subjective'. Theoretically, his argument can lead us to a very microscopic observation that, for example, the simultaneity one feels between the time the commentator starts mentioning the event and the time he finishes with it is also subjective, and that, from a physical and "objective" point of view, even the mentioning time has good reason to be assumed to consist of the starting time (the past) and the ending time (the present). When we think of the intrinsically "subjective" nature of the past-present-future scheme of time, as we already confirmed in Chapter 3, we will find that such an overly physical view of time and tense is not practical, and fails to account for the empirical aspect of time and event.

Our contention is that in some cases grammatical forms realising the perfective aspect can be taken as EPED, if they convey *temporal immediacy*. The sentence [5]-12 will be classified as an EPED if context tells us that it is part of the live broadcasting of a ball game. What is important is that, in terms of the significant NOW, [5]-12 constitutes the present time for the describer (and the described), and making a distinction between the event time and the speech time is irrelevant, whereas, in terms of the time-point NOW, it is relevant to conceptualise the event time and the speech time as two distinct entities. (But empirically there should be no temporal gap between the two times; they are felt to be virtually simultaneous because of the temporal immediacy between them. To put it another way, there should be practically no possibility, from the empirical point of view, that the describer feels the pastness of the state of affairs he is describing).

5.2.6.3 Simple past

Now we look into the possibility of the simple past being another candidate for EPED. According to Leech (*op. cit.*: 9), the simple past normally indicates an action completed in the definite past, and excludes the present moment. This view, again, reflects a rather mechanical view of the present time which tends to conceive of the present as the time-point NOW. However, as we observed in the case of sports-commentary type of event description realised in the simple present expressing temporal "hotness", there must be certain cases in which even the simple past sentences implicates the describer's sense of the significant NOW which the describer feels is made up of the time of the completed event and the time when he is making the description. See the following example:

[5]-13 [A man fired a gun at a young lady.] That guy shot her!

There are two reasons why [5]-13 can be legitimately interpreted as an EPED. One is the context; the situation will enable the reader to assume that [5]-13 implicates EPD like 'now' or 'just now'. It is reasonable to think, from context, that temporal immediacy is embedded in the sentence. The second reason concerns the problem of duration. It is true that any event has some duration, but it does not follow that EPED inevitably requires the describer to focus upon the imperfective aspect of an event. 'Shooting' is normally punctual (if it is a single shooting with a gun), and if we can say 'eating' is durational, then 'shooting' can be thought of as "durationless". Practically speaking, the describer will have no time to attend to the ongoingness describable as: 'That guy is now shooting her.' Rather, it would be much more natural to focus on the whole of the completed action, or the perfective aspect of the state of affairs. The overall situation is very similar to the sports commentator's use of the simple present. The present tense in sports commentaries might be related to the problem of register as a socio-linguistic factor. We could argue, then, that

the simple past as in [5]-13 is more practical, non-conventional choice of tense and aspect which materialises EPED.

EPED resembles what Joos (1964: 132) calls 'contemporary comment', but he pays no attention to the contemporary feature of the simple past as a likelihood. This is probably because, like Leech, he also believes a bit too strongly that there is a parallel between grammatical forms and semantic features or meanings.

5.2.6.4 Present perfect

The present perfect can be also used for EPED. Look at the following examples:

[5]-14 I have finished my project.
[5]-15 I have been living in Edinburgh since last September.

The sentence [5]-14 can be paraphrased as: 'My project is now completed.' By saying [5]-14 the describer must be able to distinguish the significant NOW from the ex-NOW, i.e. the past when he was working on it. With [5]-15, the temporal adverb 'since last September' and perhaps the progressive help to detect the temporal sequentiality. 'I'm now living in Edinburgh' is part of the meaning of [5]-15, so that it is an EPED. Note that in sentences like:

[5]-16 I have lived in Edinburgh all my life.

no eventhood can be perceived despite the temporal adverb 'all my life'. Though sounding paradoxical, we would argue that in [5]-16 the temporal adverb is asserting an atemporal, therefore, a stative aspect of the describer's

life.

In this section we have focused upon the sentence-based grammatical features of EPED. The discussion we have made so far is based upon the assumption that contemplating existential perspective helps to clarify the nature of narrative discourse as event description. In the next two sections we look into the nature of reporting perspective, as against existential perspective.

5.2.7 Reporting perspective

In real life there can be two contrastive temporal viewpoints for the verbalisation of events. One is the synchronous one, i.e. the existential perspective, and the other is the retrospective one, i.e. the *reporting perspective*. (Since it is ontologically legitimate to conceive of eventhood only in the light of either the perfective (completed) or the imperfective (ongoing) aspect of states of affairs at the speech time, future events would be nothing more than quasi-events, not concerned with the actuality of dynamic states of affairs.) The present section makes a general observation of the reporting perspective.

One of the main characteristics of reporting perspective is its *temporal distance*. The temporal distance in reporting perspective concerns the gap between event time and speech time. We already observed that, due to temporal immediacy, distinguishing between event time and speech time in EPED is irrelevant as far as the significant A-series is concerned; it is only in the time-point A-series that conceptualising the two times as two distinct entities is felt to be relevant. And the crucial point is that even in EPED it makes sense to speak of event time and speech time, depending upon the circumstances, but it makes no sense to assume that speech time is the present, while event time is the past as totally distinct from speech time, i.e.

the present. With the imperfective aspect (see 5.2.4), speech time as the time-point NOW is included or part of event time, which is then considered to be stretching into the past and the future around the time-point NOW, and with the perfective aspect (see 5.2.6), trying to see the nonsensically atomistic temporal gap between event time and speech time is to be dismissed as empirically unrealistic; the two times are felt to be virtually simultaneous. By contrast, in reporting perspective, it is always possible to conceive of speech time and event time as two distinct entities with some temporal distance between them. This means that the presentness of speech time will automatically squeeze out the pastness of event time. The feasibility of drawing a distinction between speech time and event time seems to suggest the essentially congenial relation between reporting perspective and the time-point A-series. This view will be confirmed when we think of, for example, the writing of curriculum vitae as one typical case of event description in reporting perspective as in: '1970: I finished school'. The time-point orientedness of such writing sounds "objective", and consequently is felt to be rather irrelevant to the significant A-series. Normally, the temporal distance between event time and speech time enables the reporter to *edit* the events in many different ways. And the pastness of reporting perspective naturally rejects the implication of EPD such as 'now' or 'just now'. Instead of the HERE-AND-NOW principle of existential perspective, the THERE-AND-THEN principle governs reporting perspective. In summing up, the temporal distance of reporting perspective lacks the dynamicity of existential perspective - the real dynamics we are constantly experiencing in the 'NEW to OLD logic' recognisable in the sequence of events. In the next section we will focus upon some formal characteristics of event description in reporting perspective.

5.2.8 Reporting-perspective event description

In this section we attempt to make a linguistic/ontological observation of reporting-perspective event description (hereafter RPED). The discussion will concentrate upon the flexibility of the descriptive stance of RPED because of its *retrospective* nature. The perspectival stance of RPED ranges from 'markedly retrospective' to 'mildly retrospective'. The difference between the two perspectival stances does not concern the temporal gap or distance between event time and speech time; it concerns the problem of whether a perspectival stance the reporter takes when rendering events is macroscopic (temporally far-sighted) or microscopic (temporally near-sighted). One of the important objectives in this section is to suggest that the mildy retrospective realisation of RPED is closely connected with concepts like 'narrative time', 'story present', or 'character now', which, as we will examine in the next section, is the necessary condition for a particular discourse to be reckoned as realising *narrativity*.

We start our discussion with markedly retrospective cases of RPED. To begin with, the aspectual characteristic of macroscopic RPED is its inclination toward *perfectivity*. Macroscopic RPED is characterised by its bird's-eye view of the eventhood of states of affairs. In contrast to EPED's standard aspectual choice of *imperfectivity* or open-endedness, macroscopic RPED has boundedness as its most remarkable aspectual feature. Prototypical examples from a newspaper headine and a historical document:

[5]-17 Nine die in tanker disaster.
[5]-18 1346 - David invades England but is captured at Neville's Cross.

As exemplified in [5]-17 and 18, a macroscopic RPED is typically realised in the simple form, and perhaps more importantly, it should sound more or less synoptic or summational. As shown in the two examples, the pastness of the reported event is not necessarily indicated by the past tense; it is normally

guaranteed by some temporal adjuncts which are either explicitly or implicitly given. In the case of the newspaper headline, world knowledge tells the reader that the reported event happened either the day before or earlier that day, and in historical documents, normally dates are explicitly given. That the temporal perspective of RPED is a fossilised one - unlike the living perspective of EPED - will be well understood by attending to the fact that EPD cannot co-occur with RPEDs like [5]-17 and 18. The two examples lack dynamicity peculiar to existential perspective, which can be termed now-renewal impetus (see 5.2.6). This dynamicity is concerned with the active and-then logic which makes up our existential expectation that the existential NOW will be sooner or later replaced by a new one. In [5]-17, for example, one cannot perceive any existential impetus as in: 'She is (now) walking to the door.' In this respect [5]-17 and 18 well illustrate the reporting perspective in event description; intrinsically RPED is indifferent to the active and-then logic. This is more true with macroscopic RPED than with microscopic RPED, as we will see later.

There is a strong parallel between this lack of dynamicity on the sentential level and the stagnant, inactive sequence of macroscopic RPEDs. One good example can be found in the chronological table of historical events:

[5]-19 (a) 1544-5 Henry VIII begins "rough wooing" of Mary by invading Scotland.
(b) 1568 Mary imprisoned by her cousin, Elizabeth I.
(c) 1587 Mary Queen of Scots executed at Fotheringay Castle.

The three events are ordered chronologically, but owing to the fossilised perspective the ordering is not "activated". The reader cannot possibly feel a succession of existential NOWs in a dynamic way; the events are just represented in the order in which they occurred. This writing order is an

expedient chosen for convenience of historical description. This means that the temporal distance between the event time and the speech time could have made the reporter decide to put the events in some different way more clearly indicative of temporal distance. As a way of what is called 'achronological ordering' [5]-19 (b) and (c) might have been rendered: 'Mary Queen of Scots executed at Fortheringay Castle *after being imprisoned by her cousin, Elizabeth I*'. One might argue that the impression of such stagnant sequence of past events will be to some extent weakened by linking the events with adverbial phrases that can serve as the sequence-indicator as in:

[5]-20 *First*, I wrote Chapter 3, *and then* I wrote Chapter 1.

It is to be recognised that, though the italicised adjuncts contribute to making the sequence appear "active", the dynamicity is a mock one simply because the adjuncts themselves sound retrospective, and are not to be used in EPED. Moreover, one must note that the mock dynamicity observable between the two event clauses in [5]-20 is almost entirely dependent upon those sequence-indicators; if put by themselves, even the mock dynamicity would be lost: 'I wrote Chapter 3. I wrote Chapter 1'.

Now we turn to microscopic RPED. Reporting perspective cannot be identical with existential perspective, because the former, unlike the latter, is concerned with things in the past. And considering the temporal gap between event time and speech time, which tends to give the reporter the time to edit the events he is going to describe, the normal, superordinate aspectual choice of RPED should be *perfective* as observed in macroscopic RPED. But this does not necessarily mean that perfectivity is the inevitable choice in RPED. The reporter, if he is inclined to do so, can take a temporal stance maximally close to existential perspective when reporting

events; he can simulate the temporal immediacy of EPED. So, instead of saying:

[5]-21 I approached the door. I slowly opened it. And I looked inside the room.

it would be just possible to render the same events as:

[5]-22 I was (now) approaching the door, and I was (now) slowly opening it. I was (now) looking inside the room.

Compared with the standard reporting stance represented in [5]-21, [5]-22 can be said to be temporally near-sighted in a marked way. [5]-22 is a past version of the live-broadcasting type of discourse. What is observable among the event clauses in [5]-22 is the mock dynamicity of EPED. The 'now' in parenthesis is operating as the temporal-sequentiality indicator, but it is to be differentiated from 'now' as an EPD in that it is not existential NOW which is absolute and irreplaceable in nature. The 'now' in [5]-22 could be termed 'reporting now' or 'a reporting-perspective deictic (RPD)'. The most noticeable feature of RPD 'now' is its relativity. The RPD 'now' in [5]-22 must be distinguished from the absolute and existential now-ness of the speech time or the reporting time. The relative nature of RPD 'now' is clear in that it is just accidentally set up somewhere in the past, and that, when the absolute now-ness of the reporting time is focused upon, its relativity will be cast off, and the time retrospectively called 'now' will be felt to be part of the absolute pastness as viewed from the absolute presentness.

Incidentally, the RPD 'now' as the temporal-sequentiality (or event) indicator is not to be exclusively used along with such maximally microscopic RPED as [5]-22; it can co-occur with slightly less microscopic RPED like

[5]-21, or even with remarkably macroscopic RPED like [5]-19. It is to be noted, however, that the more microscopic an RPED is, the more existential the RPD 'now' appears.

Another very important point to be discussed with respect to maximally microscopic RPED like [5]-22 is that the reporter's perspectival choice has an effect of making the reader forget the taken-for-granted distinction between speech time and event time. In [5]-22, and to a lesser degree in [5]-21, the reporter has attuned his perspective so close to the event time that the reader can feel as if the events were occurring before his eyes. One of the important effects of such *mock-existential perspective* is that the reader can be led to feel the now-ness of the event time mainly in the significant A-series. (It is to be remembered that the temporal immediacy of EPED contributes to making the distinction between event time and speech time irrelevant (cf. 5.2.6).) As was pointed out earlier, the time-point A-series is intimately associated with the objectively measurable concept of time. The temporal distance between event time and speech time, if it is measurable by clock, as in the writing of curriculum vitae, will tend to induce the reporter and the reader to react to the described events in a detached and "objective" way. This means that under such circumstances it is difficult for both the reporter and the reader to react empathetically to the now-ness of the events, taking it in terms of the significant NOW. One would have an impression that the now-ness of the execution of Queen Mary, represented as '1587 - Queen Mary was executed', is too fossilised to be captured in terms of the series of the significant NOWs. In this respect, the maximally microscopic RPED like [5]-22 may well be called *mock EPED* or *simulated EPED*; both the reporter and the reader feel they would be able to carry themselves to the time and spot of the events and see how a significant NOW is renewed by another one without being necessarily made aware of the time-point NOW, i.e. the series of time in the clock sense.

5.2.9 The story present

It is generally agreed that narrative has a function of setting up a sense of presentness in the reader's mind. 'Narratives,' Chatman says (1978: 63), 'establish a sense of a present moment, narrative NOW, so to speak.' Normally, narrative is written in the past tense, but the sequence of events in narrative tends to be felt by the reader to be the sequence of the present time which is renewed each time a new event occurs in the story world. Mendilow (1952: 94) writes: 'Mostly, the past tense in which the events are narrated is transposed by the reader into a fictive present....' Such a sequence of story NOWs is often referred to as 'narrative time-line', or 'story time-line'. The concepts such as story present, narrative time or narrativity are generally accepted ones in narrative poetics or formal studies of narrative discourse, but it must be admitted that they have tended to be taken for granted as narrative conventions; little inquiry has been made into the nature of those narrative concepts on the linguistic/ontological level. In order to elucidate the characteristics we start with looking at what might be termed *superordinate narrative discourse*:

[5]-23 (a) The door of Henry's lunch-room opened. (b) and two men came in. (c) They sat down at the counter. (Hemingway, 'The Killers': 368)

There are two reasons why we take this as superordinate narrative discourse: one is that the three clauses in [5]-23 are what Labov (1972: 360) calls 'narrative clauses', which are in simple past tense representing events in the perfective aspect, as temporally bounded; the second reason is that the events are arranged chronologically in the clear sequence. Perhaps it might be just possible to give the third reason why [5]-23 should be looked upon as a canonical form of narrative. That is the fact that some topical unity and a

considerable degree of temporal near-sightedness function as a kind of *narrative magnetism* which invites the reader to the story world in which the dynamics of now-renewal is the norm, just like in the real world. This seems crucially important when we remember it is often pointed out that the function or convention of narrative fiction is to create a *world* (cf. Culler, 1975: 189; Fowles, 1971: 86). Labov (*op. cit.*: 359) defines narrative as: 'one method of recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred.' If we take Labov's definition of narrative as generally acceptable, it would be reasonable to classify narrative discourse primarily as RPED. As we already confirmed, in RPED it is usually possible to conceive of event time and speech time as two distinct entities with some temporal distance between them (cf. 5.2.7). But one must bear in mind that in narrative fiction the past tense is thought of as a narrative convention, and that the discourse normally has no actual, definite past to refer to. The pastness of fictional discourse is, as it were, a fake. In fiction no event actually happened, and this "reality" of fictional narrative can in many cases work as a helping hand for the reader to set himself free from conceiving of the temporal gap or distance between event time and speech time in terms of the time-point A-series, i.e. the series of objectively measurable, quantitative points of time. One of the vitally important implications of this is that the reader can place himself in an "as if" situation in which he can easily feel or experience the series of story NOWs in terms of the significant A-series. Theoretically, the 'now' which can co-occur with, for example, [5]-23 (a) as in 'Now the door of Henry's lunch-room opened' is an RPD, but the perspectival peculiarity of narrative fiction, as mentioned above, would make the reader feel as if it were the absolute 'now', i.e. an EPD. (Incidentally, under such a prototypically narrative situation in which temporal immediacy is so high , the reader will be able to perceive story NOW even if the temporal adverb 'then', which normally functions as a past-marker, is explicitly employed.)

This can be verified if we understand how we empathetically experience a series of now-ness in [5]-23. When we read [5]-23 (a) we synchronously feel that the represented event constitutes a significant NOW of the story world; there is no room for a time-point NOW (for instance, 'at half past three on the 23rd of June, 1993') to operate first as a reference time at or around which we know a particular state of affairs is going on. And this first NOW is renewed by the second one exhibited in [5]-23 (b), which in turn will be replaced by [5]-23 (c). It is clearly observable that the three perfective event clauses in [5]-23 make a single series of significant NOWs.

5.2.10 The story present and narrative perspective

The main objective in this section is to contemplate the relation between the presentness of the story and narrative perspective as a realisation of temporal stance. Our discussion will reveal the peculiarity of narrative perspective as the hybrid of mock-existentiality and reporting perspective.

The question we are going to posit in this section is: 'What is the co-relation between the sense of now-ness the reader feels and the temporal perspective in a particular discourse representing events?' Let us have a closer look at [5]-23 in the light of temporal perspective. We pointed out that it realises some *temporal near-sightedness*. But how near is it? At first blush, the simple past of the event clauses denoting the clear boundedness of eventhood will give the reader an impression that [5]-23 is one notch higher in temporal distance than a mock-existentiality version that should be the past progressive as in: 'The door of Henry's lunch-room was now opening.' But it must be recognised that such maximally microscopic RPED is not the only possibility in this case. As we noted earlier in our discussion of [5]-13, when the temporariness or durationlessness is contextually detectable in the use of a particular verbal phrase, the temporal immediacy, i.e. the impression of the

contemporaneousness of event time and speech time, will be represented by the simple form, as well as by the progressive. Thus, as far as [5]-23 is concerned, the three perfective clauses can be considered as realising temporal immediacy or mock-existentiality almost as equally as when represented in the progressive. In [5]-23, together with the perspectival peculiarity of narrative fiction which conventionally makes it irrelevant to distinguish between event time and speech time, such a high degree of temporal near-sightedness is responsible for the reader feeling as if a particular series of significant NOWs were renewed in a synchronous way. In short, the reader can be easily brought into the story world as a spatio-temporal particular. The simple past form of event clauses realising a considerable degree of temporal immediacy and the chronological ordering of those clauses in [5]-23 well simulate the active and-then logic of EPED (cf. 5.2.8). This seems to be a very important point to consider when we contemplate the problem of narrativity or narrative perspective.

With a view to reflecting upon the problem of narrativity we will turn for the moment to some stylistic features of synopses of literary works. As an example of synoptic writing we take a passage from *The Oxford Companion to English Literature* summarising *Emma* by Jane Austen:

> [5]-24 ....Emma's active mind sets to work on schemes for Harriet's advancement, but her interfering and injudicious attempts lead in the end to considerable mortification. She first prevents Harriet from accepting an offer of marriage from Robert Martin, an eligible young farmer, as being beneath her. This tampering greatly annoys Mr Knightley, the bachelor owner of Donwell Abbey, who is Emma's brother-in-law and one of the few people able to see that she has faults....

Very few would deny that if [5]-23 is to be classified as narrative [5]-24 is

not narrative. It seems possible to give two reasons for this: one is the choice of tense, and the second is the temporal stance in event description. The present tense in [5]-24 should be distinguished from the historical present, which is often employed in narrative. The present tense in summaries is called the 'synoptic present' (Stanzel, 1979: 23). This present tense is not concerned with temporally particular situations; rather, it has a generalising function (*loc. cit.*). According to Stanzel, such generic use of the present tense is a marker of 'zero grades of mediacy', that is, 'story without narrator' (*ibid.*: 25). It would be argued that there is a certain parallel between the synoptic present and the present tense in newspaper headlines, as we observed in [5]-17, in that in both cases the present tense is employed for abstract writing. Stanzel emphasises the choice of the present tense as the reason for the lack of mediacy, but perhaps a more important factor contributing to the generalised atmosphere of the writing is its temporal stance in event description. It is clear that in [5]-24 one cannot feel or experience the dynamicity of the active and-then sequence of events as in [5]-23. This is mainly because the writing realises no temporal immediacy which can make the reader feel that existential perspective is well simulated. In [5]-24 it is almost impossible to recognise any series of NOWs. In order for a particular discourse to be labelled as a narrative it should fundamentally be able to exhibit a kind of magnetism to draw the reader into a world as a spatio-temporal particular. Being in that world means being capable of experiencing *the now-renewal dynamics* through the sequence of story events. In this respect the temporal stance in [5]-24 is not unlike a maximally macroscopic stance of RPED, though the tense is the present. As for the narratorial mediacy, perhaps the quintessential and the most fundamental role of the narrator as the mediator is that of the *world opener* for the reader.

Needless to say, no narrative consists of superordinate narrative clauses

only; normally the temporal stance in a particular narrative can range from mock EPED to maximally macroscopic RPED. But it would be agreed that the skeletal perspective of narrative intimately associated with the concepts like 'narrativity' or 'narrative perspective' is one which is temporally so near-sighted as to allow imperfective event clauses to co-ccur with perfective event clauses. It must be noted that in synoptic writing like [5]-24 it would sound very awkward, in the light of temporal perspective, if an imperfective event clause such as: 'She is eating lunch with her father' were inserted somewhere in the discourse. This is simply because the progressive clause as an event expression prototypically represents a high degree of temporal immediacy.

One might have an impression that the variety of temporal perspective in temporal discourse is closely related to the scene-summary distinction well exploited by Genette (1980). It might be true that there are many aspects in common between them, but Genette's taxonomy of narrative rhythms is a product of a rather mechanical attempt to apply the *chronos* concept of duration to narrative discourse on the basis of the contrast between story time and narrative time. His taxonomy illustrates possible varieties of narrative pacing, analogous to musical concepts like *andante* or *allegro* , but does not necessarily clarify how the problem of narrative pacing is both ontologically and linguistically related to that of narrativity or narrative perspective.

5.2.11 Existentiality, report, and narrativity

This section reflects further upon the problem of narrativity in relation to existentiality and report. Our discussion will be spotlighting the intrinsic fictionality, and at the same time the discourse-dependent nature, of narrativity.

5.2.11.1 Existentiality

When we speak of existentiality, report, and narrativity, we do not necessarily mean that it is possible to make a trichotomous distinction among these three perspectival phenomena. In order to get a proper understanding of what narrative perspective is like, it might be better to attempt a dichotomous distinction between existentiality and the other two. From an ontological point of view, one should recognise that existential perspective is exclusively tied to the notion of presentness, and that it is to be distinguished from report/narrativity in that, in principle, the latter can be assumed to be concerned solely with the notion of pastness. Existential perspective is typically exemplified by sports commentaries (cf. 5.2.6): the most noticeable fact about such live-broadcasting type of discourse is the coincidence of event time and speech time in real terms. EPED like sports commentaries is by no means narrative, because the presentness of the event description is an authentic one. The perspectival yoke resulting from the event describer being tied to his authentic presentness is an absolute one, so that his perspective has to be purely internalised. But this internality is not a narrative phenomenon; it is an *existential* one. In this respect existential internality should be ontologically differentiated from narrative concepts like 'internal perspective' or 'internal focalisation', which intrinsically belong to the report/narrativity side, and which normally have broader connotations such as figurative point of view or conceptual systems (cf. 5.2.2).

Here, let us make an additional comment on the nature of sports commentaries. As exemplified in Leech (1971: 3), some might cast doubt on the coincidence of event time and speech time in sports commentaries such as [5]-12. They might argue that in terms of time-point time, i.e. objectively measurable time, event time can precede speech time, and that, assuming that the temporal gap between event time and speech time at least in the time-

point sense is a necessary condition for a particular temporal discourse to be classified as narrative, sports commentaries can be a variety of narrative. This argument may sound convincing, but is misleading. One might be justified in mentioning a temporal gap between event time and speech time with respect to perfective event descriptions such as [5]-12; it is very likely that when the commentator started to describe the event of Napier's passing the ball to Attwater, the event ceased to hold. But it will be worth contemplating live broadcasting situations like the following:

[5]-25 They are both outside the ring! The referee is counting.

[5]-25 is a likely commentary in professional wrestling. When commentary is given in imperfective event clauses such as [5]-25, the simultaneity between event time and speech time is the norm; at the time when the event holds the speech holds, too. It is to be acknowledged that such genuine simultaneity in real terms is not congenial to narrative. Summing up, sports commentaries are commentaries, and not narrative.

5.2.11.2 Report

Now let us turn to the problem of report and narrativity. The questions we posit here are: 'How are these two related to each other?' 'In what respect(s) are they similar or dissimilar to each other?' First, we will contemplate report.

In the light of temporal dimension in event description, report is concerned with the retrospective rendering of events, as against the synchronous one concerning existentiality. If it is legitimate to associate pastness with report in event rendering, report can be theoretically guaranteed when pastness is confirmable either on the textual or metatextual level. On the textual level,

the reporting perspective of the event description will be confirmable if past-time indicators can be found explicitly. Past-time indicators are either lexical or syntactic. On the lexical level they are often realised as temporal adjuncts such as 'yesterday', 'one day' 'in 1215'. And when the verbal phrase exhibits some duration, often together with for-/in-/until-/by-temporal adjuncts, reporting perspective is detectable as in the following examples:

[5]-26 (a) I stayed in Edinburgh for a week.
(b) I finished the job in an hour.
(c) I worked until eleven.
(d) I read The Guardian by nine.

These durational event clauses denote pastness; the reader will clearly perceive some temporal gap between the event time and the speech time. They cannot exhibit existential perspective. On the syntactic level, the retrospective nature, i.e. the pastness of the discourse is often detectable from the syntactic complexity suggesting the fact that the author used the temporal gap between event time and speech time to make a "value judgement" in terms of determining where to put the information-focus. We already observed that pastness can be realised either by the past tense or the present tense. Therefore, the reporting perspective of a particular discourse can and should be detected even when such syntactic complexity as mentioned above is combined with the present tense like:

[5]-27 When Lucy wakes up, she finds the world is covered with snow.

There is no temporal modifier in [5]-27, but the well-structured arrangement of events is indicative of the author's "weight assessment" made before the actual rendering of them. Note that the complex structure like [5]-27 is least

likely to be employed in EPED. On the metatextual level, on the other hand, one will notice that the situation is pragmatic. There are some occasions when the pastness of the rendered events is guaranteed by metatextual signs. This can be said to be concerned with the notion of *genre*. If a particular discourse is available in the form of a paperback entitled SHORT STORIES, for example, the whole situation can conventionally work as a metatextual sign indicating the pastness of the content. Under such circumstances reporting perspective must be acknowledged even in the following expressions:

[5]-28 I'm now opening the bottle of wine. And I'm now pouring it into the rare goblet.

It is conventionally accepted that events described in a story are normally past ones; the reader is supposed to assume some temporal gap between event time and speech time (even in a fictional story). So, if the author renders his events as in [5]-28, the temporal perspective realised there is a "produced" one. It is by no means an authentic EPED. It is mock-existentiality that is represented in [5]-28. This means that, if the author had wanted to, he could have adopted a different perspective, perhaps a more distant one which goes like: 'After opening the bottle of wine, I poured it into the rare goblet.'

Now the materialisation of report or reporting perspective can be shown in the following diagram:



Figure 5.1

5.2.11.3 Narrativity

With the general characteristics of existentiality and report that we have observed so far in mind, we go on to narrativity. As an example to be reflected upon we take a passage from Anita Brookner's *Family and Friends* (p.51):

[5]-29 (a) She bathes (b) and dresses quietly; (c) then, writing a note for Alfred to tell him that she will be back in time for lunch and that he is not to worry, (d) she slips out of the door (e) and runs lightly down the red-carpeted staircase.

The first thing to note is that the present tense here is *historic present*, which this work employs as the narrative mode throughout. Reporting perspective of this discourse is confirmable, first, on the metatextual level. This is a novel, and the reader, whether he is genre-conscious or not, is supposed to take for granted the pastness of the content. And on the textual level also, reporting perspective seems to be well represented for two reasons. One is the choice of durational, perfective event clauses, such as 'bathe', 'dress' and 'write', which can be taken as prototypical grammatical forms for reporting past events. And the second reason is the fact that the author's weight assessment is traceable syntactically; compared with the finite forms of the verbs in (a), (b), (d) and (e), the participle construction of (c) appears "light" in terms of the weight of information. This kind of syntactic manipulation is alien to the temporally "hot" description of events, i.e. EPED. If one looks exclusively at (d), for instance, one might have an impression that it sounds like an EPED, since the instantaneity or durationlessness of that bounded event expression can theoretically appear in EPED. But the overall

reporting atmosphere of the discourse operates as the discoursal inertia to lead one to interpret (d) as reporting. As a conclusion, there is no room for doubt about the reporting quality of [5]-29 in spite of the present tense as a grammatical choice.

Now the reporting perspective of [5]-29 is made clear, but in its retrospective nature there is something to be distinguished from the following expressions of past events:

[5]-30 The death of Mozart in 1791.

[5]-31 I went to the zoo with Daddy yesterday.

[5]-32 (a) The Abbey church of St. Mary was founded by King David I in 1136 for Cistercian monks. (b) It grew rich and powerful under royal patronage (c) but over the centuries suffered repeatedly from English harassment, (d) the end coming in 1545.

Both [5]-30 and 31 express a single event; the former is nominalised and the latter, predicated. And [5]-32 consists of four clauses of past events. It is not difficult to recognise that in [5]-30, 31 and 32 there can be perceived no dynamicity of now-renewal logic; events are expressed just in a fossilised way. In [5]-32, some topically connected past events sequentially arranged, but it is difficult to perceive now-renewal in the event sequence in a vivid way. One would feel that retrospective degree is much higher in [5]-32 than in [5]-29, which seems to realise the active and dynamic report. The overall impression of temporal near-sightedness in [5]-29, together with the clearly observable topical unity, serves as a kind of magnetism to induce the reader to set up a "time-line" in his mind. Note that the time-line is not created by each individual clause, but by the whole discourse, and that it is a series of significant NOWs that concern the time-line. The reader feels as if a particular situation is given and being developed before his eyes. This we

should call *narrativity*. Narrativity can be defined as a linguistic realisation of reporting perspective in which the reader can be led to assume that the now-renewal logic of EPED is more or less simulated. Narrativity or narrative perspective is fictional in that the now-ness it represents is a mock one, which is to be distinguished from the authentic now-ness in existential perspective.

In many cases, whether a particular discourse can be classified as a narrative or not depends upon metatextual signs of various kinds. Generally speaking, if there can be recognised a conventionally accepted sign of some kind, which can be practically interpreted as saying, 'I'm going to tell you a story,' such as the front cover of a book entitled STORIES FOR CHILDREN, then the discourse, which is either spoken or written, ought to be taken as a narrative. This may be concerned with the institutionalised aspect of our social life. But from a linguistic and ontological point of view, a particular discourse, if it is to be labelled as a narrative, must be a reporting discourse which includes narrativity as the basic and skeletal perspective. If a particular discourse, despite the metatextual signs suggestive of story-telling, includes no narrativity and is actually made up of, say, nominalised event description such as [5]-30, then the author is institutionally rebellious, and the metatextual sign is a disguised one.

One problem with narrativity is that it is not always easy to see whether a particular chunk of a reporting discourse realises narrativity or not. This is because one cannot necessarily make clear the borderline beyond which the sense of now-ness is replaced by the fossilised sense of then-ness. Getting back to [5]-29, it would be reasonable to claim that narrativity is detectable even when the simple forms of (a) and (b), for example, are progressivised like: 'She is now bathing. And she is now dressing quietly.' Although the progressive clause is not the superordinate narrative clause, but by using the

mock-EPD 'now' in each of the progressive clauses, as shown above, now-renewal will be perceivable. Rather, we could say that narrativity realised by the plot-advancing progressive represents a more vivid now-ness than a slightly fossilised one in the simple form. The progressivisation of this kind is the extremity of the realisation of now-ness, or mock-EPED. This direction is no problem as far as the detection of narrativity is concerned. It is the other end of the nowness-scale that is not necessarily clear enough. For example, is [5]-32 a narrative? It is to be agreed that if it is a narrative it is one with a remarkably low degree of narrativity. With respect to the standard of narrativity it would not be unreasonable to claim that the closeness to EPED can be set up as a criterion for a particular discourse to be reckoned as realising narrativity. Central to the criterion will be the degree of summational flavour and syntactic complexity recognisable in an event discourse. The implication of what we have mentioned so far is that at one extreme there can be a narrative including discourse realising a maximal level of narrativity which can be called mock-existentiality, and at the other extreme there can be a narrative involving discourse realising the highest level of reportivity, such as [5]-32, which clearly reminds the reader of the gap between event time and speech time. But in many cases a narrative is a combined product of different perspectives ranging from strong narrativity to strong report.

5.2.12 Conclusion

The aim of the discussion in 5.2 was twofold. One was to investigate how temporal sequentiality, which is closely connected with eventhood (the recognition of change), can be realised linguistically, and the other was to look into the relation between perspectival and aspectual choices in event description in order to reflect upon the problem of narrative perspective or narrativity. Central to our discussion was the notion that context plays the

vitally important role in our recognition of the eventhood of linguistically realised states of affairs, and that there can be no inherent lexical-grammatical items supposed to be event expressions. With a view to clarifying the point of the argument, we set up three perspectival varieties, i.e. *existential, reporting,* and *narrative perspectives.* We argued that narrative perspective is, mainly from a pragmatic point of view, a variety of reporting perspective, and that the temporal immediacy or the temporal near-sightedness, which more or less simulates existential-perspective event description, contributes to making the reader feel that the narrative discourse consists of a sequence of story NOWs.

In 5.3, with a view to spotlighting the characteristic of narrativity from a different angle, we concentrate upon imperfective event clauses in narrative discourse. Our discussion will clarify: 1) that *strong narrativity* is a typical narrative environment in which imperfective event clauses tend to appear; 2) that the reference-time approach to narrative dynamics, often employed by grammarians and formal semanticists, has a general tendency to fail to capture the eventhood of imperfective event clauses, partly because the so-called "narrative time movement" is conceived of solely in relation to the perfective event clauses, and partly because their approach is theoretically based upon the time-point NOW view of presentness, neglecting the presentness in the significant A-series.

5.3 Imperfective event clauses in narrative discourse

5.3.1 Eventhood and the framing effect

Let us begin by looking at the following two examples:

[5]-33 (a) Little Chandler said nothing until the barman returned with

the two glasses: (b) then he touched his friend's glass lightly (c) and reciprocated the former toast. (d) *He was beginning to feel somewhat disillusioned* (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 83). (italics are mine)

[5]-34 (How he had suffered that day,) (a) *waiting* at the shop door until the shop was empty, (b) *standing* at the counter (c) and trying to appear at his ease while the girl piled ladies' blouses before him, (d) *paying* at the desk (e) and *forgetting* to take up the odd penny of his change, (f) *being called back* by the cashier, (g) and finally *striving* to hide his blushes as he left the shop by examining the parcel to see if it was securely tied. (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 90-91). (italics are mine)

The framing effect of the progressive was already referred to in 5.2.4. The progressive sentence in [5]-33 can be considered as a typical example exhibiting that effect. According to the generally accepted grammatical view, when two or more durative situations are related the meaning of the progressive is that of simultaneity, synchronisation, or co-existence (cf. Joos, 1964: 127; Huddleston, 1984: 153; Quirk et al., 1985: 209; Toolan, 1990: 99-103). There should be no doubt about the eventhood with respect to the first three clauses in [5]-33; it will be generally agreed that they are canonical narrative clauses the function of which is to advance the plot, or move the narrative time forward. Compared with those event clauses, (d) seems to be unstable in its status. It may be called a 'contemporaneous but background event' (cf. Joos, 1964), or a 'progressive state' (cf. Caenepeel, 1989). Whether it is classified as an event or a state, most people will agree that (d) does not contribute to moving the narrative time forward by advancing the plot. Our contention in this section is that the generally accepted view concerning progressives like (d) in [5]-33 is a biased idea resulting from a mechanical view of narrative time likely to be taken as a mono-dimensional item, and from a restricted view of presentness, taking

for granted the now-ness in the time-point A-series.

First of all, we must note that the progressives like [5]-33 (d), indicative of a one-off, temporary state of affairs, may well be taken as a marker of a high degree of narrativity of the neighbouring narrative discourse (we already pointed out that this sort of progressive sentence is least likely to appear in synoptic writings like [5]-24), and that the very high degree of temporal immediacy or temporal near-sightedness represented in the narrative functions as a perspectival yoke because of which some events have to be realised in the progressive form. On this point, it could be argued that the four clauses in [5]-33 all represent marked internality in terms of temporal perspective (narrative theorists like Uspensky (1973) may distinguish the internality of (d) from the externality of the preceding three clauses, claiming that (d) is characterised by what he calls *verba sentiendi*; but such a distinction is not immediately relevant to the point of our argument that the distinction between narrativity and non-narrativity is primarily concerned with the temporal stance the describer (or the narrator) assumes in event description). Setting aside for the moment the problem of whether the progressives like [5]-33 (d) are a state or not (we turn to it in the next section), we now focus upon what is happening to narrative time in [5]-33 (d). What can be observed in [5]-33, the clausal sequence from (a) to (c) demonstrates the active and-then logic; in spite of the slightly retrospective flavour of the whole discourse, detectable from 'until' in (a) operating as a lexical past-time indicator (see 5.2.11), [5]-33 can be said to realise a high degree of temporal immediacy which will make the reader feel that the now-renewal impetus is perceivable at least among the first three clauses. It is not difficult for the reader to recognise that each of the first three events constitutes a significant NOW in this narrative. But it will be felt that when the narrative comes to (d) the series of the significant NOWs is "cut off"; the now-renewal seems not operative there. What is worth noting is that, as far

as the now-ness of (d) is concerned, the discoursal environment involving (d) functions for the reader to set up a particular point of time as NOW around which the situation seems to be stretching into the past and the future. What seems to occur is, as it were, a kind of atomisation of presentness. From our argument of the two facets of presentness it is clear that such presentness concerns our sense of quantitative time which makes the time-point A-series. As noted in 5.2.4, the time-point NOW is characterised by the fact that what comes first is the setting up of a particular point of time as the present, and then, it is connected with the situation in which the NOW is construed punctually.

It is of vital importance to recognise that, in principle, where the time-point NOW holds, the significant NOW holds, too (see 5.2.4). (There may be a few exceptional cases like 'It's half past ten now' This is an example concerning which it is difficult to think up a context in which the presentness can be considered as belonging to the significant A-series; sentences like this might be called 'time-point-NOW-proper expressions'.) Then, what makes it possible to interpret [5]-33 (d) as constituting a significant NOW? The answer to this question seems to lie in our recognition of the possible non-linear characteristic of the significant NOW, as we discussed in 5.2.5. Needless to say, [5]-33 (d) cannot be counted as moving narrative time forward, as long as its presentness is considered in line with a unified series of significant NOWs realised in the event sequence from (a) to (c). But it will become possible to recognise it as constituting a significant NOW when we assume it makes a part of a different series of significant NOWs. As a matter of fact, context shows that earlier in that story a number of thought events occurred in which the protagonist (Little Chandler) thought very highly of his friend (Ignatius Gallaher). Look at the following example:

[5]-35 That was Ignatius Gallaher all out; and, damn it, you couldn't but admire him for that (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 79)

[5]-35 is about the protagonist's feeling toward the friend he was going to meet, and [5]-33 (d) expresses his new feeling toward the person he actually met. If we think of a particular series of the significant NOWs in which [5]-35 and [5]-33 (d) are aligned, it will become reasonable to give an authentic status to [5]-33 (d) as an event description which is not backgrounded when it is considered in relation to the preceding three clauses in [5]-33. It is to be noted that the renewal of now-ness in the series of [5]-35 and [5]-33 (d) does not affect that in the series of (a), (b) and (c) in [5]-33, and vice versa.

Particular attention must be drawn to the fact that, even if [5]-33 (d) had been rendered like:

[5]-33 (d)' He was somewhat disillusioned

the eventhood should have been likewise detectable. Unlike [5]-33 (d), [5]-33 (d)' has no possibility of being interpreted as an event, according to the well-accepted grammatical views of events and states, but context allows us to interpret [5]-33 (d)' as entailing NOW as an indicator of temporal sequentiality.

In summing up, we would argue that the impression of the contemporaneousness of [5]-33 (d) is nothing but a specious one due to the perspectival yoke in which it is placed. It can be said to contribute to moving narrative time forward in a different series of the significant NOWs. This suggests that one should not be adamant that 'narrative time' or 'story time' be a one-dimensional, linearity-oriented item. The eventhood of [5]-33 (d) or (d)' ought to be unambiguously recognised if they are released from the perspectival yoke resulting from the temporal near-sightedness perceivable overall in [5]-33, and are reproduced in a temporally far-sighted perspective such as: 'When he met him, he became disillusioned.'

The general situation of [5]-33 can be accounted for as follows, using an analogy of spatial dimensions. The discoursal sequence from (a) to (c) makes, as it were, a two-dimensional world, where (d) comes in as a three-dimensional object, say, a spear. Naturally, from the two dimensional point of view, it is virtually impossible to recognise it as a spear; it will be perceived as a cross-section. But the point is that the cross-section is not the appearance of the spear from the three-dimensional point of view.

As Brinton points out (1988: 247-8), the characteristic of the progressive tends to be discussed in a rather fixed situation, like narrative, presupposing a reference time around which the progressivised state of affairs is assumed to be expanded. Consequently, the framing effect of the progressive is likely to be emphasised as its chief characteristic. But even in narrative there are cases where the progressives make a single series of significant NOWs, which move the plot forward as in [5]-34. The ing-forms from (a) to (g) in [5]-34 are progressives, and one important thing to note is that the parenthesised sentence does not offer an atomic reference time for the reading of the following discourse. The relation between them is one between a generalised event description and its specifications. Therefore, there is no framing effect perceivable in those progressives. Those progressives illustrate the narrator's extremely near-sighted temporal stance that is maximally aligned with that of the character. So the narrativity is maximally high in that discourse except in the parenthesised sentence. This can be taken as a typical mock-EPED. By adopting such a temporally "hot" stance the narrator successfully portrays the sensitive nature of the protagonist who tends to be annoyed by minute and trivial details in life. [5]-34 would be considered as a good example showing that a consecutively aligned sequence of the progressives can be a series of the significant NOWs, i.e. a series of plot-advancing events in narrative discourse.

In the next section we have a critical look at the view that the progressives like [5]-33 (d) are statives, by examining the reference-time approach to narrative dynamics.

5.3.2 The problem with the reference-time approach to narrative

In this section we aim at showing that the indiscriminate application of reference times to consecutive clauses in narrative is misleading in that it fails to distinguish between event and non-event clauses, and that it is responsible for making an excessively strong image of the linear time-line of narrative. The discussion will be a critical remark upon the formal semanticists' approach to narrative dynamics.

As we reviewed in Chapter 2, Reichenbach's reference times are employed by grammarians and formal semanticists to account for the "forward movement of time" in narrative discourse. Now we reproduce the definition of the reference time which we gave in 2.1.1:

> The point of reference, i.e. the temporal standpoint from which the speaker invites his audience to consider the occurrence of the event (or the obtaining of the state) (Taylor, 1977)

With a view to examining how the concept of reference time is actually applied to the analysis of narrative discourse, here we reproduce the system postulated by Caenepeel (1989: 68-73) (cf. 2.1.3). She advanced the notion of 'symmetrical and asymmetrical referential centres (RC)'. According to her, a referential centre consists of two intervals, i.e. an asserted (r) and an assumed (r') reference time. Her schematisation shows that the so-called event clauses has a symmetrical RC. One example:



Example: The train arrived.

Type: culmination

(Note: PP means 'preparatory period', designating a period leading up to the change of state, and Cons is 'consequence', designating a period ensuing after this change of state. The punctuality of asserted reference time [r] coincides with that of assumed reference time [r'], so that the referential centre is symmetrical.)

And in the so-called state clauses RC is asymmetrical. One example:



Example: He was tired.

Type: non-contingent states, also referred to simply as states.

(Note: P means 'point' (a particular time point), which introduces a punctual asserted reference time [r]. And the durability of r' implicates, for example, that a few minutes before the time point the proposition 'He was tired' was true, and a few minutes after the time point the same proposition was still true, Thus the referential centre is asymmetrical.)

The coincidence of the asserted and assumed reference times in event clauses appears to be in parallel with our observation that an event, i.e. a temporal clause, constitutes a significant NOW. The treatment of event clauses seems to be less problematic than that of state clauses. It will be

understood that the atomistic interval of the asserted reference time can be very close to the idea of time-point presentness, i.e. the notion of NOW in the time-point A-series. Thus, it is not difficult to predict what will happen if such interval discrepancy between the asserted and assumed reference times is adopted as a test to know whether a particular clause is an event or a state. For the purpose of our discussion in 5.3, it is very important to note that clauses with asymmetrical RC are automatically classified as non-events. The main reason why Caenepeel labels the progressive as a state is that it linguistically behaves in exactly the same way as 'He was tired' given above. She says (*ibid.*: 122): 'a progressive takes as its input a process, and it describes this process as ongoing or in progress at a particular point of time, by compressing its asserted reference time into an atomic interval. Sentences encoding a progressive therefore exhibit the aspectual properties of a state.' The serious drawback of such a formally rigid view of eventhood and statehood is that it cannot distinguish an event clause like [5]-33 (d) from atemporal clauses like the following (assuming that its atemporal feature, i.e. the statehood, is contextually verifiable):

[5]-36 John was an American.

One great factor contributing to the observation that [5]-33 (d) and [5]-36 behave alike in terms of dynamics is that the fundamental principle of the reference-time approach to temporal discourse like narrative is to identify the temporal feature of a particular sentence or clause only in relation to the immediately preceding one. This is a relativistic view of temporal dynamics but one must admit that it is a markedly microscopic and rigid relativism. The general attitude underlying such a restricted view of dynamics might be given an expression like: 'What happens to the narrative time in the next clause?' It is not difficult to see that the reference-time approach to narrative dynamics fails to capture 'narrative time', 'story time'

or 'plot progression' in a more flexible manner. We observed in Chapter 3 that time is a matter of relation between events, and that the relation itself is the direction of time - the direction from NEW to OLD (see 3.2.2). It is to be recognised that this temporal dynamics holds good for narrative discourse, or story telling, and that it need not be realised only in the microscopic discoursal relation between adjacent clauses.

The problems with the reference-time approach to adjacent clauses in narrative discourse will be further discussed in the next chapter which concentrates upon *event sequencing* on the microscopic and macroscopic levels in narrative fiction.

5.3.3 Conclusion

In 5.3 we focused upon the problem of the so-called framing effect which tends to be referred to in relation to imperfective clauses such as the reasons why the well-accepted grammatical views fail to recognise the progressives in narrative as events. One is that they tend to stick to a rather rigid idea of presentness, namely, the time-point NOW type of presentness, and are normally indifferent to the presentness in the significant A-series. And the second reason is that they do not pay enough attention to the problem of perspectival restrictions peculiar to narrative perspective. Our discussion in 5.3 showed that it is legitimate and reasonable to recognise the eventhood of some types of imperfective clauses which have been traditionally labelled as states, or processes.

From a general point of view, the whole chapter can be taken as accounting for what is going on in 5.1.1, where two people interpret a particular progressive expression differently; one assumes it to be an event, and the other, a state. It is now clear that the former commonsensically assumes

that the progressivised state of affairs constitutes a significant NOW; he conceives of the whole situation as realising temporal sequentiality, that is, an event. By contrast, the latter interprets the presentness primarily in the time-point A-series, and deliberately pushes into the background the recognition of now-ness in the significant A-series. Compared with the former, the latter is marked in the way he responds. And note that this markedness would have been equally felt if the latter had said, 'No, no, it's a process, not an event'. This seems to suggest that the distinction between event and state is more intrinsic and more fundamental than that between state and process.

With our observations of perspectival varieties made in this chapter in mind, in Chapter 6 we take a closer look at the ways in which graphological sequencing realises story events in narrative fiction.

Chapter 6 Event sequencing in narrative fiction

The aim of this chapter is to make an inquiry into how graphological linearity is related to the sequence of story events in narrative discourse. Based upon the assumption that narrative discourse consists of story-event discourse, which contributes to the plot progression, and background discourse, which has no direct bearing upon the forward movement of the plot, our discussion concentrates upon the ways in which textual circumstances realise narrative dynamics, which, on the most microscopic level, means the and-then relation between two event clauses. This chapter is mainly a microscopic study of narrative dynamics, focusing upon the discoursal relations between adjacent clauses, and through the study it will be shown that the adjacency-minded approach is not necessarily helpful in detecting the dynamic sequence of story events. Our contention is that the proper recognition of narrative dynamics requires a more or less macroscopic view of graphological sequence in narrative discourse. With a view to investigating the possibilities of macroscopic readings of narrative dynamics, in the last part of this chapter (6.5) we attempt a case study of Joyce's 'A Little Cloud' .

6.1 The dynamics of narrative structure

6.1.1 The dual aspect of narrative

As a preliminary to accounting for the dynamics of states of affairs in narrative fiction, the present section makes brief reference to the dual aspect of narrative.

It will be generally acknowledged that when we speak of narrative we can

refer to two aspects of it. One is that a narrative is a narrative (story) world as a coherently structured, event-oriented entity. And the other is that a narrative is a narrative-telling, i.e. discourse. From an ontological point of view, these two cannot be separated from each other, just as it is impossible to isolate the colour from a red rose.

Which of the two aspects comes to the surface of one's consciousness may be concerned with the psychological principle of focus and periphery, which was discussed in 3.5.1. Due to the inherently selective nature of human consciousness, one cannot focus upon more than one item at the same time. If we apply this cognitive feature of human beings to the situation of narrative reading, we will be able to make the following observation. When the reader's attention is directly drawn to the represented world as a spatio-temporal particular, the other aspect of narrative as a verbal act will click out of focus and become peripheral in the reader's mind. In such circumstances the reader will feel that what is being given to him is the narrative world itself, simply because by attending solely to the represented world the language as the medium is likely to appear "transparent" to him. On the other hand, when the reader focuses upon *how* the narrative world is represented, then his primary concern will become more or less a metalinguistic one, and the narrative as a represented world will disappear into the background. This does not necessarily mean to say that there are two distinct kinds of readers; in fact, it is very likely that one particular reader will be aware of the two aspects of narrative in an oscillatory manner in the actual process of reading.

As mentioned above, both *narrative-telling* and *the narrative world* constitute the "meaning" of narrative. The veracity of this observation will be confirmed by reflecting upon the acceptability of such remarks as: 'Then, the narrative goes back to the day when he was murdered', or 'In this

narrative, A happened first, then B happened, and finally C happened'. One will have little difficulty understanding that in the two examples the same word 'narrative' is employed with two different shades of meaning; the former can be looked upon as primarily concerned with how the narrative is recounted, while the latter seems to be oriented directly to the represented world.

It is to be borne in mind that, as will be pointed out later, the knowledge of the two possible aspects of narrative is a prerequisite for the proper understanding of the temporal dynamics of narrative structure.

6.1.2 The primary characteristic of narrative time

This section looks into the intrinsic nature of narrative time which is primarily concerned with the significant A-series. By looking at Genette's theory of 'duration' (1980), we will suggest that the concept of duration or pacing is more congenial to the time-point time, which is primarily quantitative, than to the significant time, which is primarily qualitative, so that the notion of duration or pacing is of secondary importance to the recognition of the dynamics of narrative time which is virtually identical with story-event sequencing.

Genette (1980: 87-88), referring to the rhythm or pacing in narrative discourse, says: '... the speed of a narrative will be defined by the relationship between a duration (that of the story, measured in seconds, minutes, hours, days, months, and years) and a length (that of the text, measured in lines and pages)'. With this definition he suggests four possible movements: pause, scene, summary, and ellipsis. In addition to these four movements, Chatman (1978) and some others have suggested another possibility in between pause and scene, i.e. stretch (or slow down). With the

formulas 'story time' and 'narrative (or narrative-telling) time' these five possibilities will be schematised as follows:

1. Pause: Story time = 0, narrative continues
2. Stretch: Narrative time longer than story time
3. Scene: Narrative time = story time
4. Summary: Narrative time shorter than story time
5. Ellipsis: Narrative gap

The usefulness of this schematisation will be accounted for by the empirical fact that we feel a certain rhythm or pacing in reading narrative; sometimes a particular stretch of narrative is felt to be more or less accelerated or decelerated, as if it were turned from *andante* to *allegro*, and vice versa, in musical terms.

In some cases, however, it happens that the reader cannot tell, for example, whether a particular narrative is a scene, stretch or summary. With Joyce's 'Eveline' Toolan writes (1988: 56):

> For example, just how long, in story time, is Eveline's revery? It could be anything from a few minutes to several hours: it takes place between early and late evening (when the mail-boat goes). Since we can't be sure about the pace of the revery presentation, neither can we be sure as to whether the later scene at the quayside is a presentational acceleration or deceleration.

The uncertainty of the physical length of time which Eveline spent in her revery can be seen as an extreme case, but the intrinsic feature of time in the significant A-series in which *when* and *how long* can be known only in a relative manner in the sequence of events is quite commonly observable in narrative discourse as in:

[6]-1 She laid the mirror down on the dresser and went over to the window and looked out. (Hemingway, 'Cat in the Rain': 316)

What this prototypical narrative discourse suggests is that in narrative-world time the sequentiality of 'significant events' tends to overshadow the other sequence of time, i.e. the sequence of 'spurious events' (time points) in which the temporal information about *when* and *how long* is available in an absolute and objective way. Theoretically, it might be feasible to imagine a very time-conscious narrative in which the precise duration of each story event is indicated in some way or other, but, actually, showing the exact length of time of each event or the whole story is not the narrator's main concern. The narrator's awareness of time seems to be more directly concerned with the significant A-series than with the time-point A-series.

This peculiarity of narrative-world time contrasts markedly with the balanced temporality in reality. It is part of world knowledge that when a particular event takes place in the real world we can recognise it as an event in a significant way (this implicates the recogniser's "subjective" labelling or interpretation by means of verbalisation), and at the same time we can know, in an objective manner, exactly when it happened or precisely how long it endured. This will be concerned with the problem of perceptibility. From experience we know that objective measurability of time or time points concerns the perceptual aspect of reality; we feel we can measure the exact length of time by, for example, seeing the movement of the hand on the watch. Narrative world differs from reality in that the former is a medium-through, represented world, in which what counts is not *perceivability* but *conceivability*. This is the intrinsic reason why the concept of duration, i.e. the length of time, tends to be nebulous in narrative discourse. It could be pointed out that there is a parallelism between this problem and the vagueness of angle of vision in optical terms in verbal narrative, which we

discussed in 4.2.4.

In Chapter 3 (see 3.6) we contended that time is just a matter of relation between events, and that the relation itself is the direction of time - the direction from NEW to OLD. This implicates that the intrinsic nature of time is its *sequentiality*. Here particular attention must be drawn to the ontological difference between the sequentiality of the significant A-series and that of the time-point A-series. Crucial is the fact that the sequentiality of the significant-A series is primarily *qualitative*, whereas that of the time-point A-series is primarily *quantitative*. What is meant by qualitative sequentiality is that the significance attached to states of affairs constitutes time, i.e. change. Time as the qualitative sequentiality entails duration, time in the time-point A-series, but such time-point time is backgrounded, as it were, and is not directly relevant to the significant sequence of time. By contrast, the quantitative sequentiality of the time-point A-series has no direct bearing upon the significance ascribable to substantial states of affairs or entities in the world. It is not without significance, but the significance is only the concept 'from NEW to OLD' attached to the sequence of time points as abstract phenomena. This abstract time primarily concerns the notion of duration, which is characterised by its objective measurability.

It is to be generally agreed that the dynamics of narrative or narrative structure lies in the sequence of events which contributes to the impression of the so-called plot progression. And when we refer to the sequence of events what we mean to say is not the sequence of *spurious* events, i.e. the sequence of time points, but the sequence of *substantial* events, which constitute changes in entities in the fictional world. It could be said that the greatest characteristic of the narrative dynamics, which belongs to the significant A-series, is its "subjectivity" as against the "objectivity" of the event dynamics in the time-point A-series. The subjectivity of the significant A-series

concerns the fact that it is up to each individual to decide how to verbalise a particular event and how and where (temporally) to distinguish it from the preceding events or states of affairs. And the objectivity of the time-point A-series lies in its nature as "common property"; every one can share a particular time point (e.g. October 27th, 1993) and an infinite number of events can happen at a particular time. One of the central aims of the present chapter is to clarify the intrinsically subjective nature of the event-sequence of narrative structure, and to argue that attempting to look at the narrative dynamics primarily in terms of the time-point A-series tends to end up missing the real dynamics of the narrative world.

The contrast between the subjective nature of the significant A-series and the objective nature of the time-point A-series is touched upon from different angles throughout the rest of this chapter.

6.1.3 The continuity and irreversibility of narrative time

In this section we are going to stress the ontological fact that narrative time is no more discontinuous and reversible than time is in the real world.

In 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 we made an ontological observation that one cannot think of discontinuity or irreversibility of time without making a logical contradiction. As confirmed in the last section, time is essentially sequential, and this holds whether the time being referred to is a significant one or a time-point one. A particular time A is followed by another particular time B, and when this occurs, the order is semantically characterised by the ontological principle 'from NEW to OLD'. Of vital importance is the fact that there is no suspension, no interval, in between A and B; the two times make a sequence which is continuity itself. Claiming that suspension is possible between any two particular times would be almost as absurd as

insisting that, when a lump of cheese is cut, the cross-section consists of a third entity, which is neither cheese nor nothing-ness.

One must be reminded of such peculiarities of time when one contemplates narrative time. Narrative time means 'narrative world time', as mentioned before. Obviously, the narrative world simulates the real world in spatio-temporal terms. This means that the law of time and space in the narrative world is the same as the one that governs reality. In the narrative world events occur in chronological order, and time "moves forward" continuously without being suspended, just as it does in the real world (If a science fiction deals with 'suspended time' or 'reversed time', it is just playing with words; one cannot make any good sense out of such impossibilities.)

Presumably, it is when one becomes conscious of narrative time after reading a particular narrative that sequentiality as the essence of time will be fully appreciated. Under ordinary and normal circumstances, when one thinks of a particular narrative as a succession of events one will be looking at it as a continuous entity, and as long as one focuses upon the continuous aspect of narrative structure one will find it nonsensical to refer to narrative time suspension. Seeing the continuity of story events means grasping the narrative dynamics in and only in the and-then logic.

Now it is clear that when people say 'The story (narrative) is suspended here' or 'The story (narrative) goes backward there', they are referring to the telling side of narrative, whether they are aware of it or not. Any reference to narrative time suspension ought to be interpreted as saying that a particular chunk of discourse is *atemporal* , i.e. not directly concerned with the plot progression; it must not be taken literally. And the possible meaning of backward movement of narrative time is the reversed ordering in the recounting of story events. Here again, reversed movement of narrative

time does not make any sense in the literal sense of the word.

6.1.4 Conclusion

Our discussion in 6.1 elucidated the following peculiarities of narrative. 1) The term 'narrative' can refer to two different aspects, i.e. narrative telling and narrative world, and when the term is actually employed one of the two sides is likely to be spotlighted. 2) Narrative time is less concerned with the time-point A-series, which is quantitative and "objective", than with the significant A-series, which is qualitative and "subjective". 3) Narrative time is continuous and irreversible just as time in reality is, so that expressions such as 'narrative time suspension' or 'backward movement of narrative time' can be misleading and should not be taken literally, since possible meanings of such expressions are concerned with narration or story-telling.

In 6.2, following the discussion in Chapter 5, we summarise the methodological problems of formal approaches to narrative discourse which tend to fail to describe narrative dynamics in a proper way.

6.2 Problems with formal approaches to narrative dynamics

6.2.1 Reference time and simultaneity

In this section, by looking into the way in which the "objective" time in the time-point A-series can be highlighted by the application of reference time to what we call *imperfective event clauses* (cf. 5.3), we confirm that the reference time approach to consecutive (main) clauses in narrative discourse is not appropriate for the recognition of narrative dynamics.

Reichenbachian reference time is frequently employed to explain

'narrative time progression' (cf. Partee, 1984; Kamp, 1981), but as we argued in 5.3.2, the reference-time approach tends to fail to account for the real dynamics of narrative structure.

The methodological drawback of the reference time approach will be clearly understood by seeing how narrative time progression is normally assessed in the clausal chunk in which a perfective (bounded) event clause is followed by an imperfective (unbounded) event clause as in:

[6]-2 (a) She rested the nape of her neck against the cool iron bed-rail (b) and fell into a revery. (c) *There was no longer any perturbation visible on her face.* (Joyce, 'The Boarding House': 75) (italics are mine).

According to Partee's system (1984), the event (a) introduces a new reference time **r1**, which will be employed for the interpretation of the event (b), which in turn will introduce another reference time **r2** for the reading of (c). But (c) is a so-called stative clause, so that it does not update the reference time; it is supposed to surround the current reference time **r2**.

This formal, adjacency-minded analysis of narrative discourse claims that narrative time does not "move forward" from (b) to (c). Note that the impression of narrative time being suspended there can be considered to stem from the *simultaneity* or *contemporaneousness* of the two states of affairs represented by (b) and (c) respectively. It is evident that the reference-time approach of this kind assumes that stative clauses like (c) have a framing effect upon event clauses like (b); what is described in (c) is construed as a state or condition of some entity at a particular point of time. As we referred to in 5.2.4, the awareness of such time points prior to the recognition of the possible dynamics of a certain state of affairs illustrates

the fact that the temporality perceived there belongs to the time-point A-series. The most salient feature of the time-point A-series is its "objectivity", as already pointed out; a particular time point is objective enough to be shared by many different events.

It is worth noting that reference time can be fuzzy in its nature. As long as one sees that reference times are applied to the dynamic sequence of event clauses such as [6]-2 (a) and (b), the combination of which embodies the and-then logic in terms of substantial states of affairs, one may feel that reference time belongs to the significant A-series. This observation will be verified by confirming that it is possible to feel the renewal of story NOW in the sequence from (a) to (b). We need to attend to the fact that the presentness attached to the two event clauses has nothing to do with the so-called framing effect. For example, the event clause (a) can constitute a story NOW, which means that, as far as (a) is concerned, it makes no sense to claim that the event described in that clause stretches into past and future. This contrasts markedly with the temporal situation in (c). In the reference time system, the stative clause (c) cannot constitute a story NOW. Note that the reference time **r2** starts to look like a time-point when it is applied to (c). One might argue that **r2** has a flavour of the significant time because it is closely related to a significant event (b), but it is necessary to recognise that when it is referred to in connection with (c), it behaves as an abstract time point around which the state represented by (c) extends to past and future.

Formal semanticists such as Partee (1984) or Caenepeel (1989) would claim that for the reasons mentioned above narrative time stops at (c), but, as argued in 5.3.2, that is because their fundamental principle is to try to identify the temporal features of a particular sentence or clause only in relation to its immediately preceding one. It is of vital importance to note that one need not assume that temporal dynamics in narrative is to be

perceived only in the microscopic discoursal relation between adjacent (main) clauses. What matters in recognising the eventhood of (c) is that, though the presentness of (c) may look like a time-point at first, it can be taken as a significant NOW. This means that the whole situation of (c) can constitute a story NOW in contrast to the preceding situation which is not directly concerned with graphologically preceding clauses (b) and (a). The most salient feature of the significant NOW is that such presentness concerns the whole situation, and that once the presentness is identified as such it is irrelevant to say that the situation extends to past and future in time-point terms. In short, as far as the clause [6]-2 (c) is concerned, it is reasonable to assume that it entails RPD 'now' (cf. 5.2.8) as *the temporal-sequentiality marker*.

Presumably, one of the most serious drawbacks of the reference time system, which tends to go to and fro between the significant time and the time-point time, is that it cannot recognise the eventhood of imperfective clauses such as (c). The temporal adverb 'no longer' indicative of a change will allow us to perceive the eventhood represented by this clause. And the eventhood of (c) can be confirmed from context as well. Polly, one of the protagonists in the story, revealed her strong agitation here and there before [6]-2. One example:

[6]-3 She cried and threw her arms round his neck, saying:
-O, Bob! Bob! What am I to do? What am I to do at all? (Joyce, 'The Boarding House': 72)

As already pointed out, crucial is the semantic and grammatical fact that the temporal-sequentiality marker 'now' can typically co-occur with [6]-2 (c) just as in the case of [6]-2 (a) and (b), which can be thought of as prototypical event clauses in narrative discourse. What is to be noted is that

the graphological sequence from [6]-2(b) to (c) does not make an icon of temporal sequence implying 'and then', so that it is necessary to assume that the eventhood of [6]-2 (c) belongs to a different dimension of the significant A-series from that of [6]-2 (a) and (b).

The problems of formal, adjacency-minded approach to narrative dynamics which have been revealed in this section can be summarised as follows.

Firstly, formal approaches tend to assume that the perfective (bounded)/imperfective (unbounded) distinction corresponds to the event/state distinction. Such a formal fallacy seems to be well portrayed by Moens (1987: 43) who writes: 'Events will be referred to as bounded in that they are supposed to start and end at relatively precise points in time. States are "unbounded" since - although they seem to extend in time - no reference is made to their start and end points'. In our understanding the eventhood of a particular state of affairs can be recognised when it is judged to have realised the temporal sequentiality, whether it is *formally* perfective or imperfective.

Secondly, the reference-time approach is not necessarily appropriate for detecting narrative dynamics, which is intrinsically associated with the significant A-series, since reference time can find itself congenial to the time-point A-series, the "objective" series of time points. This can be known in certain narrative circumstances in which application of reference time system leads one to recognise *simultaneity* in relation to the so-called framing effect.

Lastly, formal analysts of narrative discourse tend to pay too much attention to the graphological sequence on the microscopic level. They are excessively concerned with how consecutive (main) clauses behave temporally on the

assumption that the iconicity of time movement is to be perceived in adjacent clauses.

6.2.2 The limitations of adjacency-minded approaches

The focal point of discussion in this section is to argue that formal and microscopic approaches to narrative dynamics, which are remarkably sensitive to the temporal characteristics of graphologically adjacent (main) clauses, are not necessarily appropriate for the recognition of narrative dynamics as a succession of events because of the fuzziness of the temporal relation between clauses that is quite commonly observable in works of narrative fiction.

Formally, the superordinate narrative discourse (cf. 5.2.10) will be realised as in:

[6]-4 (a) He wriggled his toes in the water in his shoes,(b) and got out a cigarette from his breast pocket. (c) He lit it (d) and tossed the match into the fast water below the logs. (Hemingway, 'Big Two-Hearted River: II': 354)

The graphological sequence of the four clauses in [6]-4 can be seen as a *prototype* of narrative structure, i.e. a representation of a succession of events; what can be perceived there is that the four consecutive clauses literally work as an icon of narrative time progression.

It will soon be recognised, however, that in actual works of narrative fiction, it too frequently happens that one cannot be sure whether a particular pair of adjacent clauses are temporally sequential or not, despite the temporality perceivable in either of them. The following example illustrates this:

[6]-5 (a) Little Chandler quickened his pace. (b) For the first time in his life he felt himself superior to the people he passed. (c) For the first time his soul revolted against the dull inelegance of Capel Street. (d) There was no doubt about it: (e) if you wanted to succeed you had to go away. (f) You could do nothing in Dublin. (g) As he crossed Grattan Bridge he looked down the river towards the lower quays (h) and pitied the poor stunted houses. (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 79))

It will be understood that for the recognition of narrative time progression applying the notion of reference time to the eight clauses one by one starting with (a) is not helpful. The first three clauses (a), (b) and (c) are what Short (1982: 183) calls 'narrative reports'. The trouble with the three clauses is that the temporal relation between them is indeterminate. The eventhood of each of them seems to be clear enough; they can all co-occur with the temporal-sequentiality marker 'now' (the importance of the temporal-sequentiality marker 'now' as a test to know the eventhood of a particular discourse will be emphasised in 6.3). But it is unclear whether the sequence of those three event clauses makes an icon of temporal progression or not.

The situation appears more difficult when the reader goes on to (d), (e) and (f) from the first three clauses. The temporal relation between (c) and (d), for example, is ambiguous. It seems likely that (d), (e) and (f) are FID (Free Indirect Speech), judging from the colloquial flavour recognisable in (d) in particular. If so, one possible interpretation is that (d), (e) and (f) are a kind of redundancy. Cohn (1978), referring to Tolstoy's *Ivan Ilych* , points out an interesting tendency of the narrator's report to overlap with directly quoted thoughts. She calls it 'redundancy'. The following is the excerpt quoted:

[6]-6 Then again together with that chain of memories *another series*

passed through his mind - of how his illness had progressed and grown worse. There also the further back he looked the more life there had been. There had been more of what was good in life and more of life itself. The two merged together. "*Just as the pain went on getting worse and worse, so my life grew worse and worse,*" *he thought.* (Cohn, 1978: 70) (italics are mine)

In [6]-6 the two italicised parts can be interpreted as the two different modes of telling of the same event - the former is NR (narrative report) and the latter, Tagged Speech (cf. 4.3.3). The important thing to note is that the redundant relation between the two different clauses is *atemporal*; it does not constitute an icon of temporal progression in graphological terms. Back to [6]-5, if we attend, for instance, to the consecutive relation between (c) and (d), which sounds redundant, we will find their sequence is *atemporal.* When we proceed further and see the graphological sequence from (f) to (g), and to (h), we will find it is *temporal.*

The ongoing discussion is stressing the drawback of the microscopic view of narrative dynamics which tends to be confronted with the uncertainty as to whether a particular clause contributes to the plot progression or not. The formal mind which is inclined to pay equal attention to each individual clause as a discrete syntactic unit in order to see the temporality of narrative may be said to have fallen into undesirable egalitarianism. Their theoretical stance will have to recognise that 'narrative time progression', 'narrative time suspension' and 'uncertainty about narrative time progression' are *equal* in weight in narrative discourse, since they generally assume that the temporal dynamics of narrative is to be assessed by seeing whether the relation between a particular main clause and the immediately following one realises temporal sequentiality or not. Such a formal attitude might be termed microscopic relativism.

The formal microscopicism mentioned so far is prone to take a static view of narrative. If one adopts microscopic relativism, one will have an impression that narrative continually stops, because, as we observed in [6]-5, it is quite common in actual narrative that one cannot tell whether the plot develops or not, as long as one sticks to the temporal relation between any two adjacent clauses. The theoretical stance of such formalism will not be able to explain the reason why, when one takes a slightly macroscopic view, the plot seems to develop from (a) to (g) in [6]-5, despite the ambiguity of the temporal sequentiality from (a) to (f). It would be irrelevant here to bring a physical point of view and argue that, as a whole, the narrative moves forward in [6]-5, just as a train can be said to go forward from a macroscopic point of view in spite of its halts at many different stations.

In the next section we are going to claim that the realisation and recognition of narrative dynamics as a sequence of story events cannot be fully understood without thinking about the pragmatic relation between narrator, text, and reader.

6.2.3 The pragmatic relation between narrator, text, and reader

That the realisation and recognition of narrative dynamics as a succession of story events is concerned not only with semantic and grammatical features of discourse but also with a pragmatic cooperation between narrator, text and reader will be understood by comparing the following two examples:

[6]-7 (a) 'The Lord-a-Lord! Why, Tess Durbeyfield, if there isn't thy father riding hwome in a carriage!'
(b) A young member of the band turned her head at the exclamation. (c) She was a fine and handsome girl - not handsomer than some others, possibly - (d) but her mobile peony mouth and large innocent eyes added eloquence to colour and

shape. (e) She wore a red ribbon in her hair, (f) and was the only one of the white company who could boast of such a pronounced adornment. (g) As she looked round Durbeyfield was seen moving along the road in a chaise belonging to The Pure Drop, driven by a frizzle-headed brawny damsel with her gown-sleeves rolled above her elbows. (Hardy, *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*: 51)

[6]-8 (a) The Abbey church of St. Mary was founded by King David I in 1136 for Cistercian monks. (b) It grew rich and powerful under royal patronage but over the centuries suffered repeatedly from English harassment, the end coming in 1545. (c) The red sandstone ruins show some of the finest stonework in Scotland with window tracery, flying buttresses, pinnacles and carved figures including on the roof that of a pig playing the bagpipes. (d) Tradition tells that the heart of King Robert I (Robert the Bruce) is buried within the Abbey. (e) The 16th Commendator's House is now a museum. (f) Open all year, daily. (g) Admission charge. (h) Easy disabled access. (from 'Scottish Borders Mini Guide: Melrose')

The reader's purpose of reading fiction will vary; some will be keen to know about the ideological background of the story, and some will concentrate on the temperamental features of the characters. But, in discussing narrative as a genre, one very fundamental thing to note is that when someone reads a narrative some pragmatic or institutional factor will require him to take it for granted that the narrative as a whole realises a succession of story events, i.e. the temporal sequentiality. It is the temporal sequentiality in narrative that is to be identified as *narrative dynamics*. And this essential feature is expected to be recognisable irrespective of the possible varieties of clausal relations on the consecutive basis.

Now, when we look at [6]-7, we are able to feel that temporal sequentiality is realised by the whole of the quoted passage. Microscopically, clauses (c), (d), (e) and (f) are to be interpreted as *atemporal* , as against (a), (b) and (g),

which are *temporal* (The distinction between temporal discourse (event expressions) and atemporal discourse (non-event expressions) in narrative discourse will be argued in connection with the concept of *story line* in 6.3). In terms of the flow of the discourse, four atemporal clauses seem to cut the "stream" of the narrative time, but the cutting is a phenomenon on the telling side, and not on the narrative-world side. It will be understood that as far as the event succession in the significant A-series from (a) to (b), and from (b) to (g) is concerned, narrative time is sequential. In other words, [6]-7 can induce the reader to recognise a *narrative form* as an abstract item, which is a linguistic realisation of a time sequence in the form of a succesion of events.

When we turn our attention to [6]-8, we find that it is irrelevant to decide whether the passage as a whole realises temporal dynamics or not, though structurally [6]-8 resembles [6]-7 in that both are made up of the combination of temporal and atemporal clauses. With [6]-8, perhaps the most evident non-narrative indicator can be observed in the clausal sequence from (f) to (h). The primary intention of each of the three clauses is to give practical information to the reader, and such practicality should be least relevant to narrative or story-telling. With the practical-orientedness as the distinctive feature, the whole passage will be judged to be informative. When we look at [6]-8 more specifically, we see that, as far as the first two clauses (a) and (b) are concerned, they are considered to designate a succession of events. But one will feel, from the overall practicality of the passage as observed above, that there is no *pragmatic* reason to take the temporal chunk of discourse as the dominant note in this passage. The temporal adverb 'now' in the clause (e) may be taken as a temporal-sequentiality marker implying the eventhood (change) of the situation, but the reader will not feel that the clause (e) constitutes a dynamic story-line together with (a) and (b). It will be acknowledged that [6]-8 as a whole lacks a pragmatic and metatextual sign

which says to the reader, 'I am going to tell you a story'. The writer has no intention of conveying temporal dynamics in [6]-8.

The main reason why adjacency-minded formal approaches to narrative discourse cannot grasp narrative dynamics properly is that, if one applies the reference-time analysis to the two passages [6]-7 and [6]-8 on the basis of consecutive clauses one cannot make reference to the distinctive features of either of them, since all one can mention will be the alteration of 'temporal progression' and 'temporal suspension' for both of them.

In 6.4, as a way of explicating how narrative dynamics can be perceived beyond semantic and grammatical features of each clause as a discrete syntactic unit, we will postulate /STORY LINE/ as an abstract and mental construct.

6.2.4 Subordinate clauses and S/T presentation

It must be admitted that formal analysts have traditionally concentrated upon the temporal characteristics of main clauses excluding S/T presentation in narrative discourse. Consequently, the eventhood of subordinate clauses and speech forms has been little studied. In this section we point out the problem of the reference-time approach to story events detectable in syntactically hypotactic clauses and speech/thought presentation.

That checking the update of reference times on the main clause basis is not necessarily helpful as a way of detecting story events properly can be acknowledged by taking into account the fact that application of reference times to narrative discourse concerns 'interval semantics' originally postulated by Taylor (1977) and extended by Dowty (1979), in which it is of central importance to determine the truth-value of a sentence (proposition)

with respect to the interval of time (time-point time). We reproduce Dowty's schematisation, which was given in 2.1.3:

(a) A sentence *a* is a stative iff it follows from the truth of *a* at an interval of I that *a* is true at all subintervals of I (e.g. 'John was ill from 2 to 4').

(b) A sentence *a* is an activity iff it follows from the truth of *a* at an interval I that *a* is true of all subintervals of I down to a certain limit in size (e.g. 'John played in the meadow from 2 to 4').

(c) A sentence *a* is an accomplishment/achievement iff it follows from the truth of *a* at an interval I that *a* is false at all subintervals of I (e.g. 'I listened to a Beethoven piano sonata from 2 to 2:30').

This schematisation of the three aspectual types in connection with the notion of the truth of a sentence concerning a time interval deals with propositions which can be assumed to be *assertive* with respect to the indication of the presence or absence of dynamicity of a particular state of affairs. Naturally, this system is not concerned with the assessment of the possible eventhood detectable in hypotactic clauses such as:

[6]-9 *Before he went back to the front* they went into the Duomo and prayed. (Hemingway, 'A Very Short Story': 301) (italics are mine)

[6]-10 *After the armistice* they agreed he should go home to get a job so they might be married. (Hemingway, 'A Very Short Story': 301) (italics are mine)

From the reader's point of view it is possible and reasonable to construct story events out of the italicised discourse in the two examples given above, though neither of the two hypotactic clauses is assertive as a proposition. As discussed in 5.2.11, the parataxis/hypotaxis choice made by the narrator is

suggestive of "weight assessment" that the narrator performed before the actual recounting. It is up to the reader to shake off the perspectival peculiarities attached to the encoded product and appreciate story events that are grammatically immanent. In 6.4 we deal with the combination of main and subordinate clauses, such as [6]-9 and 10, as a possible form which realises /STORY LINE/.

In 4.3.1 we observed that speech/thought presentation can be a substantial part of a particular narrative. The insignificance of applying reference times to speech/thought sentences or clauses as discrete syntactic units which represent story events will be recognised by looking at the following example:

[6]-11 'I wish he would go home. I never get to bed before three o'clock. What kind of hour is that to go to bed?'
'He stays up because he likes it.'
'He is lonely. I'm not lonely. I have a wife waiting in bed for me'.
(Hemingway, 'A Clean Well-lighted Place': 383)

This is a prototypical example of non-tagged speech (see 4.3.2). It is clear that quotation marks function as speech boundaries which implicates the narrator's presence as the event describer saying 'He said'. But considering that speech presentation is a showing of the narrative world, it could be claimed that even each individual sound in speech presentation contributes to the update of reference time. This means that there is no good reason to conceive of each sentence as a discrete event unit. In terms of story-event construction by the reader, it could be argued that it is in speech/ thought presentation that a macroscopic view which will unify more than one single clause or sentence as an event unit seems to be most reasonable. The problem of event unification will be discussed in 6.5.

6.2.5 Conclusion.

The aim of our discussion in 6.2 was to point out the theoretically undesirable aspects of consecutivity-oriented, formal approaches to narrative dynamics. The time focused upon in formal systems is the time-point time, which is not congenial to narrative time, which is intrinsically not *quantitative* but *qualitative*. Our contention is that time-point time is of secondary importance for the proper recognition of story events, which are to be detected primarily upon the basis of time in the significant A-series. The essential relation between the recognition of story events and the significant time will be further referred to in 6.3.

6.3 Events and non-events in narrative discourse

6.3.1 The "historical" function of context

The vital core of the present thesis is to argue that it is misleading to try to see a strong parallel between the temporal boundedness/unboundedness and the event/state distinction, since the problem of temporal boundaries has traditionally been discussed only in the framework of objective, quantitative time, which we call time in the time-point A-series.

In this section we clarify the possible criteria for a particular narrative discourse to be classified as a story event or not, on the assumption that, as we suggested in 6.1.2, the eventhood of a particular state of affairs is most clearly recognisable when in the axis of time the significance attached to the state of affairs can be found distinct from that previously attached to it. The significance being referred to is the significance perceivable as a change in a particular state of affairs, and the recognition of the change is possible only in a *relative* manner in a particular series of story events.

As repeatedly stressed in this thesis, the eventhood of a particular state of affairs is to be perceived when it is judged to have realised temporal sequentiality, whether it is formally perfective (bounded) or imperfective (unbounded). For the moment we concentrate upon a particular narrative situation in which imperfective (unbounded) clauses are sequentially arranged. The point of argument is that it is generally difficult to detect eventhood in imperfective (unbounded) clauses without a context which helps the reader to take them in a historical perspective.

Consider the following discourse:

[6]-12 (a) There were only two Americans stopping at the hotel. (b) They did not know any of the people they passed on the stairs on their way to and from their room. (c) The room was on the second floor facing the sea. (Hemingway, 'Cat in the Rain': 314)

This is the opening discourse of the short story. Our claim is that as far as this narrative situation is concerned none of these three clauses can be reckoned as a story event. Let us focus upon the clause (a). In judging the presence or absence of the eventhood of (a), the most important thing is not to fall into the ontological fallacy. One must realise that it is misleading to rely on world knowledge and insist that the significance of (a) can be contrasted in a relative manner with a possible series of significance *historically* attached to the hotel, so that the eventhood of (a) as a representation of a change can be observed. If a fictional fact is available, and one can confirm that there were, say, 1000 Japanese tourists staying at the hotel immediately before (a) holds, then one might be able to detect the eventhood implied in (a); a possible event description one is likely to make will be: 'There was a drastic decrease in the number of guests at the hotel'.

But crucial is the fact that, with respect to the hotel, there is no such context or history given in that particular narrative. One has to be *practical* rather than ontological in order to recognise story events properly.

When we ask whether it is feasible to use the temporal-sequentiality marker 'now' for (a), the answer must be negative. If the significance attached to (a) can be evaluated in contrast to a particular historical background of the hotel, then 'now' as the marker of a time sequence will be applicable; then the whole situation represented in (a) will constitute the presentness of the hotel in a significant way. That will be suggestive of the eventhood of the imperfective clause. But the actual narrative circumstances in which (a) is placed do not allow RPD 'now' (either significant or time-point) to co-occur with (a).

The same goes for (b) and (c). There is no context or historical background for them, out of which the reader would in a contrastive manner squeeze out RPD 'now' (again, either significant or time-point) applicable to them.

Here, some might argue that the use of 'now' as a temporal adverb can be optional with (a), if not with (b) or (c). Note that what underlies such thinking is a kind of contextualisation based upon world knowledge. Ontologically, no-one will doubt the eventhood of someone's stay at a hotel, simply because staying or stopping at a hotel is *normally* temporary. World knowledge will lull one into perceiving a change (or an event) in that situation, i.e. a change from not staying to staying at the hotel (from ~P to P). This sort of taken-for-granted contextualisation is so deep-ingrained in the way we understand the world that we have difficulty recognising it as such. Those who insist that the temporal adverb 'now' can be used in [6]-12 (a) will argue against using 'now' for [6]-12 (c) 'The room was on the second floor facing the sea'. One must realise that the judgement of whether

or not 'now' is acceptable for the two clauses in question is deeply associated with the way world knowledge operates as a form of contextualisation on the reader's part. When someone says that 'now' cannot co-occur with (c) due to the unrestricted meaning of the clause, he is actually trying to take the meaning of it in a specific but *conventionalised* context in which it is impossible to think of a change of any kind, such as the transplantation of the room from somewhere else.

My argument is as follows. One could claim the ontological eventhood of (a) by assuming that RPD 'now' is applicable to (a), but that is one's own contextualisation employing world knowledge, and it is not directly concerned with the actual narrative context in which (a) is rendered. As will be discussed in 6.2.3, story events ought to be story-line events. This means that story events are to be recognised in the now-renewal scheme in a narrative context directly available to the reader. From the viewpoint of story-telling as a process of narratorial contextualisation, [6]-12 (a), despite the applicability of the temporal adverb 'now' in ontological or grammatical terms, has no good reason to be taken as a story event (or a story-line event), since [6]-12 (a) is nothing more than the situation or the state of the narrative world when it is initiated; it would be unreasonable in terms of narration or narrative circumstances to insist that (a) can be captured in the active and-then logic concerned with the renewal of story NOW.

It will be of utmost importance to note that bringing too much reality into narrative world is irrelevant, particularly in terms of story event detection. In reality, as far as we ourselves and our immediate surroundings are concerned, we can normally see things in a historical scope; we know the past and the present of a particular state of affairs. This could be the main reason why it is in many cases possible to apply the temporal-sequentiality marker 'now' (the event-marker 'now') to imperfective, unbounded

clauses as in:

[6]-13 John is *now* in hospital.

The point is that in [6]-13 the speaker takes John's situation in a dynamic sequence of past and present. As will be discussed in 6.3.3, such dynamic sequentiality is comparable to *story line* in narrative, in which story events are to be recognised as forming a succession of events in the active and-then logic.

Our argument in the present section implicates that any imperfective, unbounded discourse can be construed as an event description, if it is feasible to assess the discourse in a historical scope. But the so-called 'eternal truth expressions' cannot possibly suggest any present-past contrast, so that it is virtually impossible to see the eventhood in them. One example:

[6]-14 God is just.

As far as the moral fibre of God is concerned, it is irrelevant to contextualise any past as distinguishable from the present. No context is available with repect to the moral history of God. Therefore, [6]-14 cannot possibly constitute the significant NOW for God.

We come back to 'Cat in the Rain' later again in the next section, in order to think practically and realistically about the problem of story events.

6.3.2 Boundedness vs. unboundedness

The present thesis is going to maintain that it is misleading and futile to become overly sensitive to sentence-grammar or very microscopic

discourse-grammar and try to consider the problem of narrative dynamics only by looking at each individual clause or adjacent clauses without paying enough attention to *narrative form*, a manifestation of discourse inertia, in which and only in which the dynamicity of narrative as an active sequence of story events is to be perceived in an authentic way. We turn to the problem of narrative form in relation to the problem of story line in the next section, in which our discussion will be a markedly context-oriented one.

As a preliminary to our context-bound talk in the next section, this section will be devoted to a rather decontextualised, general discussion of temporal boundedness and unboundedness in order to think about the problem of the autonomy of eventhood.

A decontextualised discussion of whether a particular discourse is an event description or not may sound unfair, considering the intuitively acknowledgeable fact that change or event is a relative phenomenon. The relative nature of event is clear in that one can recognise a change in some item when it is possible to refer to the transition from ~P to P in logical terms.

Our argument in the present section is that the eventhood of a temporally-bounded discourse tends to be perceived in an intrinsically context-free and autonomous way due to the distinctness of temporal demarcation which is easily recognisable in the occurrence-oriented flavour of the discourse, whereas the eventhood of a temporally unbounded discourse is likely to depend upon the "historical" function of context which enables one to appreciate the significance of the time during which the discourse holds in contrast to the significance previously or historically attached to an item or items represented by the discourse.

Compare the following examples:

[6]-15 (a) John died in 1983.
(b) Fiona played tennis this morning.
(c) Dick wrote a letter.

[6]-16 (a) John was a British citizen.
(b) Scot was in the garden.
(c) Kate was angry.

According to Vendler (1967), [6]-15 (a) is an achievement, (b), an activity, and (c), an accomplishment, but it will be recognised that such semantic distinctions do not count very much as far as the detectability of the transition from ~P to P in the three clauses is concerned. The three clauses are similar to each other in that one can feel the presence of the dynamicity represented by the verbal predicate in sharp contrast with the absence of it at the preceding phase of time. For instance, with (a) one can set up some indefinite time point that must have virtually served as the turning-point at which 'being alive' (~p) ceased to hold and 'being dead' (P) began to hold. The dynamic situation in (a) induces one to recognise a change (event) as vividly as if one would recognise the clear-cut contrast between light and shadow. The same can be said with respect to (b) and (c). The dynamicity of the verbal predicates in the two clauses naturally invites one to assume that there must have been some time points at which 'played tennis' and 'writing a letter' began and terminated respectively.

One very important implication of the ongoing discussion is that, though it is inappropriate, as we observed in Chapter 2, to assume there is a strong parallelism between form and meaning, there are certain structural patternings whose formal features seem to invite one to mentally contextualise them in a fixed way in a so-called decontextualised situation.

It will be agreed that the formal characteristics of [6]-15 (c), for example, induce the reader to take it as an event, even if it is given by itself without any contextual help. Put differently, dynamic clauses such as [6]-15 can stand on their own as event expressions without being contrasted with a particular context, in relation to which to confirm the eventhood of those clauses.

Compared with [6]-15, the outstanding feature of the three clauses in [6]-16 is their *lack of autonomy* as event expressions. The three clauses in [6]-16 are so-called statives. World knowledge may direct one to take it that (a) is less temporary than (b), which is in turn less temporary than (c). But one must notice that such a commonsensical way of thought presupposes the fact that those three clauses were *actually* used in a certain (perhaps mental) context. With respect to duration, it is always possible to think of specific situations in which the order of temporariness in the three clauses will be reversed. Take [6]-16 (a) for instance. If John's immediately available context indicates that he was an American citizen until the day before, but *now* he was British, then (a) implicates the temporal sequentiality or temporal boundary at least on one side. With such contextual help, one will have no difficulty pointing out the eventhood which is hidden in the apparent syntactic structure. In that case, one would be able to construct an event expression: 'John obtained British citizenship'. But the actual situation of [6]-16 is that the three clauses are just given without any context which would help one to make sure that the eventhood is implicated. In short, because of the formal features, statives such as the three clauses in [6]-16, when given by themselves, tend to direct the reader to contextualise them primarily in the state situations.

Here also one must be careful not to fall into the ontological fallacy. Some might argue that if the temporal sequentiality works as the index of the

eventhood of a particular state of affairs, then clauses like [6]-16 (a) are definitely event expressions regardless of whether context is available or not, because, even if John was a British citizen from the very beginning, that situation can be temporally contrasted with the situation before his birth. This might be true ontologically, but it is not a practical view of event or change. It would not be counterintuitive to say that when John was a British citizen throughout his life, that is a non-event, a stable condition of John.

6.3.3 Discoursal environments

In this section, by discussing the problem of *discoursal environments* we point out that the recognition of story events requires taking discoursal situations into account. With a view to elucidating the very important narrative fact that recognising the dynamicity of event succession requires more or less macroscopic views of discourse, we quote a rather long passage that immediately follows [6]-12:

[6]-17 (a) It also faced the public garden and the war monument. (b) There were big palms and green benches in the public garden. (c) In the good weather there was always an artist with his easel. (d) Artists liked the way the palms grew and the bright colours of of the hotels facing the gardens and the sea. (e) Italians came from a long way off to look up at the war monument. (f) It was made of bronze and glistened in the rain. (g) It was raining. (h) The rain dripped from the palm trees. (i) Water stood in pools on the gravel paths. (j) The sea broke in a long line in the rain and slipped back down the beach to come up and break again in a long line in the rain. (k) The motor cars are gone from the square by the war monument. (l) Across the square in the doorway of the cafe a waiter stood looking out at the empty square.

(m) The American wife stood at the window looking out. (n) Outside right under their window a cat was crouched under one

of the dripping green tables. (o) The cat was trying to make herself so compact that she would not be dripped on.

(p) 'I'm going down and get that kitty,' the American wife said.

(q) 'I'll do it,' her husband offered from the bed.

(r) 'No, I'll get it. The poor kitty out trying to keep dry under a table.'

(s) The husband went on reading, lying propped up with the two pillows at the foot of the bed.

(t) 'Don't get wet,' he said.

(u) The wife went downstairs and the hotel owner stood up and bowed to her as she passed the office. (v) His desk was at the far end of the office. (w) He was an old man and very tall. (x) 'Il piove,' the wife said (Hemingway, 'Cat in the Rain': 314-5)

The immediate purpose of quoting this long passage is to argue that a story event is identifiable as such when the active environment or the and-then dynamics is judged to be at work in the discourse, and that it is the active environment that is most directly responsible for the reader's recognition of *narrative form*, i.e. event sequencing in the framework of active and-then logic, and that in order to understand narrative dynamics properly one has to pay enough attention to *discoursal environments*, instead of just attending to semantic and aspectual features of each individual clause or sentence.

In the light of narrative dynamics, [6]-17 can be divided into two parts. The turning-point is (p). The criterion for the distinction is the presence of discoursal activity. The overall impression of the first part from (a) to (o) is that it does not realise any active sequence of story events. Macroscopically, the first part as a whole appears to function as a stative discourse. We have to pay particular attention to (p), which, together with the ensuing clause (q), serves as a kind of magnetism to induce the reader to

set up an image of time-line in his mind. This fiction entitled 'Cat in the Rain' starts with [6]-12, but it will be acknowledged that the narrative does not become activated until it comes to (p). It is at (p) that now-renewal impetus (cf. 5.2.6) begins to be perceivable. A clause like (p), which can be considered to work as a starter of the active sequencing of story events might be called *story-line inchoative.* It could be argued that in order for a particular discourse to be classified as a narrative, it must realise an active sequence of events with the story-line inchoative as the inceptor. Our contention is that it is story-line events starting with the story-line inchoative that are most intimately associated with the reader's story-event construction which will directly concern the reader's recognition of *narrative form* as the abstract, mental concept of and-then dynamics of narrative discourse.

Now we attempt to take a close look at the first part of [6]-17. The discourse from (a) to (o), though sounding inactive or stative as a whole, includes some "event" clauses. As a matter of fact, from an aspectual, and sentence-grammar point of view, only (a), (b), (c), (d) and the first half of (f) might be genuinely labelled as states or statives, and all the others seem to be more or less indicative of some kind of dynamics. For example, (e) will be classified as 'culmination' (Moens, 1987). As we pointed out in the preceding section, dynamic clauses like (e), if decontextualised, can stand on their own as event expressions. So, when one focuses upon the semantic and grammatical feature of (e) in a decontextualised way, one will find it is difficult *not* to recognise the eventhood represented by the expression.

But it must be admitted that the eventhood of (e) is not felt to be as vivid and active as that of (p) and (q). Ontologically speaking, there might be no legitimate reason to differentiate (e), (h), (i) or (j) from the event clauses from (p) to (u), as far as the aspectual value attached to individual clauses is concerned. But it is to be noted that the clauses from (a) to (o) are nothing

but fragmentary visual pieces of information which do not contribute to the impression of the plot progression; no two clauses, whether consecutive or not, can be considered to make an active sequence in temporal terms which may enable the reader to feel that now-renewal impetus is at work. Presumably, the irrelevance of referring to the temporal relation between the 15 clauses from (a) to (o) is the main reason why one will feel that a kind of temporal stagnation seems to be operating as the dominant note in that discoursal environment.

To put it another way, no single clause in the first part has an immediately available context behind it. Take (g) 'It was raining' for instance. Ontologically, there should be no doubt about the eventhood implicated by this imperfective, progressive clause; it is part of world knowledge to assume that at some indefinite time in the past the rainfall must have started. But as far as this narrative situation is concerned, there is no good reason why one has to take the meaning of this clause in a historic span, since (g) is the situation or condition of the narrative world when it is initiated, and no context is available which will convince the reader that (g) represents a changed situation in this narrative circumstance. (If we say that this narrative world is initiated at (a) in [6]-12, and at the same time that (p) works as the story-line inchoative, it may sound slightly confusing, but in terms of narrative time, which is supposed to be a simulation of time in reality, one could say that narrative time is already there at [6]-12 (a) 'There were only two Americans stopping at the hotel'. But the time is not a dynamic one which is known in a relative manner by the change of significance in states of affairs. This will be understood if one considers reality in which the time we experience does not always have story-like, and-then dynamics. Therefore, it would be too strong to say that narrative time stops from (a) to (o); the point is that the time there represents no story dynamics.)

It might be feasible to claim that such temporal stagnation as the dominant note permeates each clause in the first part, and as a result, the reader has difficulty perceiving the eventhood of (e), (g), (h) or (m), which otherwise might have been perceived more vividly. How discoursal environments make a clause or sentence look different in terms of the dynamicity it represents will be appreciated by comparing (l) and (m) with the italicised expression in the following discourse:

[6]-18 - Derevaun Seraun! Derevaun Seraun!
She stood up in a sudden impulse of terror. Escape! She must escape! Frank would save her. He would give her life, perhaps love, too. But she wanted to live. Why should she be unhappy She had a right to happiness. Frank would take her in his arms, fold her in his arms. He would save her.

* * * * * *

She stood among the swaying crowd in the station at the North Wall. He held her hand and she knew that he was speaking to her, saying something about the passage over and over again. (Joyce, 'Eveline': 41-42) (italics are mine)

Note that from an aspectual point of view, (l) and (m) in [6]-17 and the italicised clause in [6]-18 can be interpreted as sharing the same characteristic; in formal terms the aspectual type of the verbal predicate, using the same lexis 'stand', will be classified as process or activity. But the italicised clause in [6]-18 is greatly different from (l) and (m) in [6]-17 in that, unlike the latter, which may well be taken as part of background discourse, the former implicates one of the most significant events in the story. This is simply because the italicised clause in [6]-18 can be legitimately counted as a story-line event. By the time the narrative has come to the clause, it has already given Eveline's history, telling the reader that she was in her room before getting to the North Wall. This explains the

reason why it is acceptable to interpret the italicised clause as entailing the temporal-sequentiality marker (the event-marker) 'now'. By contrast, in the case of (l) and (m) in [6]-17, one will not be justified in assuming that they entail the temporal-sequentiality marker 'now', because they are not given in a historic scope.

This contrastive observation of the same verbal predicates in different discoursal environments seems to be suggestive of the very notable fact that whether or not a particular discourse is interpreted as representing a story event is not to be determined solely by the inherent formal characteristics of the discourse. It is worth noting that story events are primarily narrative phenomena, and are not necessarily to be discussed from a purely ontological or grammatical viewpoint on the sentence-grammar basis.

6.3.4 Story-line events and background discourse

Following our observations we made in the last section, we now could argue that narrative dynamics is strongly tied to the image of story line, and that event expressions which are judged to contribute to the impression of the story line constitute story events, which are to be recognised in the active and-then dynamics. Story events are *story-line events,* and the expressions which realise story-line events can be construed as entailing the temporal-sequentiality marker (the event marker) 'now'.

By contrast, the discourse which cannot be interpreted as contributing to the plot progression might be termed *background discourse.* The story line is a prerequisite for a particular discourse to be identified as a narrative, but in many cases a narrative consists of the story-line events and the background discourse.

Now back to [6]-17, the distinction between the story-line events and the background discourse can be explained as follows.

In [6]-17, the discourse from (a) to (o) constitutes a background discourse, which is not directly concerned with the narrative dynamics. The dynamicity which some of the fifteen clauses from (a) to (o) are assumed to represent on their own is made immanent by the overall inactivity of the sequential relations between the clauses, which can be said to be working as the predominant atmosphere permeating them.

The story line in [6]-17 is initiated by the story-line inchoative (p). The story line, consisting of a succession of story events, is continuous as a mental construct that is created in the reader's mind, but graphologically it can be made discontinous by the background discourse located between story (story-line) events. The clauses (v) and (w) make the background discourse on the story line identifiable in the discourse from (p) to (x). On the story line the discoursal environment is active, and narrative time is captured in the and-then dynamics. Therefore, it is irrelevant to say that narrative time stops at the background discourse graphologically inserted on the story line. Such insertion, which reflects the narrator's choice in textualisation, is a phenomenon on the telling side. A reasonable way of expressing this would be that the background discourse inserted on the story line does not contribute to the plot progression, just as it does not when it is located off the story line. In Bonheim's system of 'narrative modes' (cf. 1.2.2), for example, narrative time seems to be conceived of as something capable of stopping as well as moving (see Figure 1.3 (p.22)). Almost the same view can be observed in Moens (1987: 92) when he says that time does not move forward with static clauses in narrative discourse (cf. 2.3.3). It must be recognised that such a stop-and-go type of analysis of time in narrative can result from the failure to make an ontological distinction between time in the

represented world as a simulation of the real world and the Genettian concept of pacing in narrative-telling.

6.3.5 Conclusion

Our discussion in 6.3 can be summarised as follows. Generally speaking, whether a particular discourse represents a story event or not can be determined by the availability of context which enables the reader to grasp the state of affairs represented by the discourse in historical contrast with the situation in which it did not hold. Compared with bounded discourse, unbounded discourse tends to depend on context if it is to be counted as representing a story event. Because of its aspectual characteristics, bounded discourse tends to exhibit the eventhood by itself, and this is the reason why in many cases the eventhood is easily perceivable when a narrative starts with a bounded clause with no preceding text.

In judging whether a particular discourse can be interpreted as representing a story event or not, it is useless and futile to stick to sentence grammar and try to look at each individual clause or adjacent clauses without paying enough attention to the function of discoursal environments. It is when the discoursal environment is felt to be active that the story line can be set up as a mental construct. The image of the story line is intimately associated with the reader's recognition of and-then dynamics of narrative. The story line is made up of a succession of events. And it is those events which constitute story events. That is, story events are story-line events.

Assuming that temporal dynamics is the essential characteristic of narrative discourse, one could say that narrative discourse is made up of both story-line events and the background discourse representing no temporal dynamics.

6.4 Story line and clause boundaries

6.4.1 The abstract nature of story line

We already referred to the concept of 'narrative form' in 6.3.2 and 6.3.3, and introduced the term 'story line' in the last section. These two terms are virtually identical with each other, though sounding different. 'Story line' would sound more concrete than 'narrative form', since 'line' in 'story line' is felt to be a visual metaphor of narrative dynamics. Hereafter we employ 'story line' to refer to the abstract, mental concept of and-then dynamics of narrative discourse.

The main purpose of the present section is to confirm the abstract nature of story line as a mental construct that is created in the reader's mind in the process of reading narrative, and to stress its pragmatic aspect as a product of cooperation between narrator, text, and reader.

As pointed out in the last section, story line consists of story-line events. If verbalised, the abstract nature of story line will be expressed as: ' Story Event 1 happened, *and then* Story Event 2 happened ....n'. Now we might be able to postulate a formula as follows. When in a particular narrative discourse two event expressions can be identified as story-line events, they realise /STORY LINE/.

Let us return to [6]-17 for the moment to look into the relative aspect of /STORY LINE/. That the realisation of /STORY LINE/ takes at least two temporally sequential events can be understood by reflecting upon the reading process of (p) '"I'm going down and get that kitty," the American wife said' and (q) ' "No, I'll get it," her husband offered from the bed'. The intrinsic relativity of /STORY LINE/ is clear in that at the time when the

reader comes to (p) he would not be ready yet to take it as a story-line event; it is only when he goes on to (q) with the eventhood of (p) in mind, and envisages an ensuing event, feeling the now-renewal impetus is at work that a "line image" will be set up in his mind. Only then will the reader recognise that a dynamic story world is opened before his eyes. As far as [6]-17 is concerned, the reader will have to proceed to (q) in order to feel that /STORY LINE/ at the most microscopic level is materialised in this narrative.

Needless to say, the impression of such dynamicity in narrative discourse is entirely due to textualisation, or grammaticalisation in the broad sense of the term. But it is to be pointed out that a pragmatic element is also involved in the reader's recognition of /STORY LINE/. As discussed in 6.2.3, narrative dynamics is not only a grammatical and semantic, but also a pragmatic phenomenon. It would be justifiable to argue that /STORY LINE/ is a product of mutual cooperation between narrator, text, and reader. Both grammatically and semantically, a chart entitled History of Scotland may represent a succession of events, but there is no pragmatic reason to perceive /STORY LINE/ at work there. From an institutional point of view, it is the narrator's obligation to materialise /STORY LINE/ in some way or other in the encoding process, even if doing so is not his main interest in writing a fictional narrative. If the narrator conforms to the institutional norm and textualises story-line events, this will elicit the reader's cooperative behaviour; the reader will recognise /STORY LINE/ materialised by the story-line events.

The central aim of 6.4 is to make an inquiry into the way in which story-line events are textualised in narrative discourse mainly on the microscopic basis. Particular attention will be drawn to clause boundaries as indices of whether the plot progresses or not. Our discussion spotlights more specific

aspects of story-line events and background discourse, and at the same time is a preliminary to 6.5, in which the problem of 'event unification' is to be brought into focus.

6.4.2 Consecutive story-line events - prototypes

The following examples illustrate the most prototypical story-line events which are graphologically consecutive:

[6]-19 (a) Another woman, very little, with cropped black hair, a red face and a big mouth, came forward (b) and took the man by the arm. (Spark, *The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie*: 33)

[6]-20 (a) A carriage was heard. (b) He was on the move immediately. (Austen, *Emma*: 318)

In these examples the consecutively arranged story-line events (a) and (b) literally work as an icon of the time sequence. [6]-19 and 20 can be reckoned as prototypical examples of story-line events realising /STORY LINE/.

The prototypical sequence of story-line events can be also observed in the syntactic combination of main and subordinate clauses. Look at the following examples:

[6]-21 (a) So *when the approach of Mrs Deborah was proclaimed through the street,* (b) all the inhabitants ran trembling into their houses, each matron dreading lest the visit should fall to her lot (Fielding, *Tom Jones*: 62) (italics are mine)

[6]-22 (a) THE next morning as early as it was decent, Jones attended at Mrs Fitzpatrick's door, (b) *where he was answered that the lady was not at home.* (Fielding, *Tom Jones*: 620) (italics are mine)

[6] -23 (a) ...and *after he had paid her his proper respects*, (b) was desired to sit down. (Fielding, *Tom Jones*: 613) (italics are mine)

[6]-24 (a) The company were hardly well settled, (b) *before the arrival of the peer lately mentioned caused a fresh disturbance and a repetition of ceremonials*. (Fielding, *Tom Jones*: 618) (italics are mine)

[6]-25 (a)...*and being directed to the house*, (b) he gave one gentle rap at the door. (Fielding, *Tom Jones*: 611) (italics are mine)

The noticeable difference between main clauses and subordinate clauses is that the latter, unlike the former, lack assertion as propositions. This will be understood if one sees that none of the italicised parts in the above examples can make a formally proper answer to the question: *What happened?* Therefore, it could be said that one cannot perceive the "equal partnership" as story-line events in the combination of (a) and (b) in [6]-21-25. This syntactic situation mainly concerns the narrator's perspectival choice, or value judgement in terms of determining where to put the information-focus in rendering narrative, as observed in 5.2.11. It would be reasonable to claim that the examples of story-line events from [6]-21 to 25 exhibit a higher level of retrospective degree for the indices of the narrator's weight assessment than those in [6]-19 and 20. This suggests that in the five examples from [6]-21 to 25 temporal-sequentiality is less vividly felt in the subordinate clauses than in the main clauses. But it is to be maintained that the seven examples from [6]-19 to 25 have good reason to be counted as prototypes of story-line events in that the reader can feel that /STORY LINE/ is materialised by graphologically adjacent event expressions.

6.4.3 Consecutive story-line events - non-prototypes

In narrative discourse there are so many cases in which, when viewed

mechanically, a particular chunk of discourse seems to consist of an event clause and non-event, background clauses which do not contribute to the plot progression, but a careful inspection of the clausal relations will lead one to interpret it as representing one particular event. Consider the following examples:

[6]-26 (a) She then proceeded to commend the honour and spirit with which Jenny had acted. (b) She said, she could not help agreeing with her brother, that there was some merit in the sincerity of her confession, and in her integrity to her lover: that she had always thought her a very good girl, and doubted not but she had been seduced by some rascal, who had been infinitely more to blame than herself, and very probably had prevailed with her by a promise of marriage, or some treacherous proceedings.
(c) This behaviour of Mrs Bridget greatly surprised Mrs Deborah... (Fielding, *Tom Jones*: 71)

[6]-27 (a) Moments of their secret life together burst like stars upon his memory. (b) A heliotrope envelope was lying beside his breakfast-cup and he was caressing it with his hand. Birds were twittering in the ivy and the sunny web of the curtain was shimmering along the floor: he could not eat for happiness. They were standing on the crowded platform and he was placing a ticket inside the warm palm of her glove. He was standing with her in the cold, looking in through a grated window at a man making bottles in a roaring furnace. It was very cold. Her face, fragrant in the cold air, was quite close to his; and suddenly she called out to the man at the furnace:
-Is that fire hot, sir?
But the man could not hear her with the noise of the furnace. It was just as well. He might have answered rudely.
(c) A wave of yet more tender joy escaped from his heart and went coursing in warm flood along his arteries. (Joyce, 'The Dead': 244)

A common discoursal characteristic shared by [6]-26 and 27 is that the relation between (a) and (b) in both examples is that between a summational event description and its specified version which has a flavour of detailed unfolding of content. One could see a parallel between the two examples cited above and *redundancy* discussed in 6.2.2. It should be clear that in [6]-26 and 27 attempting to check whether there is temporal sequentiality between (a) and each of the clauses in (b) is meaningless and irrelevant. It might be feasible to argue that (a) and (b) in each of the two examples reflect two different levels of perspectival choices made by the narrator in temporal terms. The lack of temporal immediacy detectable in the synoptic tone of (a) in each of them can contrast with a high level of temporal immediacy recognisable throughout (b).

With [6]-26, (a) can be classified as NRSA, which exhibits a fossilised perspective suggestive of a certain degree of temporal distance, whereas, the scenic flavour of (b) seems to be accentuated by what might be looked upon as a gradual shift in speech form from tagged speech (Indirect Speech) to non-tagged speech (Free Indirect Speech). The syntactic contrast between the matrix clause and the embedded clause, which serves as the index of Indirect Speech, seems to be traceable up to a certain point; the conjunction 'that' which combines the reporting clause with the reported clause appears twice. But the main-subordinate contrast on the syntactic level is felt to be somewhat loosened when the narrative comes to 'and doubted not but she had been seduced by some rascal' in the middle of (b); the reader might have an impression that from that part on the discourse has gained a more "free" tone as a speech presentation. The borderline between Indirect Speech and Free Indirect Speech is not necessarily clear, but there is no room for doubt about a high degree of temporal immediacy permeating [6]-26 (b).

With [27], (a) can be labelled as NRTA, which, as well as [26]-(a), designates

a certain degree of temporal distance. By contrast, a plethora of progressives in (b), construed as examples of mock EPED (cf. 5.2.11), can be considered to indicate that the temporal perspective is strongly attuned to that of the character in the story world. A possible interpretation of narrative modes from line-1 'A heliotrope envelope was lying...' to line-10 '...she called out to the man at the furnace' is Free Indirect Thought, except 'he could not eat for happiness' in line-4, which will be NRTA. And lines-12 and 13 'But the man could not hear her...He might have answered rudely' might be read as Free Direct Thought. In contrast with a high degree of temporal distance in (a), the scenic speech presentation in [6]-27 (b) is characterised by its remarkably high level of temporal immediacy.

The reason why [6]-26 and 27 can be categorised under the rubric of 'consecutive story-line events' is that a justifiable way of seeing them is that (a) and (b) as a chunk of event description adjoins (c), which , together with (a) and (b), constitutes story-line events which materialise /STORY LINE/. (Microscopically, it may be possible to refer to the plurality of events in (b) in each example, but that would make little sense from the viewpoint which encompasses (a), (b) and (c) in the framework of the main /STORY LINE/. We discuss the problem of embedded or secondary /STORY LINE/ in 6.4.6.)

The contrast between (a) and (b) in [6]-26 and 27 is closely associated with the problem of 'event unification', which will be highlighted in 6.5. It could be argued that (a) in each of the two examples is a condensed representation of a story event, whereas (b) is its specified, more space-consuming presentation. In actual works of fictional narrative it is quite easy to find a contrast of this kind employed by the narrator. What we intend to do in 6.5 is to contemplate the reader's role in making such a contrast.

If one can term the discoursal relation between (a) and (b) in [6]-26 and 27

as *specification,* the following example might be classified as *inclusion:*

[6]-28 (a)Eight years before he had *seen his friend off* at the North Wall and *wished him godspeed.* Gallaher had *got on.* You could tell that at once by his *travelled air*, his *well-cut tweed suit*, and *fearless accent. Few fellows had talents like his* and fewer still could remain *unspoiled by such success.* Gallaher's *heart was in the right place* and he had *deserved to win. It was something* to have a friend like that.
(b) Little Chandler's thoughts ever since lunch-time had been of his meeting with Gallaher, of Gallaher's invitation and of the great city London where Gallaher lived. (He was called Little Chandler...and when he smiled you caught a glimpse of a row childish white teeth)
(c) As he sat at his desk in the King's Inns he thought what changes those eight years had brought. (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 76) (italics are mine)

In [6]-28, it can be assumed that (b) (except the parenthesised part which can be thought of as a background discourse, as we will discuss later) and (c) constitute story-line events, since the two sentences, both of which are NRTA (Narrative Report of Thought Act), represent different topics of thought. What is worth noting is the discoursal relation between (a) and (b). In this story one can observe a great many examples showing the protagonist Little Chandler's idiolectal or dialectal distinctiveness. According to Boyle (1969: 85-86), the expressions in italics can be taken as indices of Little Chandler's cliché-ridden language, which is felt to be of idiolectal value. If so, it is very likely that (a) is classifiable as non-tagged speech (Free Indirect Thought). Assuming that (a) is FIT, one could interpret (b) as a generalised or temporally condensed narrative report of a thought event, and (a) as its content, though the order of recounting *unifying discourse* and *unifiable discourse* in [6]-28 differs from that in [6]-26 and 27.

Then, (a) in [6]-28 might be counted as just another example of specification, but one could refer to a peculiarity of its nature by pointing out the possibility that (a) might be nothing more than a part of the possible content of the unifying discourse (b), since in (a) one cannot find any allusion to Chandler's thought of Gallaher's invitation or of the great city London, which is recognisable in (b).

It is to be stressed that, in terms of discoursal circumstances in which (a) and (b) are located, checking to see the temporal sequentialty or plot progression between the clauses in (a) is irrelevant, and that labelling (b) as a background discourse because it does not move the plot forward in relation to the graphologically preceding clause is unreasonable and misleading. For the proper recognition of narrative dynamics, a unifying view which takes (a) and (b) as representing one single event would be most acceptable.

Sometimes there are cases in which a particular event expression can be best thought of as a *paraphrase* of the preceding event expression. Look at the following example:

[6]-29 (a) As he passed Lenehan took off his cap (b) and, after about ten seconds, Corley returned a salute to the air. (c) *This he did by raising his hand vaguely and pensively changing the angle of position of his hat.*
(d) Lenehan walked as far as the Shelbourne Hotel where he halted and waited.(Joyce, 'Two Gallants': 60) (italics are mine)

Evidently, the chunk of discourse from (a) to (d) in [6]-29 makes a sequence of story-line events, but one should attend to the absence of the plot progression from (b) to (c). Considering the discoursal relation between the two clauses, one will understand that (c) is not to be reckoned as a background discourse for the apparent reason that it does not extend the

story line. One plausible interpretation is that (c) is a specified version of (b), but the very small quantitative gap between the two clauses would most naturally lead one to take (c) as a paraphrase of (b). It is of vital importance to know that where paraphrasing is identifiable, as in the case of [6]-29, applying the criterion for determining whether it is a story-line event or a background discourse is irrelevant. In [6]-29, what counts is to unify (b) and (c) as one event, and try to see the graphologically consecutive story-line events from (a) to (b)/(c), and then to (d).

Lastly, we make brief reference to the so-called *simultaneous discourse*. The clause (a) in [6]-29 can be singled out as a typical example showing *simultaneous events*. [6]-29 (a) can be devided into two parts as in:

[6]-29' (a) As he passed (a)' Lenehan took off his cap.

In terms of time-point time, there is no doubt about the simultaneity of (a) and (a)'; the event of Lenehan's passing the two people (Corley and a woman) and the event of his taking off his cap occurred at the same time. This is the reason why there is no discoursal realisation of the plot progression from (a) to (a)'. But it is not legitimate to assume (a)' to be a background discourse in relation to (a), since both (a) and (a)' can be connected with [6]-29 (b) in the and-then dynamics. As we shall see in the next section, if either of any two clauses is a background discourse, it cannot possibly be linked in the and-then dynamics with the event clause that follows them. (Our discussion concerning [6]-29 (a) does not necessarily presuppose that (a) and (a)' enjoy equal status as event expressions. The simultaneity in the sense of the time-point time and the main-subordinate syntactic contrast between the two clauses will induce one to amalgamate the two events into one centred around the eventhood represented in the main clause.)

6.4.4 Non-consecutivity

In the present section we look into some typical cases in which story-line events are made graphologically discontinous by background discourse coming in between them. First, look at the following example:

[6]-30 (a) The door of the room now flew open, (b) and, after pushing in her hoop sideways before her, (c) entered Lady Bellaston, (d) who having first made a very low courtesy to Mrs Fitzpatrick, (e) and as low a one to Mr Jones, (f) was ushered to the upper end of the room.
(g) *We mention these minute matters for the sake of some country ladies of our acquaintance, who think it contrary to the rules of modesty to bend their knees to a man.*
(h) The company were hardly well settled, (i) before the arrival of the peer lately mentioned caused a fresh disturbance and a repetition of ceremonials. (Fielding, *Tom Jones*: 618) (italics are mine)

The clause (g) in [6]-30 can be classified as 'commentary' (cf. Chatman, 1978: 220-52). The non-dynamic nature of (g) as a background discourse is clear that when viewed in the graphological sequence with (f), (g) does not contribute to the forward movement of the plot, and when viewed in relation to the ensuing discourse (h) and (i) (or (i) and (h)), (g) is not temporally connected with them, either. This is mainly because the present tense in (g) functions as a linguistic marker of the narrator's generalisation, alien to the spatio-temporal particularity of the narrative circumstances.

What Chatman (*loc.cit.*) calls 'description of setting', 'identification of character', 'definition of character' and 'commentary' are in many cases classifiable as background discourse. The opening discourse of Hemingway's 'Cat in the Rain', which we discussed in [6]-12 and 17, is a good example of

description of setting An amalgam of identification of character and definition of character is well illustrated in the second paragraph of Joyce's 'A Little Cloud':

[6]-31 (a) Little Chandler's thoughts ever since lunch-time had been of meeting with Gallaher, of Gallaher's invitation and great city of London where Gallaher lived. (b) *He was called Little Chandler because, though he was but slightly under the average stature, he gave one the idea of being a little man. His hands were white and small, his frame was fragile, his voice was quiet and his manners were refined. He took the greatest care of his fair silken hair and moustache and used perfume discreetly on his handkerchief. the half-moons of his nails were perfect and when he smiled you caught a glimpse of a row of childish white teeth.*
(c) As he sat at his desk in the King's Inns he thought what changes those eight years had brought. (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 76) (italics are mine)

The italicised discourse (b) in [6]-31 can be observed as a graphological intervention between the story-line events made up of (a) and (c). The main discoursal function of background discourse like (b) in the example cited above can be said to offer a profile of the narrated world in the non-dynamic dimension.

6.4.5 Unbounded story-line events

The discussion in this section is a confirmation of our observation that story events do not have to be verbalised in *perfective* or *bounded* clauses.

With a view to shedding light on the possible eventhood detectable in

temporally unbounded clauses we single out a passage from Joyce's 'A Little Cloud', and look into narrative dynamics.

In investigating clause boundaries which are assumed to be directly concerned with the sequence of story-line events we have so far concentrated upon the combinations of the so-called perfective, or bounded clauses or sentences. Here in the present section we look at a narrative situation in which a particular clause, on the consecutive basis, is not classifiable as any of specification, inclusion, paraphrase, simultaneity or background discourse, but can be interpreted as constituting story-line events by combining with a graphologically distant event expression. Consider the following example:

[6]-32 (a) He emerged from under the feudal arch of the King's Inns a neat modest figure, (b) and walked swiftly down Henrietta Street. (c) The golden sunset was waning and the air had grown sharp. A horde of grimy children populated the street. They stood or ran in the roadway or crawled up the steps before the gaping doors or squatted like mice upon the thresholds. (d) Little Chandler gave them no thought. (e) He picked his way deftly through all that minute vermin-like life and under the shadow of the gaunt spectral mansions in which the old nobility of Dublin had roistered. (f) *No memory of the past touched him, for his mind was full of a present joy.* (g) (He had never been in Corless's but he knew the value of the name...and at times a sound of low fugitive laughter made him tremble like a leaf.) (h) He turned to the right towards Capel Street. (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 77-78) (italics are mine)

The overall narrative structure of [6]-32 may be classified as non-consecutive encoding of story-line events (cf. 6.4.4), since the parenthesised discourse (g), which is actually a 16-line paragraph, can be looked upon as a

background discourse. What is clear about the dynamicity of [6]-32 is that the clauses (a), (b), and (h) constitute story-line events in that their discoursal relations can be captured in the and-then dynamics. The chunk of discouse (c) will be a background discourse if it is a description of setting by the narrator, but if the phraseological choices such as 'A horde of grimy children' or 'squatted like mice' can be thought of as reflecting the character's perceiving act, then it will be an internal event occurring at the same time with (b). With (d), it would be feasible to refer to its simultaneity with (b), and a reasonable reading of (e) is that it is a paraphrase or a specified version of (b).

The discourse which needs special attention is (f). It may be possible to make reference to (f)'s partial simultaneity with (b) ,(d), or (e), but the unbounded aspectual feature of (f) seems to suggest that (f) is more durative than (b), (d) or (e). And this is the reason why (f) looks like a stative. One will understand that the simultaneity observable in (e) and (f) is not to be discussed in parallel with the "genuine" simultaneity we referred to in [6]-29'. If (f) is seen only in its relation to (e), it may look like a background discourse, since one cannot observe any and-then dynamics between them. But, as already discussed (cf. 5.3.1, 6.2.1), if contextual help is available and it is possible to look at an imperfective discourse like (f) in a historical scope, then one can interpret the discourse as representing an event. The eventhood of (f) is contextually evident, since the state of affairs represented by the discourse constitutes a significant NOW, in contrast with the narrative circumstances about twenty lines back:

[6]-33 (a) He watched the scene and thought of life; (b) *and* (as always happened when he thought of life) *he became sad.* (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 77) (italics are mine)

It would be reasonable to argue that, when one looks back at [6]-33 (b) from the standpoint of [6]-32 (f), [6]-33 (b) will be available as a context concerning the protagonist's emotive aspects in this story. It is this contrastive perspective in temporal terms that enables one to perceive the eventhood of [6]-32 (f). It is unclear exactly when Little Chandler's depressed feeling turned into a euphoric one, as confirmable from [6]-32 (f). This is because, unlike [6]-33 (b), of which the inchoative aspect indicates in a relative manner the time when the state of affairs began to hold in contrast with other events, [6]-32 (f) is unbounded in its temporal scope. The aspectual feature of [6]-32 (f) is due to the narrator's perspectival choice in recounting narrative, and because of the aspectual feature [6]-32 (f) does not make a sequence of story-line events with the immediately preceding event expression (e). This means that the graphological sequence from (e) to (f) is not concerned with the renewal of the significant NOW. In other words, the significant NOW attached to (f) in [6]-32 belongs to a different dimension from that attached to (e).

A predictable question with respect to the dimensional difference of the significant NOW mentioned above will be: How is it possible that [6]-32 (f), which is supposed to belong to a different series of significant NOWs from [6]-32 (a), (b), (h), makes a series of the significant NOW with [6]-33 (b), which can be considered to make a sequence of story-line events with [6]-32 (a), (b), (h)?

A possible answer to the question will be as follows. World knowledge tells us that any event has its inchoative moment. This means that, if seen from a perspectivally-situated viewpoint, every event has its inception of the significant NOW. What is to be noted is that one can grasp every event one can know in a single series of the significant NOW, if and only if one pays attention to the inchoative moment, for the temporal location of the

inchoative moment of a particular event is relatively identifiable in contrast with the preceding and the ensuing events, even if the objectively measurable time-point time (e.g. 5:35 p.m.) is not available. The inchoative moments of events are naturally sequential (unless they are simultaneous), thus constitute a series, which is coherent enough to be called as such (see 5.2.5). This will explain the reason why [6]-33 (b) can be grasped in the *same* series of the significant NOW in which [6]-33 (a) and [6]-32 (a), (b), (h) find themselves in a sequential manner; one can see the and-then dynamics operating in that sequence.

The second point to be noted is that the significant NOW can linger, just as events can be durative. In this respect, one could point out the possibility that Little Chandler's significant NOW of being sad, which began to hold at [6]-33 (b), lingered up to the time when [6]-32 (a) began to hold. If so, it is to be acknowledged that the protagonist's presentness of being sad and his presentness of emerging from under the feudal arch of the King's Inns belong to different dimensions of the significant NOW, since the two NOWs cannot be captured in the and-then dynamics. As we argued in 5.2.5, the significant A-series is characterised by its possible multipicity.

This is the reason why [6]-32 (f), which is a lingering significant NOW, cannot make a sequence of story-line events with (e) or (h); (f) belongs to a different dimension of the significant NOW from (e) and (h). The eventhood of (f) is to be recognised in a particular series of the significant NOW in which the lingering NOW of Little Chandler's being sad, which is commonsensically predictable from 'he became sad' in [6]-33 (b), must have been succeeded at some indefinite time in the story world by 'he became very happy'.

As already pointed out, the aspectual feature of [6]-32 (f) is due to the

narrator's perspectival choice. It is one of the central aims of 6.5 to discuss how such perspectival choices made by the narrator in textualisation can be related to /STORY LINE/, which might be said to have a general tendency to reject the multiplicity of NOWs in different A-series in favour of a linear-oriented succession of story events. Here it will suffice to say that /STORY LINE/ is closely associated with the construction of story events on the reader's part and that in the process of building them, the reader is likely to shake off the perspectival features originally encoded in the narrative text, and attempt to make a coherent sequence of story-line events focusing upon the inchoative aspect of the events.

6.4.6 Anachronies and story-line events

According to Genette (1980: 48), types of discrepancy between the chronological order and the told order of events in narrative are 'anachronies'. In this section, in terms of detecting narrative dynamics we look into two kinds of anachronies, i.e. those which can be construed as background discourse, and those which may well be thought of as embedded or secondary story-line events.

Anachronies consist of two types of subcategories: 'analepses' and 'prolepses' (*loc. cit.*). We concentrate upon analepses, which are in the Western tradition far more common in narrative fiction than prolepses. The following discourse may well be taken as including a typical example of an analepsis as a background discourse:

[6]-34 (a) No memory of the past touched him, for his mind was full of a present joy.
(b) He had never been in Corless's but he knew the value of the name. He knew that people went there after the theatre to eat oysters and drink liqueurs; and he had heard that the waiters

there spoke French and German. Walking swiftly by at night he had seen cabs drawn up before the door and richly dressed ladies, escorted by cavaliers, alight and enter quickly. They wore noisy dresses and many wraps. Their faces were powdered and they caught up their dresses, when they touched earth, like alarmed Atalantas. He had always passed without turning his head to look. It was his habit to walk swiftly in the street even by day and whenever he found himself in the city late at night he hurried on his way apprehensively and excitedly. Sometimes, however, he courted the causes of his fear. He chose the darkest and narrowest streets and, as he walked forward, the silence that was spread about his footsteps troubled him, the wandering silent figures troubled him; and at times a sound of fugitive laughter made him tremble like a leaf.
(c) He turned to the right towards Capel Street. (Joyce, 'Little Cloud': 77-78)

The excerpt cited above corresponds to (f), (g) and (h) in [6]-32. In [6]-34 one will have little difficulty perceiving the analeptic nature of (b) in comparison with (a) and (c), which concern the story NOW. The main topical items in (b) are the iterative or habitual experiences the protagonist underwent in the past. The discoursal environment throughout the whole discourse of (b) is inactive; there is hardly any and-then dynamics working between the clauses. It is just possible to see the and-then logic at work in line-6 'alight and enter quickly' and in lines-8-9 'they caught up their dresses, when they touched the earth, like alarmed Atalantas', but the inactivity permeating (b) as a whole virtually kills the dynamics, so that the reader will find it difficult to take them as story-line events in the active and-then framework. In short, [6]-34 (b) does not include any story-line events that materialise /STORY LINE/.

In the same story, however, one can find an example of an analepsis which may have good reason to be called 'embedded or secondary story-line

events':

[6]-35 (a) Little Chandler sat in the room off the hall, holding a child in his arms. (b) To save money they kept no servant but Annie's young sister Monica came for an hour or so in the morning and an hour or so in the evening to help. (c) But Monica had gone home long ago. (d) It was a quarter to nine. (e) **1** Little Chandler had come home late for tea, (e) **2** and, moreover, he had forgotten to bring Annie home the parcel of coffee from Bewley's. (e) **3** Of course she was in a bad humour (e) **4** and gave him short answers. (e)**5** She said she would do without any tea (e) **6** but when it came near the time at which the shop at the corner closed (e)**7** she decided to go out herself for a quarter of a pound of tea and two pounds of sugar. (e) **8** She put the sleeping child deftly in his arms (e) **9** and said:
- Here. Don't waken him. (Joyce, 'A Little Cloud': 90)

The clause (a) in [6]-34 represents the story NOW, when Little Chandler came home after meeting his friend at Corless's. Thus, the clause (a) implicates eventhood. The ensuing three clauses (b), (c) and (d) will be labelled as the background discourse; they will presumably be the 'descriptions of setting'. The clause (c) may be construed as an analepsis, but, just like [6]-34 (b), it should be a background discourse, since it has nothing to do with the narrative dynamics, or the plot progression.

But when one comes to a cluster of clauses of (e), one will find a different narrative situation going on. What is noticeable is that the active and-then logic seems to be detectable throughout (e); one will have the impression that the discoursal environment is geared to the active mode. Viewed more specifically, the clauses (e) **1** and **2** do not constitute story-line events, since they are 'simultaneous events'; this means that both of them respectively makes a sequence of story-line events with (e) **3**. The relation between (e) **4**

and **5** is ambiguous; they represent either sequentiality or redundancy. But the clausal relation between the four clauses from (e) **6** is sequential, thus constituting story-line events. It would be justifiable to argue that the analeptic discourse like [6]-35 (e), which seems to contribute to the plot progression on its own, can be termed *embedded story-line events* which materialise the embedded /STORY LINE/.

It is Rimmon-Kenan (1983 :51) who distinguishes between 'character-motivated anachronies' and 'narrator-motivated anachronies'. When a particular anachrony can be anchored to the character, it is filtered through the character's own thinking. In that case, it is a thought event, so that it should be counted as a part of the main story-line events. In 6.4.3, we looked at an example ([6]-27) showing the contrast between the unifying discourse and the unifiable discourse (specification). That is a good example of a character-motivated anachrony. Let us reproduce the discourse that can be interpreted as an example of embedded story-line events:

[6]-27 It was very cold. Her face, fragrant in the cold air, was quite close to his; (a) and suddenly she called out to the man at the furnace:
- Is that fire hot, sir?
(b) But the man could not hear her with the noise of the furnace. (Joyce, 'The Dead': 244)

The considerably high level of temporal immediacy in this discourse (between (a) and (b)) will make one feel the narrative dynamics well operating. This chunk of discourse can be reckoned as embedded story-line events, but one must note that these embedded story-line events belong to the main story-line events, since they are a product of the character's thinking. According to our analysis, the embedded story-line events in [6]-27 are to be differentiated from those in [6]-35 in that , on a macroscopic level, the

former can be considered to be a part of the main story-line events, whereas the latter ought to be reckoned as a background discourse in its relation to the framing narrative. The reader, however, may have an impression that [6]-27 does not contribute to the plot progression on the main story-line any more than [6]-35 does (in Genettian terms, it may be felt that both [6]-27 and [6]-35 are a 'pause', though the concept of his 'pause' is not necessarily clear from the viewpoint of narrative-discourse analysis). If the reader has such an impression, that is perhaps because the embedded story-line events naturally have their own topical unity as a succession of events, seemingly distinguishable from that in the main story-line events. The point to be noted is that the character's thought is a verbal (thought) event, and that the peculiarity of such a verbal event is that it can be a framing narrative referring to other events of the hypotactic level; verbal events can refer to some other physical or verbal events. From the reader's point of view, such double-layered eventhood or event description peculiar to verbal events might be responsible for the impression of the plot being suspended at discoursal chunks like [6]-27, which should logically be interpreted as a representation of main story-line events because of the character's involvement as an agent performing a cognitive act. This is a kind of false impression that is created in the reader's mind when, with a particular topical unity of the main story-line events in mind, he comes to the character's thought event which, as a unifiable discourse as against a frequently adjoining unifying discourse, exhibits a topical unity as a succession of events (often as analepsis) on the hypotactic level. Anyway, as a constituent of the main story-line events on a macroscopic level the character-motivated anachronies such as [6]-27 may well be distinguished from the narrator-motivated anachronies such as [6]-35, which can be assumed to be outside the main story-line events.

6.4.7 Ambiguities in graphological sequencing

In the preceding sections in 6.4 we have examined clause relations on the consecutive basis in order to see whether or not a particular clause makes a sequence of story-line events with an ensuing clause (or clauses). We have postulated some criteria for distinguishing story-line events from background discourse. But, as we pointed out in 6.2.2, in actual works of fiction it is not uncommon that one cannot decide whether a particular pair of adjacent clauses are temporally sequential or not. In this section we contemplate the problem of sequential ambiguities by taking up two typical cases. First, consider the following example:

[6]-36 (a) On the train from Padua to Milan they quarrelled about her not being willing to come home at once. (b) When they had to say good-bye, in the station at Milan, (c) they kissed good-bye, (d) but were not finished with the quarrel. (e) He felt sick about saying good-bye like that.
(f) *He went to America on a boat from Genoa.* (g) *Luz went back to Pordenone to open a hospital.* (Hemingway, 'A Very Short Story': 301-2) (italics are mine)

In terms of narrative dynamics, it is clear that the clauses (a), (c), (e), constitute story-line events. (The subordinate clause (b), unlike [6]-21 (a), does not make story-line events with the main clause (c); this main-subordinate combination can be interpreted as an example of 'simultaneity'. The clause (d) may well be labelled as a background discourse). The sequential ambiguity lies between (f) and (g). The temporal relation between the two clauses is susceptible to two readings. The first interpretation is that (f) is followed by (g); the second possibility is that they are "simultaneous" (in the broad sense of the term).

But the point is that in no case is it likely that either (f) or (g) is a background discourse, despite the sequential ambiguity exhibited by the

graphological relation between the two clauses. The reason is mainly an aspectual one; both (f) and (g) are bounded clauses, which are normally characterised by their autonomy of eventhood (cf. 6.3.2). And in this narrative situation context helps the reader to recognise that (f) and (g) both contribute to the narrative dynamics, i.e. the plot progression, for, even if the two clauses represent contemporaneous events, they respectively constitute story-line events with the clause (e), for example.

The sequential ambiguity tends to be most conspicuous when the narrative discourse comes to unbounded clauses. Look at the following example:

[6]-37 (a) Under cover of her silence he pressed her arm closely to his side; (b) and, as they stood at the hotel door, (c) he felt that they had escaped from home and friends and run away together with wild and radiant hearts to a new adventure.
(d) *An old man was dozing in a great hooded chair in the hall.*
(e) He lit a candle in the office (f) and went before them to the stairs. (Joyce, 'The Dead': 246) (italics are mine)

In this excerpt, the clauses (a), (b)/(c), (e), and (f) are story-line events ((b) and (c) are simultaneous). With (d), there are two possible readings. One is that it is a background discourse. Ontologically, it might be possible to squeeze out the eventhood from this clause, since it entails the inchoative moment, namely, the moment of the inception of a change when the old man began to doze. But (d) is nothing but a state which already holds when the story NOW, which is being continuously renewed, comes to (c); no contextual help is available which will convince the reader that the old man in (d) has a *story* behind him (e.g. he worked until nine o'clock, and then began to doze). If such context is available in this story, then one might be able to refer to the implicated eventhood of (d). As repeatedly claimed in the present thesis, story events are story-line events, and they are less

ontological than narrative phenomena, products of story-telling circumstances. Therefore, if one focuses upon the availability of context in deciding whether the clause (d) can be a story-line event or not, one will have to say that it is a background discourse, and not a story-line event.

But the other possible interpretation must be also referred to. It would be difficult to deny the likelihood that (d) is an *internal event*, i.e. the character's perceiving act, if it is reasonable to assume that (b)/(c) operate as a 'window opener' (Fehr, 1938; Brinton, 1980), and that (d) is the focalised discourse. In that case, one could take it that a matrix clause representing the character's cognition (e.g. 'he saw' or 'he recognised') is implicated in (d). Assuming that (d) is an internal event, one would be able to claim that in [6]-37 the clauses (a), (b)/(c), (d), (e) and (f) all contribute to the narrative dynamics, making a sequence of story-line events.

It seems that in reading narrative this sort of ambiguity is an inevitable accompaniment.

Before putting an end to the discussion concerning [6]-37, we attempt an additional comment on (d) particularly in its relation to the ensuing event descriptions (e) and (f). If we suppose that internal eventhood is irrelevant with respect to (d), it should be evident that (d) does not make a sequence of story-line events with any of the other clauses in [6]-37. Focusing upon the clausal sequence from (d) to (e) to (f), we see that in a relative sense the story-line inchoative is (e), and not (d). But it might be of discoursal interest to note that it is feasible to point out an elided event as a hidden story-line event between (d) and (e), which goes like: 'He woke up'. This seems to show an ontological fact that world knowledge can contribute quite explicitly to the fleshing out of the story events, which need not be made explicit by the narrator.

6.4.8 Conclusion

The presupposition of our discussion on 6.4 was that story events are story-line events, which are primarily narrative-telling phenomena, so that it is not legitimate to attempt to identify the narrative dynamics without considering the discoursal circumstances in which a particular clause or sentence is placed. With this presupposition in mind, we attempted to stipulate the discoursal criteria for making a distinction between *story-line events* and *background discourse;* the former can be assumed to materialise /STORY LINE/ as an abstract concept of narrative dynamics, whereas the latter cannot.

By concentrating upon the clausal relations on the consecutive basis, we made it clear that narrative dynamics cannot be captured by merely looking at the discoursal relation between two adjacent clauses. The significant implication of our observation in 6.4 is that there are many cases in which a reasonable way of viewing a cluster of clauses is to unify them as one event expression, and that the narrator sometimes seems to suggest the possibility of *event unification* by the co-ordination of the *unifying discourse* and the *unifiable discourse.*

In 6.5 we focus our attention on the possibility of event unification by the reader, and by doing so we contemplate the way in which perspectival choices originally encoded in the text by the narrator are concerned with /STORY LINE/. By taking up Joyce's 'A Little Cloud' as a text , we attempt a case study looking into the possibility of a macroscopic appreciation of narrative dynamics.

6.5 The reader's role in story-event recognition

6.5.1 The reader's aspectual adjustment

In 6.4 we investigated the ways in which narrative dynamics is textualised in the form of story-line events, as distinguishable from background discourse. One noticeable aspect of narrative discourse, which we observed in the discussion we have made so far, is that story-line events are not necessarily encoded in the form of prototypical, canonical narrative clauses, which are bounded or perfective in terms of aspect. In some cases, the so-called stative clauses can be assumed to implicate eventhood, as we have seen in a few examples (cf. 5.3.1; 6.2.1; 6.4.5), and this seems natural and normal in narrative discourse, which in many cases adopts a high degree of temporal immediacy as a necessary temporal perspective which helps the reader to feel the renewal of story NOW as the narrative goes along.

Our discussion in 6.3.2 clarified an ontological fact that it is not the unbounded but the bounded form that prototypically and autonomously designates the change from ~P to P. In this respect it could be said that it is the bounded form that authentically realises the icon of the eventhood, and that, when an event is given an expression in the unbounded form, one has to undergo the process of confirming the entailed but only covertly perceivable moment of change from ~P to P, so that he can identify the eventhood. This process might be termed *aspectual adjustment*. Put differently, recognising the eventhood of a particular state of affairs encoded in the so-called stative form will require one to be inchoative-oriented. And what makes aspectual adjustment possible, or what induces one to be inchoative-oriented, when coming across apparent statives, is the availability of context with which one can look at the state of affairs in a historical span.

Now, when we apply this to the reading process of narrative, a reasonable assumption would be that, when a story-line event is textualised in the bounded form as a perspectival choice made by the narrator, the reader does not need aspectual adjustment to see the eventhood, but if the narrator

employs the unbounded form for which context is available, the reader will have to go through aspectual adjustment as a mental process to recognise that the form contributes to /STORY LINE/. It is worth noting that aspectual adjustment, which is performed on the sentential/clausal basis to see eventhood in imperfective/unbounded expressions, can be looked upon as a necessary process for the construction of story-line events on the reader's part.

In the next section, by attempting to build story-line events of Joyce's 'A Little Cloud', we look more specifically at the relation between narrative perspective and /STORY LINE/.

6.5.2 A presentation of story events in Joyce's 'A Little Cloud'

'A Little Cloud' is one of the fifteen short stories in James Joyce's *Dubliners*. This story can be divided into three parts in terms of content. For convenience of reference we call them PART 1, PART 2, and PART 3 respectively (see Appendix). The protagonist is a thirty-two-year-old Dubliner called Little Chandler, who is apparently a scrivener in the legal line. Little Chandler is a would-be poet of sensitive and delicate nature. Now we attempt to present the story-line events on a considerably generalised level. The following is a representation of story-line events showing aspectual adjustment, and at the same time perspectival manipulation (see p. 295) as an index of a macroscopic view of story-line events.

<PART 1 (lines 1-144)>

(a) At King's Inns Little Chandler thinks of his friend Ignatius Gallaher, who is a successful journalist on the London Press, and of his own life, (b)

and becomes depressed, feeling shackled to his fate. (c) He finishes his job, (d) and then he heads for Corless's, where he is going to meet Gallaher. (e) On his way to Corless's a euphoric feeling seizes him; he expects that his meeting with Gallaher will open bright future perspectives for him.

<PART 2 (lines 145-424)>

(f) At Corless's Little Chandler meets Gallaher and begins to talk to him. (g) While talking to his friend Little Chandler feels disillusioned with him; he observes in his friend vulgarity of a certain kind which he had not noticed before. (h) Little Chandler sees in Gallaher's patronising manner the injustice of the fate he is faced with; he strongly laments the lack of courage and opportunity to show his talent. (i) When their topic of conversation comes to the prospect of Gallaher's marriage Little Chandler experiences a serious clash of opinion with him; the clash makes Little Chandler aware of the grim reality of his married life.

<PART 3 (lines 425-544)>

(j) After coming home from Corless's, Little Chandler takes care of his child, holding him in his arms. (k) While doing so, he begins to be lost in the reverie about his loveless life with his wife Annie. (l) Then, in a shattered mood, he begins to read Byron's poems, (m) and he is impressed with the melancholy tone. (n) And then his child wakes up and begins to cry. (o) He tries desperately to hush it but in vain. (p) Then Annie comes home, (q) and she vehemently attacks him for his failure to look after the child properly. (r) This brings tears to Little Chandler's eyes.

Presumably, the most noticeable stylistic factor contributing to the generalised flavour of the story-event presentation shown above will be its 'synoptic present' (cf. 5.2 10). The peculiarity of the synoptic present lies primarily in the lack of immediacy in temporal perspective. Because of this, the reader will normally find it difficult to feel the now-renewal impetus at work in the sequence of event expressions. That is to say, the impression of the renewal of story NOW is irrelevant in the writing/reading of highly generalised story-line events as exemplified above; the reader will feel that what is presented there is a comparatively neutralised accumulation or sequence of events in terms of perspectival choice.

Let us pay attention to PART 1 (e) and PART 2 (g) for the moment. These two are the examples of aspectual adjustment. The original narrative discourse that can be construed as corresponding most immediately to PART 1 (e) (the first half of (e)), and PART 2 (g) are respectively 'for his mind was full of a present joy' (line 57), and 'He was beginning to feel somewhat disillusioned' (lines 232-3). As already clarified, unbounded event expressions tend to reflect a remarkably high degree of temporal immediacy that can be referred to as mock EPED (cf. 5.2.11). In this respect, the two originally encoded clauses well illustrate perspectival situatedness; they are suggestive of the narrative situation in which the narrator was tightly bound to the story NOW in recounting them. But it is to be recognised from context that the two unbounded clauses are not states but events in the story, and that, when the aspectual values attached to the original clauses are shaken off, it is justifiable to construct the corresponding bounded clauses as prototypical event expressions, which can be located in the literal and-then sequence of event clauses. This kind of elimination of aspectual choices encoded in the original discourse concerns (4)' in Figure 4.3 which indicates the reader's interpretative act in reading narrative. It would be feasible to argue that the presentation of the story-line events in PART 1 (e) and

PART 2 (g) is an example of the reader's justifiable interpretation of the original discourse to identify /STORY LINE/. In short, PART 1 (e) and PART 2 (g) are a manifestation of aspectual adjustment (i.e. the shaking-off of the original aspectual values encoded in unbounded sentences/clauses) in the recognition of story-line events.

Of great importance is the fact that the shaking-off of the perspectival values originally textualised in narrative has two facets. As we have discussed so far, one is mainly concerned with aspectual adjustment, which is necessary for the identification of story events on the discoursally microscopic (or sentential/clausal) level. And the other might be termed *perspectival manipulation*, which will lead one to go in the direction of event unification as a way of reading narrative dynamics. Unlike aspectual adjustment, perspectival manipulation is concerned with the reader's macroscopic recognition of story events. In other words, perspectival manipulation means the reader's attempt to unify sentences or clauses to see story events on a more or less generalised level. This unifying process can be called event unification, which is realised by perspectival manipulation on the reader's part. One will easily recognise that most of the clauses in the story-event presentation in this section are examples of event unification by means of perspectival manipulation. In the next section we attempt to explicate the mechanism of event unification, and by doing so we spotlight the elasticity of perspectival manipulation by the reader.

6.5.3 Event unification by perspectival manipulation

Both aspectual adjustment and perspectival manipulation are intimately associated with a kind of distancing orientation in viewing story events, since they are mental activities trying to get rid of the perspectival qualities (normally designating temporal near-sightedness concerned with the story

NOW) encoded in the original discourse. Our argument in this section is that it is the distancing orientation in perspectival manipulation that is particularly responsible for unified, thus macroscopic views of story-line events, and that the distancing orientation in that respect is virtually identical with generalisation or abstraction of the original discourse.

The main purpose of this section is to look into the way in which the reader performs perspectival manipulation in his own way in recognising narrative dynamics, but, as already pointed out in 6.4, it frequently happens that the narrator himself shows a model of perspectival manipulation in the actual recounting of narrative discourse. The following is a good example from 'A Little Cloud':

> [6]-38 (a) As he crossed Grattan Bridge he looked down the river towards the lower quays (b) and pitied the poor stunted houses. (c) They seemed to him a band of tramps, huddled together along the river-banks, their old coats covered with dust and soot, stupefied by the panorama of sunset and waiting for the first chill of night to bid them arise, shake themselves and begone. (lines 103-9).

In this passage (c) can most naturally be interpreted as a more specific version of (b). Therefore, the discoursal relation between (b) and (c) is that of unifying discourse and unifiable discourse. In terms of perspectival affinity and distance, one might be able to say that unifying discourse is concerned with perspectival distance, and unifiable discourse, with perspectival affinity. The clause (b) can be thought of as a discoursal product of the narrator's perspectival manipulation.

The most striking feature of perspectival manipulation is that, by performing it, one can go in the direction of minimising the number of the sequential

borderlines between events. To put it another way, generalisation by perspectival manipulation is oriented toward macroscopic sequencing of story events. How macroscopic the sequence can be depends upon the degree of perspectival manipulation one performs.

Now we return to the example of the story-line events shown in the last section, and look at the elasticity of perspectival manipulation by the reader.

An example of mild macroscopicism will be found in PART 1 (c) 'He finishes his job'. This event expression covers the following three story-line events in the original discourse:

[6]-39 (a) When his hour had struck (b) he stood up (c) and took leave of his desk and of his fellow clerks punctiliously. (lines 45-6).

It would be acceptable that if PART 1 (c) is a unifying discourse, [6]-39 can be interpreted as the unifiable discourse. One important implication of this is that the discoursal presentation of story-line events in the original discourse is absolutely necessary for the reader to recognise /STORY LINE/, but the reader does not have to be tied to the original recounting to feel or construct /STORY LINE/ in his own way. As two examples of strong macroscopicism we consider PART 1 (d) and (e). PART 1 (d) 'and then heads for Corless's, where he is going to meet Gallaher' can extensively cover the following story-line events:

[6]-40 (a) He emerged from under the feudal arch of the King's Inns... and walked swiftly down Henrietta Street. (lines 46-8)

(b) He turned to the right towards Capel Street. (line 77)

(c) Little Chandler quickened his pace. (line 98)

(d) As he crossed Grattan Bridge.... (line 103)

A far more extensive discourse will be covered by PART 1 (e) 'On his way to Corless's a euphoric feeling seizes him; he expects that his meeting with Gallaher will open bright future perspectives for him':

[6]-41 (a) No memory of the past touched him, for his mind was full of a present joy. (lines 56-7)

(b) Ignatius Gallaher on the London Press!... Thomas Malone Chandler, or better still: T. Malone Chandler. He would speak to Gallaher about it (lines 77-139)

The original discourse considered to correspond to PART 1 (e) consists mostly of Little Chandler's euphoric reverie about Gallaher and himself. [6]-41 (b) contains [6]-38 as a part of it. The overall tone of [6]-38 is Little Chandler's strong hatred of the streets and the people in Dublin, so that [6]-38 may appear to have no direct bearing upon the protagonist's happy feelings, but it would be reasonable to say that such strong sensations emanated from his elated feelings which he only temporarily enjoyed while travelling to Corless's. Thus, PART 1 (e) can be counted as a way of performing perspectival manipulation which generalises a long stretch of event expressions ([6]-41 (a) and (b)) into one story-line event.

That both PART 1 (d) and (e) extensively cover the original discourse naturally implies that the strong overlapping of the story time is conceivable between the two. A question that might arise here will be: How such overlapping events can be arranged sequentially as in 'PART 1 (d) *and then* (e)'? A possible answer to the question will be that by means of aspectual adjustment one can become inchoative-minded and infer from context that, as far as PART 1 (d) and (e) are concerned, the time when the protagonist

started to head for Corless's must have preceded the time when he *started* to become euphoric. It could be argued that, as a rule, distancing orientation goes toward capturing things in bounded forms, rather than in unbounded forms.

6.5.4 Event unification in speech/thought presentation

Our contention in this section is that the detection of eventhood in S/T presentation can be performed most elastically; it tends to be determined by what the reader thinks is a *meaningful speech unit* in graphological terms.

Presumably one's metalinguistic consciousness will be at the lowest level when one tries to see the sequence of story-line events in S/T presentation, since clause boundaries in S/T presentation are not as meaningful as those in NR (Narrative Report). The reason can be explained as follows. As a showing of the story world, the utterance of even one sound can contribute to the "update" of the story-world time, as far as S/T presentation is concerned. This is where S/T presentation markedly differs from NR. For example, when a discourse 'The door opened and John came in' is given as NR, it would be normal and meaningful to take it that two events are mentioned there, attending to the clause boundary between 'opened' and 'and', whereas, if the discourse is presented as a character's speech, paying attention to the clause boundary is not very significant, at least in the light of story-line events in the framing narrative.

As we argued in 4.3, the narrator's perceptibility as the event cogniser in non-tagged speech is more implicit than in tagged speech, but this does not mean that the narrator is totally imperceptible in non-tagged speech; it is legitimate to assume that the narrator as the event cogniser is always implicated even in non-tagged speech. But it is an immanent phenomenon, so

that it could be said that the reader is given considerable amount of freedom in assessing what event occurred in what speech unit.

With S/T presentation, the most relevant semantic and pragmatic item to be considered in identifying the eventhood will be the 'illocutionary act' (cf. Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969). It would be of vital importance to try to identify what the character *did* with a particular speech. In the case of tagged speech, the narrator tends to invite the reader to take a certain length of speech as a discrete, meaningful speech unit (or event unit), by attaching tags (or reporting clauses). The narrator's invitation of this kind is quite arbitrary. One example from 'A Little Cloud':

[6]-42 (a) - I hope you'll spend an evening with us, he said, before you go. My wife will be delighted to meet you. We can have a little music and -
(b) Thanks awfully, old chap, said Ignatius Gallaher, I'm sorry we didn't meet earlier. But I must leave to-morrow night. (lines 328-33).

Syntactically, [6]-42 (a) consists of three sentences, and (b), of two sentences, but the narrator induces the reader to take (a) and (b) as discrete speech events. It is worth noting that the tag employed in each discourse sounds highly generalised, so that it has very little communicative value as a conveyer of *what happened* . This is where the reader should come in as an event detector. One plausible event-interpretation will be that in [6]-42 (a) Little Chandler invited Gallaher to his home, and in (b) Gallaher declined it. But, taking context into account, one would interpret the eventhood of (b) in a different way and claim that Gallaher showed a patronising attitude toward his old friend. Or a more elastic view of story-line events would unite (a) and (b) into one speech event and claim that a sort of imbalance between demand and supply was revealed. With respect to S/T presentation in 'A

Little Cloud', a very macroscopic recognition of a story-line event is shown in PART 2 (i), for example. Little Chandler's serious clash of opinion with Gallaher concerning the prospect of Gallaher's marriage may well be considered to cover the following discourse:

[6]-43 - Who knows? he said, as they lifted their glasses... - Must get a bit stale, I should think, he said. (lines 382-424).

This is just another example which shows that one can take a very elastic view in deciding what chunk of discourse is *unifiable* as a meaningful story-line event.

It will soon be recognised that if 'event unification' is performed on the maximum level a whole narrative can be taken as representing a single story event. Rimmon-Kenan (1983: 15) suggests the possibility by saying: '...a vast number of events may be subsumed under a single event label (e.g. 'The Fall of the Roman Empire')'. With Joyce's 'A Little Cloud', which we have been discussing as our case-study material, a reasonable presentation of the story event on the maximum level would be: 'A would-be poet becomes disillusioned with life'

In the present chapter we have argued that story events are story-line events (cf. 6.3.5). The point of our argument is that the concept of story event(s) is intrinsically a relative one, depending upon discoursal environments in which a particular event expression appears in relation to other ones. Here a question that will arise is: How is it that the notion that story events are story-line events is compatible with the notion that a whole narrative can be interpreted as a telling of one single story event? We will be able to answer this question as follows. In principle, the concept 'story events' makes sense

when events are viewed in a particular *series* as a coherent entity. Therefore, the recognition of one single event is not the authentic recognition of story (story-line) events. But one important thing to note is that such event recognition presupposes decoding story events as a series on the microscopic level. Differently put, such maximally-macroscopic event recognition is characterised by the confirmability or retrievability of story-line events as *mini events* from which to construct the single story event. It is in this respect that the description of a single story event is to be distinguished from one-event descriptions such as 'John laughed' (provided that the event expression is not a unifying one as against unifiable ones). Consequently, we could claim that the description of a single story event as a form of maximal event unification is a variety of story (or story-line) event description.

6.5.5 Conclusion

In 6.5 we postulated the two important concepts closely associated with the recognition of narrative dynamics, i.e. aspectual adjustment and perspectival manipulation. The common characteristic shared by these two is that both are concerned with the distancing orientation in viewing story-line events, which means getting rid of the originally encoded perspectival values, which tend to designate temporal near-sightedness peculiar to narrative perspective.

Aspectual adjustment concerns the mental process of the reader trying to see eventhood in unbounded sentences/clauses when they can be looked upon in a historic span in a narrative discourse And perspectival manipulation is directly related to event unification by generalisation or abstraction of story-line events detectable on the discoursally microscopic (i.e. sentential/clausal) level. Perspectival manipulation means minimising the number of sequential borderlines between event expressions in narrative discourse. Perspectival

manipulation can be performed by the reader, as well as by the narrator. Perspectival manipulation makes it possible for the reader to take an elastic and macroscopic view of narrative dynamics without having to be tied to the textual circumstances in the original discourse, which may invite the reader to read story-line events *literally* and rather metalinguistically on the microscopic level.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

The main aim of the present thesis is to elucidate the mechanism of narrative dynamics from the perspective of the ordinary reader. The term 'narrative dynamics' is primarily concerned with 'story event' and 'narrative time', as mentioned in Introduction. What I tried to do as I wrote this thesis was to remind myself of how narrative dynamics can be recognised by the ordinary reader of narrative fiction who is not formally trained, and who does not necessarily intend to analyse literary works for the sake of analysis. This means that the overall tone of the discussion is critical of unduly formal views of narrative entities'. One of the most fundamental points of argument in the present thesis is that unduly formal views of narrative entities do not always accord with the intuitions of the ordinary reader. One good example is the story-discourse scheme postulated by Chatman (1978). Such a dualistic view of the structure of narrative, obviously influenced by the formal concepts of narrative posited by Russian formalists early in the twentieth century, can be counterintuitive simply because such a dual scheme automatically implies that discourse (narrative text) is something to be differentiated from story. Very few would deny that an ordinary reader, when coming across a narrative discourse, will think it is a story. But this does not suggest, as argued in Chapter 4, that the monistic view adamantly amalgamating story with discourse is what the ordinary reader adopts as an ideological stance in recognising the structure of narrative.

Assuming a commonsensical view of narrative dynamics means that one does not fall into the formal (grammatical) or ontological fallacy. When a formal analyst argues that in a temporal discourse 'John went out of the room. The room was quite messy' narrative time stops in the second clause because it is grammatically labelled as a stative, and if he conceives of the

stoppage of narrative time in the literal sense of the term, he can be said to be caught in a formal trap. Such a formal analyst may be compared to someone who claims that, when looking at a painting portraying a ball, time stops or "freezes" there; he fails to notice that what is stationary or motionless is not the world entity, i.e. the scene of people, dressed up for the party, dancing in a lively and cheerful way, but the *form* or medium which represents it. An ordinary viewer intuitively knows that time is *there* in the represented world, and might feel as if he were hearing the shuffling of the dancers' feet. As for the ontological fallacy, it would be possible to point out the danger of forcing out eventhood from static discoursal environments in narrative, which are not directly concerned with the description of plot progression, i.e. the realisation of /STORY LINE/. One would be falling into the ontological trap if one claims that the opening discourse of Joyce's 'A Painful Case': 'Mr James Duffy lived in Chapelizod because he wished to live as far as possible from the city of which he was a citizen...' describes an event, assuming that living somewhere entails an inceptive moment, i.e. a change from *not living* to *starting to live* . As argued in Chapter 6, such an ontological view of eventhood is not necessarily helpful in identifying story events (story-line events) which are not so much ontological as narrative phenomena.

The general point of argument in the preceding chapters was to stress the importance of *not* clinging to a rigid idea that a particular linguistic form has a particular structural meaning (e.g. the treatment of 'progressive states' by Caenepeel (1989)). But this does not suggest that in the representation/recognition of narrative dynamics the relation between form and meaning (eventhood, for example) is quite arbitrary. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 we argued that it ought to be of socio-linguistic interest to note that narrative form as a linguistic representation of a story world has some institutionalised aspects. That is to say, a story world (an event-oriented

world) is expected to be verbalised prototypically by using a particular linguistic form of event description called 'narrative clauses' (Labov, 1972).

Such a relationship between linguistic form and meaning that one normally expects to be realised in the representation of a story world may well be said to be a conventional aspect of narrative writing/reading, but what we attempted to stress in our discussion throughout the thesis was that story-event description /recognition is not solely concerned with sentence-based linguistic units. In a sense, as the story-event describer and cogniser both the author/narrator and the reader are bound up with the formal features of narrative discourse, and at the same time can be independent of them. The reader's independence of the original encoding of story events is discussed in Chapter 6 under the rubric of 'event unification'. The discussion in that chapter is intended to shed light on the mechanism in which the original encoding as a formal realisation of a story world becomes "transparent" to the reader, who, as an independent story-event cogniser, can attempt to materialise /STORY LINE/ in his own way from a more or less macroscopic point of view. As pointed out in Chapter 6, the reader's active role as the story-event detector has a lot to do with his freedom to shake off the perspectival values attached to the original encoding by the narrator. We attempt to clarify that it is by the reader's perspectival adjustment that what has traditionally been labelled as 'non-event discourse' by formal analysts can be taken as a description representing a story event.

<Implications of this thesis - a future prospect of research>

Emphasising the importance of taking an elastic view of the relationship between formal features of narrative and story-event recognition was one of the most important points of argument in this thesis. We argued against the linguistically microscopic view of eventhood in narrative discourse, which

tends to identify story events mainly on the basis of sentence-grammar by looking upon each clause or sentence as a syntactically discrete unit, and by assuming that there is a correlation between the formal discreteness and the event-state distinction. Specifically speaking, we discussed some cases in which discoursal environments can make the reader recognise story dynamics (or story eventhood) in clauses which have traditionally been classified as statives (or temporally unbounded clauses). An important implication of the discussion was that perfectivity or temporal boundedness represented by a clause or a sentence is not the necessary condition for a reader to recognise or detect narrative dynamics in it. The importance of discoursal environments in recognising narrative dynamics was also stressed by showing some cases in which perfective clauses which would be taken as representing eventhood in a "decontextualised" situation have virtually nothing to do with story-event sequencing. And in Chapter 6 we discussed another aspect of the elastic appreciation of narrative dynamics by shedding light on the active role of the reader as a story-event detector on the macroscopic level.

What I have done in the present thesis seems to have some suggestions concerning the direction in which I might go in the future when I attempt further research into narrative dynamics as a continuation of this thesis. One possible direction is to look into event sequencing in narrative on a highly microscopic level of words and phrases. This thesis dealt with clauses or sentences as the most microscopic linguistic items describing story events. As far as narration is concerned, clausal representation of events is characterised by its assertive flavour emanating from its propositional quality; the reader would be able to perceive eventhood in an explicit way, since a clause in narrative circumstances can be a prototypical linguistic form conveying actions and happenings in the story world. I assume, from a theoretical point of view, that it might be possible to detect eventhood

(change of state) on a highly implicit level by attending to the way in which words and phrases are employed. There is a likelihood that a context-oriented view of individual words and phrases may help the reader to scoop up discoursally hidden story events. Trying to detect story events by looking at grammatically small units such as words and phrases may sound extremely microscopic, but it presupposes a significantly macroscopic view of narrative discourse in that the recognition of eventhood built in individual words requires the reader to re-evaluate them in the whole context of the discourse. From a stylistic point of view, it might be possible to research into the literary effect of story-event description on the structurally implicit level, as compared with that on the structurally explicit level.

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Appendix

The text: James Joyce's 'A Little Cloud' in *Dubliners* (London: Grafton, 1977, pp. 76-94)

Note: 'A Little Cloud' can be divided into three parts in terms of content: in this thesis they are called 'PART 1' (lines 1-144), 'PART 2' (lines 145-424), and 'PART 3' (lines 425-544) respectively, for convenience of analysis. Every fifth line of the text is numbered for convenience of subsequent reference.

A Little Cloud

EIGHT years before he had seen his friend off at the North Wall and wished him godspeed. Gallaher had got on. You could tell that at once by his travelled air, his well-cut tweed suit, and fearless accent. Few fellows had talents like his and fewer still could remain unspoiled by such success. Gallaher's heart was in the right place and he had deserved to win. It was something to have a friend like that.

Little Chandler's thoughts ever since lunch-time had been of his meeting with Gallaher, of Gallaher's invitation and of the great city London where Gallaher lived. He was called Little Chandler because, though he was but slightly under the average stature, he gave one the idea of being a little man. His hands were white and small, his frame was fragile, his voice was quiet and his manners were refined. He took the greatest care of his fair silken hair and moustache and used perfume discreetly on his handkerchief. The half-moons of his nails were perfect and when he smiled you caught a glimpse of a row of childish white teeth.

As he sat at his desk in the King's Inns he thought what changes those eight years had brought. The friend whom he had known under a shabby and necessitous guise had become a brilliant figure on the London Press. He turned often from his tiresome writing to gaze out of the office window. The glow of a late autumn sunset covered the grass plots and walks. It cast a shower of kindly golden dust on the untidy nurses and decrepit old men who drowsed on the benches; it flickered upon all the moving figures—on the children who ran screaming along the gravel paths and on everyone who passed through the gardens. He watched the scene and thought of life; and (as always happened when he thought of life) he became sad. A gentle melancholy took possession of him. He felt how useless it was to struggle against fortune, this being the burden of wisdom which the ages had bequeathed to him.

He remembered the books of poetry upon his shelves at home. He had bought them in his bachelor days and many an evening, as he sat in the little room off the hall, he had been tempted to take one down from the bookshelf and read out something to his wife. But shyness had always held him back; and so the books had remained on their shelves. At times he repeated lines to himself and this consoled him.

When his hour had struck he stood up and took leave of his desk and of his fellow-clerks punctiliously. He emerged from under the feudal arch of the King's Inns, a neat modest figure, and walked swiftly down Henrietta Street. The golden sunset was waning and the air had grown sharp. A horde of grimy children populated the street. They stood or ran in the roadway or crawled up the steps before the gaping doors or squatted like mice upon the thresholds. Little Chandler gave them no thought. He picked his way deftly through all that minute vermin-like life and under the shadow of the gaunt spectral mansions in which the old nobility of Dublin had roistered. No memory of the past touched him, for his mind was full of a present joy.

He had never been in Corless's but he knew the value of the name. He knew that people went there after the theatre to eat oysters and drink liqueurs; and he had heard that the waiters there spoke French and German. Walking swiftly by at night he had seen cabs drawn up before the door and richly dressed ladies, escorted by cavaliers, alight and enter quickly. They wore noisy dresses and many wraps. Their faces were powdered and they caught up their dresses, when they touched earth, like alarmed Atalantas. He had always passed without turning his head to look. It was his habit to walk swiftly in the street even by day and whenever he found himself in the city late at night he hurried on his way apprehensively and excitedly. Sometimes, however, he courted the causes of his fear. He chose the darkest and narrowest streets and, as he walked boldly forward, the silence that was spread about his footsteps troubled him, the wandering silent figures troubled him; and at times a sound of low fugitive laughter made him tremble like a leaf.

He turned to the right towards Capel Street. Ignatius Gallaher on the London Press! Who would have thought it possible eight years before? Still, now that he reviewed the past, Little Chandler could remember many signs of future greatness in his friend. People used to say that Ignatius Gallaher was wild. Of course, he did mix with a rakish set of fellows at that time, drank freely and borrowed money on all sides. In the end he had got mixed up in some shady affair, some money transaction: at least, that was one version of his flight. But nobody denied him talent. There was always a certain ... something in Ignatius Gallaher that impressed you in spite of yourself. Even when he was out at elbows and at his wits' end for money he kept up a bold face. Little Chandler remembered (and the remembrance brought a slight flush of pride to his cheek) one of Ignatius Gallaher's sayings when he was in a tight corner:

—Half time, now, boys, he used to say light-heartedly. Where's my considering cap?

That was Ignatius Gallaher all out; and, damn it, you couldn't but admire him for it.

Little Chandler quickened his pace. For the first time in his life he felt himself superior to the people he passed. For the first time his soul revolted against the dull inelegance of Capel Street. There was no doubt about it: if you wanted to succeed you had to go away. You could do nothing in Dublin. As he crossed Grattan Bridge he looked down the river towards the lower quays and pitied the poor stunted houses. They seemed to him a band of tramps, huddled together along the river-banks, their old coats covered with dust and soot, stupefied by the panorama of sunset and waiting for the first chill of night to bid them arise, shake themselves and begone. He wondered whether he could write a poem to express his idea. Perhaps Gallaher might be able to get it into some London paper for him. Could he write something original? He was not sure what idea he wished to express but the thought that a poetic moment had touched him took life within him like an infant hope. He stepped onward bravely.

Every step brought him nearer to London, farther from his own sober inartistic life. A light began to tremble on the horizon of his mind. He was not so old—thirty-two. His temperament might be said to be just at the point of maturity. There were so many different moods and impressions that he wished to express in verse. He felt them within him. He tried to weigh his soul to see if it was a poet's soul. Melancholy was the dominant note of his temperament, he thought, but it was a melancholy tempered by recurrences of faith and resignation and simple joy. If he could give expression to it in a book of poems perhaps men would listen. He would never be popular: he saw that. He could not sway the crowd but he might appeal to a little circle of kindred minds. The English critics, perhaps, would recognize him as one of the Celtic school by reason of the melancholy tone of his poems; besides that, he would put in allusions. He began to invent sentences and phrases from the notices which his book would get. *Mr Chandler has the gift of easy and graceful verse. . . . A wistful sadness pervades these poems. . . . The Celtic note.* It was a pity his name was not more Irish-looking. Perhaps it would be better to insert

his mother's name before the surname: Thomas Malone Chandler, or better still: T. Malone Chandler. He would speak to Gallaher about it.

He pursued his revery so ardently that he passed his street and had to turn back. As he came near Corless's his former agitation began to overmaster him and he halted before the door in indecision. Finally he opened the door and entered.

The light and noise of the bar held him at the doorway for a few moments. He looked about him, but his sight was confused by the shining of many red and green wine-glasses. The bar seemed to him to be full of people and he felt that the people were observing him curiously. He glanced quickly to right and left (frowning slightly to make his errand appear serious), but when his sight cleared a little he saw that nobody had turned to look at him: and there, sure enough, was Ignatius Gallaher leaning with his back against the counter and his feet planted far apart.

—Hallo, Tommy, old hero, here you are! What is it to be? What will you have? I'm taking whisky: better stuff than we get across the water. Soda? Lithia? No mineral? I'm the same. Spoils the flavour. . . . Here, *garçon*, bring us two halves of malt whisky, like a good fellow. . . . Well, and how have you been pulling along since I saw you last? Dear God, how old we're getting! Do you see any signs of aging in me—eh, what? A little grey and thin on the top—what?

Ignatius Gallaher took off his hat and displayed a large closely cropped head. His face was heavy, pale and clean-shaven. His eyes, which were of bluish slate-colour, relieved his unhealthy pallor and shone out plainly above the vivid orange tie he wore. Between these rival features the lips appeared very long and shapeless and colourless. He bent his head and felt with two sympathetic fingers the thin hair at the crown. Little Chandler shook his head as a denial. Ignatius Gallaher put on his hat again.

—It pulls you down, he said, Press life. Always hurry and scurry, looking for copy and sometimes not finding it: and then, always to have something new in your stuff.

Damn proofs and printers, I say, for a few days. I'm deuced glad, I can tell you, to get back to the old country. Does a fellow good, a bit of a holiday. I feel a ton better since I landed again in dear dirty Dublin. . . . Here you are, Tommy. Water? Say when.

Little Chandler allowed his whisky to be very much diluted.

—You don't know what's good for you, my boy, said Ignatius Gallaher. I drink mine neat.

—I drink very little as a rule, said Little Chandler modestly. An odd half-one or so when I meet any of the old crowd: that's all.

—Ah, well, said Ignatius Gallaher, cheerfully, here's to us and to old times and old acquaintance.

They clinked glasses and drank the toast.

—I met some of the old gang to-day, said Ignatius Gallaher. O'Hara seems to be in a bad way. What's he doing?

—Nothing, said Little Chandler. He's gone to the dogs.

—But Hogan has a good sit, hasn't he?

—Yes; he's in the Land Commission.

—I met him one night in London and he seemed to be very flush. . . . Poor O'Hara! Boose, I suppose?

—Other things, too, said Little Chandler shortly.

Ignatius Gallaher laughed.

—Tommy, he said, I see you haven't changed an atom. You're the very same serious person that used to lecture me on Sunday mornings when I had a sore head and a fur on my tongue. You'd want to knock about a bit in the world. Have you never been anywhere, even for a trip?

—I've been to the Isle of Man, said Little Chandler.

Ignatius Gallaher laughed.

—The Isle of Man! he said. Go to London or Paris: Paris, for choice. That'd do you good.

—Have you seen Paris?

—I should think I have! I've knocked about there a little.

—And is it really so beautiful as they say? asked Little Chandler.

He sipped a little of his drink while Ignatius Gallaher finished his boldly.

—Beautiful? said Ignatius Gallaher, pausing on the word and on the flavour of his drink. It's not so beautiful, you know. Of course, it is beautiful.... But it's the life of Paris; that's the thing. Ah, there's no city like Paris for gaiety, movement, excitement....

Little Chandler finished his whisky and, after some trouble, succeeded in catching the barman's eye. He ordered the same again.

—I've been to the Moulin Rouge, Ignatius Gallaher continued when the barman had removed their glasses, and I've been to all the Bohemian cafés. Hot stuff! Not for a pious chap like you, Tommy.

Little Chandler said nothing until the barman returned with the two glasses: then he touched his friend's glass lightly and reciprocated the former toast. He was beginning to feel somewhat disillusioned. Gallaher's accent and way of expressing himself did not please him. There was something vulgar in his friend which he had not observed before. But perhaps it was only the result of living in London amid the bustle and competition of the Press. The old personal charm was still there under this new gaudy manner. And, after all, Gallaher had lived, he had seen the world. Little Chandler looked at his friend enviously.

—Everything in Paris is gay, said Ignatius Gallaher. They believe in enjoying life—and don't you think they're right? If you want to enjoy yourself properly you must go to Paris. And, mind you, they've a great feeling for the Irish there. When they heard I was from Ireland they were ready to eat me, man.

Little Chandler took four or five sips from his glass.

—Tell me, he said, is it true that Paris is so ... immoral as they say?

Ignatius Gallaher made a catholic gesture with his right arm.

—Every place is immoral, he said. Of course you do find

spicy bits in Paris. Go to one of the students' balls, for instance. That's lively, if you like, when the *cocottes* begin to let themselves loose. You know what they are, I suppose?

—I've heard of them, said Little Chandler.

Ignatius Gallaher drank off his whisky and shook his head.

—Ah, he said, you may say what you like. There's no woman like the Parisienne—for style, for go.

—Then it is an immoral city, said Little Chandler, with timid insistence—I mean, compared with London or Dublin?

—London! said Ignatius Gallaher. It's six of one and half-a-dozen of the other. You ask Hogan, my boy. I showed him a bit about London when he was over there. He'd open your eye. . . . I say, Tommy, don't make punch of that whisky: liquor up.

—No, really. . . .

—O, come on, another one won't do you any harm. What is it? The same again, I suppose?

—Well . . . all right.

—*François*, the same again. . . . Will you smoke, Tommy?

Ignatius Gallaher produced his cigar-case. The two friends lit their cigars and puffed at them in silence until their drinks were served.

—I'll tell you my opinion, said Ignatius Gallaher, emerging after some time from the clouds of smoke in which he had taken refuge, it's a rum world. Talk of immorality! I've heard of cases—what am I saying?—I've known them: cases of . . . immorality. . . .

Ignatius Gallaher puffed thoughtfully at his cigar and then, in a calm historian's tone, he proceeded to sketch for his friend some pictures of the corruption which was rife abroad. He summarized the vices of many capitals and seemed inclined to award the palm to Berlin. Some things he could not vouch for (his friends had told him), but of others he had had personal experience. He spared neither

rank nor caste. He revealed many of the secrets of religious houses on the Continent and described some of the practices which were fashionable in high society and ended by telling, with details, a story about an English duchess—a story which he knew to be true. Little Chandler was astonished.

—Ah, well, said Ignatius Gallaher, here we are in old jog-along Dublin where nothing is known of such things.

—How dull you must find it, said Little Chandler, after all the other places you've seen!

—Well, said Ignatius Gallaher, it's a relaxation to come over here, you know. And, after all, it's the old country, as they say, isn't it? You can't help having a certain feeling for it. That's human nature.... But tell me something about yourself. Hogan told me you had ... tasted the joys of connubial bliss. Two years ago, wasn't it?

Little Chandler blushed and smiled.

—Yes, he said. I was married last May twelve months.

—I hope it's not too late in the day to offer my best wishes, said Ignatius Gallaher. I didn't know your address or I'd have done so at the time.

He extended his hand, which Little Chandler took.

—Well, Tommy, he said, I wish you and yours every joy in life, old chap, and tons of money, and may you never die till I shoot you. And that's the wish of a sincere friend, an old friend. You know that?

—I know that, said Little Chandler.

—Any youngsters? said Ignatius Gallaher.

Little Chandler blushed again.

—We have one child, he said.

—Son or daughter?

—A little boy.

Ignatius Gallaher slapped his friend sonorously on the back.

—Bravo, he said, I wouldn't doubt you, Tommy.

Little Chandler smiled, looked confusedly at his glass and bit his lower lip with three childishly white front teeth.

—I hope you'll spend an evening with us, he said, before you go back. My wife will be delighted to meet you. We can have a little music and—

—Thanks awfully, old chap, said Ignatius Gallaher, I'm sorry we didn't meet earlier. But I must leave to-morrow night.

—To-night, perhaps . . . ?

—I'm awfully sorry, old man. You see I'm over here with another fellow, clever young chap he is too, and we arranged to go to a little card-party. Only for that . . .

—O, in that case. . . .

—But who knows? said Ignatius Gallaher considerately. Next year I may take a little skip over here now that I've broken the ice. It's only a pleasure deferred.

—Very well, said Little Chandler, the next time you come we must have an evening together. That's agreed now, isn't it?

—Yes, that's agreed, said Ignatius Gallaher. Next year if I come, *parole d'honneur.*

—And to clinch the bargain, said Little Chandler, we'll just have one more now.

Ignatius Gallaher took out a large gold watch and looked at it.

—Is it to be the last? he said. Because you know, I have an a.p.

—O, yes, positively, said Little Chandler.

—Very well, then, said Ignatius Gallaher, let us have another one as a *deoc an doruis*—that's good vernacular for a small whisky, I believe.

Little Chandler ordered the drinks. The blush which had risen to his face a few moments before was establishing itself. A trifle made him blush at any time: and now he felt warm and excited. Three small whiskies had gone to his head and Gallaher's strong cigar had confused his mind, for he was a delicate and abstinent person. The adventure of meeting Gallaher after eight years, of finding himself with Gallaher in Corless's surrounded by lights and noise,

of listening to Gallaher's stories and of sharing for a brief space Gallaher's vagrant and triumphant life, upset the equipoise of his sensitive nature. He felt acutely the contrast between his own life and his friend's, and it seemed to him unjust. Gallaher was his inferior in birth and education. He was sure that he could do something better than his friend had ever done, or could ever do, something higher than mere tawdry journalism if he only got the chance. What was it that stood in his way? His unfortunate timidity! He wished to vindicate himself in some way, to assert his manhood. He saw behind Gallaher's refusal of his invitation. Gallaher was only patronizing him by his friendliness just as he was patronizing Ireland by his visit.

The barman brought their drinks. Little Chandler pushed one glass towards his friend and took up the other boldly.

—Who knows? he said, as they lifted their glasses. When you come next year I may have the pleasure of wishing long life and happiness to Mr and Mrs Ignatius Gallaher.

Ignatius Gallaher in the act of drinking closed one eye expressively over the rim of his glass. When he had drunk he smacked his lips decisively, set down his glass and said:

—No blooming fear of that, my boy. I'm going to have my fling first and see a bit of life and the world before I put my head in the sack—if I ever do.

—Some day you will, said Little Chandler calmly.

Ignatius Gallaher turned his orange tie and slate-blue eyes full upon his friend.

—You think so? he said.

—You'll put your head in the sack, repeated Little Chandler stoutly, like everyone else if you can find the girl.

He had slightly emphasised his tone and he was aware that he had betrayed himself; but, though the colour had heightened in his cheek, he did not flinch from his friend's gaze. Ignatius Gallaher watched him for a few moments and then said:

—If ever it occurs, you may bet your bottom dollar there'll be no mooning and spooning about it. I mean to marry money. She'll have a good fat account at the bank or she won't do for me.

Little Chandler shook his head.

—Why, man alive, said Ignatius Gallaher, vehemently, do you know what it is? I've only to say the word and to-morrow I can have the woman and the cash. You don't believe it? Well, I know it. There are hundreds—what am I saying?—thousands of rich Germans and Jews, rotten with money, that'd only be too glad.... You wait a while, my boy. See if I don't play my cards properly. When I go about a thing I mean business, I tell you. You just wait.

He tossed his glass to his mouth, finished his drink and laughed loudly. Then he looked thoughtfully before him and said in a calmer tone:

—But I'm in no hurry. They can wait. I don't fancy tying myself up to one woman, you know.

He imitated with his mouth the act of tasting and made a wry face.

—Must get a bit stale, I should think, he said.

. . . . . .

Little Chandler sat in the room off the hall, holding a child in his arms. To save money they kept no servant but Annie's young sister Monica came for an hour or so in the morning and an hour or so in the evening to help. But Monica had gone home long ago. It was a quarter to nine. Little Chandler had come home late for tea and, moreover, he had forgotten to bring Annie home the parcel of coffee from Bewley's. Of course she was in a bad humour and gave him short answers. She said she would do without any tea but when it came near the time at which the shop at the corner closed she decided to go out herself for a quarter of a pound of tea and two pounds of sugar. She put the sleeping child deftly in his arms and said:

—Here. Don't waken him.

A little lamp with a white china shade stood upon the

table and its light fell over a photograph which was enclosed in a frame of crumpled horn. It was Annie's photograph. Little Chandler looked at it, pausing at the thin tight lips. She wore the pale blue summer blouse which he had brought her home as a present one Saturday. It had cost him ten and elevenpence; but what an agony of nervousness it had cost him! How he had suffered that day, waiting at the shop door until the shop was empty, standing at the counter and trying to appear at his ease while the girl piled ladies' blouses before him, paying at the desk and forgetting to take up the odd penny of his change, being called back by the cashier, and, finally, striving to hide his blushes as he left the shop by examining the parcel to see if it was securely tied. When he brought the blouse home Annie kissed him and said it was very pretty and stylish; but when she heard the price she threw the blouse on the table and said it was a regular swindle to charge ten and elevenpence for that. At first she wanted to take it back but when she tried it on she was delighted with it, especially with the make of the sleeves, and kissed him and said he was very good to think of her.

Hm! . . .

He looked coldly into the eyes of the photograph and they answered coldly. Certainly they were pretty and the face itself was pretty. But he found something mean in it. Why was it so unconscious and lady-like? The composure of the eyes irritated him. They repelled him and defied him: there was no passion in them, no rapture. He thought of what Gallaher had said about rich Jewesses. Those dark Oriental eyes, he thought, how full they are of passion, of voluptuous longing! . . . Why had he married the eyes in the photograph?

He caught himself up at the question and glanced nervously round the room. He found something mean in the pretty furniture which he had bought for his house on the hire system. Annie had chosen it herself and it reminded him of her. It too was prim and pretty. A dull resentment against his life awoke within him. Could he not escape

from his little house? Was it too late for him to try to live bravely like Gallaher? Could he go to London? There was the furniture still to be paid for. If he could only write a book and get it published, that might open the way for him.

A volume of Byron's poems lay before him on the table. He opened it cautiously with his left hand lest he should waken the child and began to read the first poem in the book:

Hushed are the winds and still the evening gloom,
Not e'en a Zephyr wanders through the grove,
Whilst I return to view my Margaret's tomb
And scatter flowers on the dust I love.

He paused. He felt the rhythm of the verse about him in the room. How melancholy it was! Could he, too, write like that, express the melancholy of his soul in verse? There were so many things he wanted to describe: his sensation of a few hours before on Grattan Bridge, for example. If he could get back again into that mood. . . .

The child awoke and began to cry. He turned from the page and tried to hush it: but it would not be hushed. He began to rock it to and fro in his arms but its wailing cry grew keener. He rocked it faster while his eyes began to read the second stanza:

Within this narrow cell reclines her clay,
That clay where once . . .

It was useless. He couldn't read. He couldn't do anything. The wailing of the child pierced the drum of his ear.

It was useless, useless! He was a prisoner for life. His arms trembled with anger and suddenly bending to the child's face he shouted:

—Stop!

The child stopped for an instant, had a spasm of fright and began to scream. He jumped up from his chair and walked hastily up and down the room with the child in his arms. It began to sob piteously, losing its breath for four or five seconds, and then bursting out anew. The thin walls of the room echoed the sound. He tried to soothe it but it

sobbed more convulsively. He looked at the contracted and quivering face of the child and began to be alarmed. He counted seven sobs without a break between them and caught the child to his breast in fright. If it died! . . .

The door was burst open and a young woman ran in, panting.

—What is it? What is it? she cried.

The child, hearing its mother's voice, broke out into a paroxysm of sobbing.

—It's nothing, Annie . . . it's nothing. . . . He began to cry . . .

She flung her parcels on the floor and snatched the child from him.

—What have you done to him? she cried, glaring into his face.

Little Chandler sustained for one moment the gaze of her eyes and his heart closed together as he met the hatred in them. He began to stammer:

—It's nothing. . . . He . . . he began to cry. . . . I couldn't . . . I didn't do anything. . . . What?

Giving no heed to him she began to walk up and down the room, clasping the child tightly in her arms and murmuring:

—My little man! My little mannie! Was 'ou frightened, love? . . . There now, love! There now! . . . Lambabaun! Mamma's little lamb of the world! . . . There now!

Little Chandler felt his cheeks suffused with shame and he stood back out of the lamplight. He listened while the paroxysm of the child's sobbing grew less and less; and tears of remorse started to his eyes.